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Over the last decade, US passenger airline industry faced an extremely adverse 
period when it comes to profit generation, culminating in significant losses and bankruptcies 
of several carriers. Within this market, airlines operate under a very demanding and stressful 
environment. Three main factors are reflective of this specific setting, such as: the existence 
of unpredictable fuel costs (being the major burden to these firms), the increasing 
competition forces mainly coming from low-cost carriers and a very economic-sensible air 
travel demand faced by carriers. Taking into account those industry-specific features, airlines 
found M&A a strategic tool to increase their profitability by sharing and pooling resources. 
Ultimately, most recent mega-mergers within this sector are performed aiming at the 
reduction of capacity in order to strengthen efficiency levels, so the companies can properly 
weather economic adverse conditions. 
In this paper, a proposed merger of equals between Delta Airlines and US Airways is 
analyzed in order to attest a further step on US airline industry consolidation. Simultaneously, 
the thesis is expected to fill the blanks about how much value would be yielded by combining 
these carriers not only from a macro perspective, but also assessing how much value would 
be captured by each party. 
The paper found that the deal would be supported by the generation of cost synergies 
due to the fact that both companies have a considerable portion of overlapped business 
operations, specially reflected on identical routes. Indeed, the final results of the report show 
that after the combination of both firms – including the net effect of synergies -, the value 
would be 22.6% higher than the enterprise value of the simple combination of each firm 
based on their standalone valuations. Despite of such positive outcome, this paper took into 
account the role of antitrust authorities on the process, which can influence the final result of 
the deal, due to the fact that, after the proposed deal, the combined firm would get a 
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The present paper approaches the case of a proposed merger between two 
American airlines, namely Delta Airlines and US Airways. Both carriers turn out to have 
considerable portions of the American market and are considered to be amongst the US top 
air carriers in terms of revenues. The aim of the thesis is to assess the sources of potential 
value creation and how such deal should be structured. Logically, those two final points are 
the result of a thorough research on finance theoretical concepts applied to the reality of US 
airline industry, which was intensively studied. 
Taking into account that the assessment of hypothetical synergies is associated with 
some levels of subjectivity and uncertainty, this paper is strongly supported by a theoretical 
framework exposed in literature review. This section provides widely accepted principles by 
academics and practitioners with respect to company valuation and all associated concepts 
one should be prudent when handling them. Moreover, literature review will also cover 
important facts within M&A topic, portraying the in-between steps companies usually follow 
when pursuing the conclusion of such deals as well as the most recent trends within this 
field. 
The next section, Industry and Company Analysis, will provide a valuable overview of 
the US airline industry, based on the depiction of how this market is organized; which market 
players one should take into account and how this industry has performed over the most 
recent years. Simultaneously, both companies will be presented through the representation 
of their revenue, cost, operational and financial past performance, which will provide a 
reliable and clear picture of their situation, this being crucial to perform the forecasting of 
several variables. 
Company Valuation section shows a detailed process of forecasting the most 
important drivers that will influence decisive inputs for both companies’ standalone valuation. 
For each company, three valuation methods were used (discounted cash flow based on 
WACC method, adjusted present value model and relative valuation), in order to add 
robustness to the findings. 
 The last section of the paper analyses the potential value creation when combining 
Delta and US Airways, through the assessment of the sources of synergies as well as their 
respective valuation. Lastly, the acquisition itself is going to be analyzed presenting its most 
important details. Simultaneously, the paper will propose the fair terms that should be implied 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Mergers and acquisition has been a topic of great interest: it has been deeply studied 
by academics and also widely used by practitioners and managers as a strategic tool. Indeed, 
until 2007 M&A activity was soaring by reaching in that year more than 4.000 deals involving 
roughly $4.5 trillion worldwide.   
Such popularity among world business is the ultimate reflection of a belief from 
managers that the combination of two entities generates an extra value – commonly referred 
to as synergies – that would not be attained if those companies operated on an individual 
basis (Damodaran, 2005). 
Yet, M&A outcome with regard to synergies generation is inconclusive and, 
consequently, has created two schools of thought across academics. While some average 
statistics show that most acquisitions do not create value for acquiring shareholders and are 
often based on whims and “attraction to control and power” (Eccles et al. 1999), Bruner 
(2005) refuses the average outcome of those statistics arguing that each merger is case-
specific and its success may be linked to particular features of the industry, economy, market 
structure and companies involved. Throughout academics, the following analysis found no 
precise evidence of the certainty of success or failure of M&A in the majority of industries. 
The following section of this analysis will provide insight into the most common 
approaches regarding company valuation - that will serve as the theoretical base for this 
analysis’ conclusions – as well as a thorough review of some fundamentals aspects of M&A 
topic based on past academic research.!
2.1 Valuation Approaches 
 
 Valuation is surely one of the most important and widely used tools in the world of 
finance. Its relevance for financial specialists and academics has always been central, 
though, nowadays it has also been increasingly important for general managers as they 
become more assertive in resource-allocation decisions (Luehrman, 1997a). 
 For the sake of consistency, the literature review will only cover the valuation models 
that are either relevant for the application of the thesis topic or those which are widely 
accepted by academics and practitioners.  
 By pointing out these requirements, two valuation models arise: The DCF technique – 
entailing different perspectives of how a cash flow should be discounted – and the Multiples 
technique – which presents various ratios. The major difference between these 
methodologies lies, as Damodaran (2006a) simply clarifies, on a philosophical disparity: 
while DCF methodologies focus on the intrinsic value of an asset driven by the value created 
along the future and discounted to the present at a certain rate entailing a given amount of 
risk, the multiples method finds an asset value by assessing what the market has offered for 
an asset with similar characteristics. 
 Furthermore, academics have also researched about what could be the most 
legitimate and reliable method to be used. DCF models were considered as the most reliable 
valuation methodology (Kaplan & Ruback, 1996), and have been regarded as the most 
widely practice for valuing assets, projects, divisions and companies (Koller et al.,2010). 
 However, the level of reliability of a valuation methodology is intrinsically linked to the 
level of accuracy of the assumptions and forecasts. Thus, multiples analysis can be a strong 
provider of reliability to forecasts and DCF valuations by sourcing comparability of those in 
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order to assess if one’s company valuation is higher or lower than what the market has been 
offering (Koller et al., 2010). 
 
2.1.1 The Components of Discounted Cash Flow Models 
 
 DCF methodology is based on the cumulative sum of all the forecasted expected 
cash flows the firm will generate which will be discounted at the opportunity cost (the return 
the company would earn in a similar risk level project composed by the value of time as well 
as a the risk premium),(Luehrman, 1997a). 
 Hereafter, a thorough analysis will be made to each one of the elements that 
compose any DCF method: starting with the components of Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF), 
the components of the cost of capital and, finally, some insight about the clash between 
some of the far and wide used models: DCF using weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
and the Adjusted Present Value (APV). 
 
 





Free Cash Flow to Firm 
 
 In order to value the firm as a whole - including equity – one should use the Free 
Cash Flow to Firm, which entails the residual cash flows after meeting operational expenses 
and taxes, but before debt payments (Damodaran, 2006a): 
 
!"!! = !"#$%!!"#!!"#$%&'()!!"#$%& − !"#$% − !"#$"%&'(&)* − ∆!" 
 
 This cash flow is widely used in DCF based on WACC models as well as on the APV 
model, as it will be demonstrated later.  
 Throughout the following analysis, the term WACC approach refers to the model, 
which resorts to FCFF as cash flows used, being discounted at the weighted average cost of 
capital. Despite some unanimity among practitioners and academics that considered WACC 
approach as the primary model to be used in valuation over the last quarter of 21st century, 
new models have come to challenge its dominance (Luehrman, 1997a), such as the APV as 
later it will be covered. 
 




!"!!! . (1 + !)
!"## − !
(1 +!"##)!  
Growth 
 
 Growth is an extremely crucial input for DCF valuation methodology, which directly 
influences the value of a firm driven by the expected earnings growth rate, but also serves as 
an indirect factor for relative valuation (Damodaran, 2008a). The same author defines growth 
(!) as the sum of two different portions: the first related to the growth motivated by new 
investments, and the second regarding the growth driven by efficiency. 
 









 The first term reflects the multiplication of the marginal return of a new investment by 
the plowback ratio (i.e. proportion of earnings retained in the company). The second term 
exposes the effects efficiency gains in existing assets. 
 Damodaran (2008) and Koller et. al (2010) concluded that there is no persistency of 
patterns in terms of how companies grow: a company which records a high growth rate 
during a given period of time is as likely to continue to produce those rates as a company 
recording a low growth rate during the same period.  
 Moreover, growth rates vary across industries due to disparities in one company’s life 




 When valuing a company, the terminal value assumes a very important part of it, 
since it represents a big chunk of the final valuation (Damodaran, 2006b). The terminal value 
is estimated by assuming that earnings grow at a constant rate through the long-term 
(Damodaran, 2006b), meaning that the last period’s cash flow will be generated indefinitely 
as a growing perpetuity (Kester, 1997). Formally, one should compute terminal value and its 
present value as it follows: 
 





 However, this only holds if one assumes that the company being valued is a going 
concern, in other words, if it will last long enough to reap the terminal value portion of the 
total firm’s value. When companies report negative earnings, have large outstanding debts 
and fail to have spare cash to cover their operating needs, one should acknowledge that they 
are facing financial distress. 
 Therefore, when companies are unlikely to survive into the future, it is wrong to 
incorporate the terminal value (Damodaran, 2006b). Financial distress will affect one’s 
company valuation process, as it will be covered later. 
 Finally, seeing that the deal approached refers to two companies in a capital-
intensive industry – which is the airline sector – it is important to highlight the fact that when 
assessing this variable, capital expenditures should be equal or higher than depreciation 
(Kaplan & Ruback, 1996). It is clear to see that an air company requires a large amount of 
capital investments over its lifetime (e.g. investment in aircraft equipment). 
Estimating the Cost of Capital 
 
 The majority of companies and projects are financed through a mix of funds coming 
from different sources, having different costs (i.e. equity and debt). The following paragraphs 
will describe how the cost of different sources should be estimated, also pinpointing the main 
insights about the elements that compose one and the other. 
  
 Considering the fact that companies have different capital sources, the company’s 
cost of capital should be derived from the concept of WACC:  




!"## = !! .
!
! + ! + !! .
!
! + ! . 1 − !! !!! 
 
 The aforementioned formula regards the after-tax WACC, weighting the cost of both 
equity and debt by their relative relevance on the company’s capital structure and, also, 
incorporating the fact that interests are tax deductible (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). 
 The after-tax WACC equation provides the cost of capital at which cash flows are 
discounted, particularly FCFFs, which will be used in our analysis. 
Cost of Debt 
 
 The cost of debt can be measured by applying a credit default spread over the risk 
free rate - also known as default risk premium – which will be computed according to the risk 
profile of the company. Thus, the default spread is regarded as the price charged by 
debtholders for perceived risk in a loan (Damodaran, 2010a). 
 
!"#$!!"!!"#$ = !"#$%!&&!!"#$ + !"#$%&'!!"#$%& 
 
 According to Damodaran (2010a), one could derive the cost of debt from three 
alternatives. The first states that, if the company has bonds outstanding, cost of debt should 
be equal to the interest rate on traded bonds because securities’ market prices reflect what 
investors think it is a fair value for them. 
 Secondly, in order to assess the default spread, a company can also rely on rating 
agencies which will rate the company’s debt according to the size of the debt relative to the 
value of the firm, the volatility of the firm’s assets value and the length of time the debt has to 
run. 
 Finally, seeing that many companies do not have access to public debt markets nor 
they have rated debt, the most general approach is to use the historical borrowing cost as 
the cost of debt. Furthermore, in cases in which debt has some complexity involved and has 
different sources, the cost of debt is equal to the book interest rate as follows:  
 
 
!""#!!"#$%$&#!!"#$ = ! !"#$%$&#!!"#!$%!%!""#!!"#$%!!"! "#$ 
 
 Another way to compute the cost of debt is through the Capital Asset Pricing model 
(CAPM), as long as the beta for debt is not equal to zero or, in other words, the credit default 
spread is positive. Therefore, CAPM application is more relevant to compute the cost of debt 
when the company has on its balance sheet high-yield debt or other risky types of debt 
(Cooper & Davydenko, 2007). 
!
Cost of Equity 
 
 When assessing the cost of capital – entailing the cost of debt and cost of equity - the 
latter turns out to be the most challenging one. Theoretically, the cost of equity is the 
opportunity cost equity holders could expect if they would invest in a similar project in terms 
of risk (Luehrman, 1997a). The most far and wide used model to compute this variable is the 
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CAPM1, which models the relationship between risk and return. A company’s cost of equity 
equals a risk free rate (r!!), pegged to a sovereign bond, plus a risk premium (!r! − r!!) 
appropriate to the level of the risk engaged. The extent on which risk premium is either 
higher or lower is defined by the beta !β! , which reflects the asset return sensitivity to 
market volatility. A major assumption of this model lies on the fact that the marginal investor 
holds a diversified portfolio (market portfolio)2, containing every asset of the market, reducing 
to zero the firm-specific risk. Thus, the only risk the investor faces is the one that cannot be 
reduced through diversification, also known as systematic risk. Simultaneously, this type of 
risk is the only source of uncertainty that the investor should be compensated for. As 
Damodaran (1999) states, the risk the marginal investor faces comes from the addition of 
marginal risk to the “market portfolio “. 
 
!! = !! + !! . (!!! − !!)                                    !! = !! + !!. (!!! − !!) 
 
 From the model, one could derive the cost of equity levered (!!) and also the cost of 
equity when the company is fully financed by equity (!!). One should be attentive to the fact 
that the beta varies from one equation to another. Logically, by running into debt, company’s 
equity holders find themselves with less seniority when claiming the company’s cash flows, 
requiring a higher return. That difference is generated by the fact that β! is higher that β!, as  
follows: 
 





 The CAPM is a very simple and effective asset-pricing model with a very strong 
theoretical base about risk and return (Koller et al., 2010). However, the model has drawn 
attention because some of its pitfalls, which were intensively studied by academics. Fama 
and French (1992,1996,2003) studied deep into the assumptions and findings of CAPM and 
they have drawn interesting conclusions: they rejected the fact that the betas are sufficient to 
explain the expected returns, and average stock returns are responsive to other variables 
such as EPS, cash-flows-to-price and book equity-to-market equity. Moreover, it could be 
concluded that empirical failures of CAPM were caused by bad proxies for the market 
portfolio, which would generate erroneous outcomes: the relationship between beta and 
return, according to those authors, was actually flatter than predicted, making high stock 
betas too high and low stock betas too low. For that reason, Fama and French (1992,1996, 
2003) argue that in order to model the relationship between return and risk, one ought to rely 
on multi-factor models.  
 Nonetheless, despite of the presence of some pitfalls, CAPM is still regarded as the 
most useful asset-pricing model available to be used. Koller et. al (2010) claims, “it takes a 
better theory to kill an existing theory.” 
 Thus, throughout this analysis, the CAPM is the model selected to predict the cost of 
equity. In the following paragraphs attention will be devoted attention on each input of this 
model for a better understanding of how it works. 
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Model developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) 
 
2 Seeing that a true Market portfolio is only theoretically possible and less likely to be observable, proxies are used. A common Market index proxy 
in the U.S is the S&P 500 (Koller et al., 2010). 
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Risk Free Rate 
 
 The concept of risk in the finance world regards the variance between the actual and 
expected return on a certain investment. Therefore, a free risk investment will yield an actual 
return precisely equal to the expected return. The risk free rate is pegged to riskless 
securities/investments i.e. securities that are issued by a default free entity, such as 
governments that are most likely to guarantee3 the repayment to bondholders because of 
their ability to print money (Damodaran, 2008b). Besides, the same author argues that a 
riskless investment cannot have reinvestment risk in order to be considered so. 
 The risk free rate is vital, due to its contributions to the assessment of both the cost of 
debt and capital; as one of the components of the cost of capital (Luehrman, 1997a), and 
using a flawed risk free rate will generate erroneous discounted rates, which eventually can 
lead to misvaluation problems (Damodaran, 2008b). 
 Regarding the time period of risk free rate that should be used, Damodaran (2008b) 
emphasizes it has to be adequate to the frequency in which cash flows are generated (i.e. 
one would use a 5-year government bond to derive the risk free rate for a 5-year cash flow). 
Furthermore, Damodaran (2008) stated that as long as the company operates in a mature 
market, using a 10-year bond of the same currency as cash flows is a good practice in 
valuations. 
 Therefore, since the deal that is being analyzed entails two American companies, 
operating in a mature market, and the US treasury is a free default entity, the risk free rate 
used should be the 10-year Treasury bond. 
Beta 
 
 Beta (!) measures the degree to which returns on a certain security move together 
(Bodie et al., 2011), as well as the risk added to a well-diversified portfolio (Damodaran, 
1999). According to Damodaran (1999) and Neves (2000), the beta is computed by 
regressing the security returns against a certain market index – representing a globally and 
broad-asset base diversified portfolio in theory. 
 
 
Figure 1: Graphical Representation of Beta 
One should compute the beta as McNulty et al. (2002) refer: 
 
! = !"#$%!!"#$%&#&%'!"#$%!!"#$%&#&%' ! .!"##$%&'(")!!"#$%!!". !"#$% 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!













Return on the market index 
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 A more formal derivation can be presented as Bodie et al. (2011) concluded which is: 
the !"#!(!! , !!), the covariance between a certain security and the market return divided by 





!,!!!0 ≤ !! !≤ 1! 
 
 The estimation of beta is a source of debate across various academics. Koller et al. 
(2010) mention the difficulty of the process of estimating it as well as the imprecision 
involved. Moreover, computing this variable is a source of frustration and a vast portion of 
practitioners and academics find them unreliable (McNulty et al., 2002). As mentioned 
before, Fama and French (1992, 1996, 2003) argue that the betas are not ample enough to 
explain the average return – motivated, specially, by the weak market proxies the CAPM is 
based on. 
 Damodaran (1999) acknowledges that for a reliable estimate of the beta, one should 
use a market-weighted index with the broadest set of stocks possible naming the S&P 500 
as a good option. Regarding this specific topic, Koller et. al (2010) share the same opinion. 
Simultaneously, the choice of a time period is vital. In the analysis of firms which have been 
restructured, acquired or divested, one should use shorter estimation periods when 
compared to stable firms (in terms of business cycle and capital structure). 
 Finally, in order to reduce imprecision when computing the beta of a specific firm, one 
should resort to industry-based betas. Within the same industry, companies share similar 
levels of operating risk, yielding analogous betas (Koller et al., 2010). However, one should 
recall that even within the same industries, companies might be distinct among them (Koller 




 In finance, the risk premium is the extra return one can expect by engaging in risky 
investments (Luehrman, 1997a), meaning that a well-diversified investor expects to be 
compensated by a premium for the systematic risk (Damodaran, 2010b). There are several 
underlying factors which affect the stability of risk premiums, such as extent of risk aversion 
of the investor, economic risk, liquidity and Government policy (Damodaran, 2010b). 
  The majority of analysts and practitioners use the historical premium as the main 
approach to estimate the equity risk premium, comparing long-term actual returns against a 
risk free rate as a government bond (Goetzmann & Ibbotson, 2005). However, Damodaran 
(2010) argues that when using this widely used technique one should account for three 
issues: 
• Time period: one should be cautious on how far back an analysis should go, seeing 
that information is less reliable in earlier periods and levels of risk premium from the 
past century are different from those of today. Nevertheless, considering short 
periods might also add some problems and may not be a valid and reliable solution, 
since studies showed that standard errors of risk premium were higher when 
considering such time frames. Approaching this specific issue, Koller et. al (2010) 
regressed the US market premium versus time for a 100-year period, concluding  that 
not only no trend was found, but also observations for shorter-periods yielded 
significant higher values of volatility. 
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• Market index and risk free rate: one should use a sufficiently broad index of stocks, 
which should be market-weighted (e.g. S&P 500 in the US) and should include equity 
investments from companies that have gone bankrupt or were acquired – avoiding 
the survivor bias. Regarding the risk free rate, one should use a long-term 
government bond as standard rather than a short-term security. In the US – where 
our deal took place – one should use a 10-year Treasury bond (Koller et al., 2010). 
• Averaging: one ought to use arithmetic average over geometric average when there 
is evidence that returns are uncorrelated over time which is also confirmed by Koller 
et. al (2010). 
 
 If one takes into account historical averages and forward-looking estimates, a 
tolerable market risk premium is between 4.5% and 5.5% ( Koller et al., 2010).  
 
2.1.2 WACC Model and Adjusted Present Value Method 
 
 The DCF model based on WACC has reigned through academics and practitioners 
during the 1970s until late 1990s, and for that period it was considered as the best DCF 
methodology for valuing companies and projects (Luehrman, 1997b). However, the 
development of computing techniques – motivated by the decreasing associated costs 
(Luehrman, 1997b) -, allowed other more sophisticated and detailed models to arise, making 
that past and reigning model obsolete. 
 One of the new models was the APV approach, introduced by Myers (1974). This 
model lays its valuation analysis by splitting the value of the company into two chunks: the 
first being regarded as the base case value, which concerns the unlevered value of the 
company or, in other words, the value if the company was 100% equity-financed: 
 





 As with DCF based on WACC model, one should compute the FCFFs for each period 
and Terminal Value, both discounted at an appropriate unlevered cost of capital. 
 The second chunk of the firm’s value comes from the side effects of its choice of 
capital structure. Tax shields are one of the most important positive impacts of the presence 
of debt, since interests are tax deductible: 
 
 






 Among academics there is still some controversy on the specific question about the 
discount rate at which tax shields should be discounted, though initially Myers (1974) 
computed them by using the cost of debt. Milles and Ezzel (1980) refer to the cost of equity 
as the most suitable rate for the incorporation of the risk of interest tax shields. Luehrman 
(1997b) conversely, argues that those should be discounted at cost of debt because tax 
shields are as uncertain as principal and interest payments, except for those companies 
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facing extreme adverse financial conditions, which often are able to fulfill debt obligations but 
fail to use tax shields. 
 Other side effects from the decision on capital structure are important to mention, 
such as the present value of all the costs of financial distress, subsidies, hedges and issue 
costs (Luehrman, 1997b). 
 Computing the present value of financial distress costs is crucial when valuing a non 
going concern company, and this model is quite insightful in this field, because it can 
explicitly present a number for the financial distress. Financially distressed companies ought 
to assess the consequences of default or bankruptcy when computing their value. 
Damodaran (2006b) shows that the expected bankruptcy are equal to the probability of 
default (!!) times the bankruptcy costs. 
 The probability of default can be computed through three different methods: statistical 
approach, bond rating analysis and bond price analysis (Damodaran, 2006b). In order to 
compute the bankruptcy costs, one ought to include all the litigation fees from dealing with 
the liquidation process – which represents 3-5% of the firm’s value (Warner, 1997) – and all 
the indirect costs such as the reluctance of customers to buying the company’s products, the 
strictness of suppliers and the inability to approve positive NPV projects (Almeida & 
Philippon, 2008); altogether these factors may can account for 10-23% of the company’s 
total value (Andrade & Kaplan, 1998). Simultaneously, Korteweg (2007) for airline 
companies, found that bankruptcy costs may account for 48% of the value of the firm 
altogether in case of distress. 
 
 
!" !"#$%&$'!!"#$%&'()*!!"#$# = !!.!" !"#$%&'()*!!"#$#  
 
!"#$!!"#$% = !! + !" !"# − !!.!"(!"#$%&'()*!!"#$#) 
 
 Logically, one should verify that the level of present value of expected bankruptcy 
costs is positevely linked to the level of the company’s financial distress. Consequently, 
combining the fact that distressed firms generate few tax shields – due to low or negative 
operating income – and high bankruptcy costs, the value of the company will be reduced 
(Damodaran, 2006b). 
 
Finally, while the WACC is simple and straighforward to use (Luehrman, 1997a),  it is 
not as complete and precise as the APV. For instance, the WACC may lead to errors (Koller 
et al. 2005), for companies with non-constant capital structures, as well as for those with 
non-vanilla debt on their balance sheets and complex tax positions (Luehrman, 1997a). 
Conversely, APV is stated to be more flexible, less prone to errors helping managers to know 
where the value comes from, introducing the concept of value additivity in valuation 
(Luehrman, 1997b). Threfore, in the specific case of M&A field, this methodolgy takes further 
importance seeing that it allows managers to verify not only the source of value generated 
(i.e. synergies coming from costs reductions or revenue enchanements (Sirower & Sahni, 
2006)), but also the distribution of value after the deal: how much of the value is retained by 
the seller company and captured by the acquiring company (Luehrman, 1997b). 
 




Figure 2: Unbundled Value of a Firm resorting to APV model (Luehrman 1997b) 
2.1.3 Relative Valuation 
 
 Relative valuation is an alternative methodology for valuing a company. Unlike the 
DCF methods, whose analysis was entirely based on the unique features of an asset, 
multiples approach relies on what the market offers, on average, for similar assets 
(Damodaran, 2006a). 
  In current literature, DCF models are described to produce more reliable estimates of 
market value (Kaplan & Ruback, 1996), although the same researchers found that using a 
combination of DCF and multiples could lead to even more precise and effective results. 
From the same school of thought, it is argued that multiples are not only a good instrument 
for valuation, but also a highly useful tool to produce accurate forecasts and to verify if a DCF 
valuation outcome is higher or lower compared to the company’s peers (Koller et al., 2005). 
 In fact, practitioners have been using relative valuation to a large extent. Damodaran 
(2002), mentions that almost 90% of equity research valuations and 50% of acquisition 
valuations use this approach, while investment bankers and appraisers call upon this 
methodology because DCF models require cash flows and discount rates estimates which 
are often very difficult to assess (Lie & Heidi, 2003). 
 By following this methodology, value is derived by multiplying the multiple4 (i.e. 
median value) of the comparable companies by the performance measure of the company 
one is valuing (Kaplan & Ruback, 1996). 
 A very discussed topic within relative valuation refers to the question about the scope 
of the comparable term, namely what criterion should be followed when one wants to build a 
set of comparable companies. Some argue that comparable companies are those which 
share similar cash flow growth as well as an analogous risk profile (Kaplan & Ruback, 1996), 
and also a comparable ROIC (Koller et al., 2005). Others, conversely, claim that choosing 
comparable firms on the basis of the same industry – sharing the same 3 digit SIC code – 
will produce the smallest estimation errors for the particular case of P/E multiple (Lie & Heidi, 
2003). However, one should be cautious because even within the same industry, companies 
often have different growth and ROIC expectations as well as different capital structures 
(Koller et al., 2005). 
 Koller et al. (2005) point out important issues that should be followed for a correct 
valuation based on multiples. Firstly, enterprise value multiples should be used over Price-to-
Earnings, because they are both affected by capital structure decisions and, since based on 
earnings, they become affected by non-operating items. Secondly, empirical evidence shows 
that multiples based on historical data are not as accurate as forward-looking multiples. 
Finally, when enterprise value multiples are used, one should take into account adjustments 
for some non-operating items such as excess cash, operating leases, employee stock 
options and pensions. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Price/Earnings; Price/Sales; Enterprise Value/EBIT; Enterprise Value/EBITDA, among others 
APV !
Value of the company 
if it was fully financed 
by equity 
Hedges    
Subsidies 
Cost of Financial Distress 
Interest Tax Shields 
Issue Costs  
Base-Case Value!
Value of all financing 
side effects!
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2.2 M&A Essentials 
 
 M&A activity has been a flourishing field, which saw a steady upward growth – both in 
terms of value and number of deals – specially from the late 1990’s (Eccles, Lanes, & 
Wilson, 1999). After having reached a peak in 2007, this activity, however, has slowed down 
due to the recent economic turmoil: global M&A activity saw in 2012 its transaction values 
decreasing by 41% from pre-crisis numbers totaling $2.177 billion (Clifford Chance, 2013). 
Globalization and geographic diversification (Zenner et al., 2008) are the drivers of today’s 
M&A presence in every part of the globe: the US still represents more than 40% of the global 
M&A activity, while Europe absorbs 31% of the deals. However, emerging markets are also 
becoming proactive in this field, not only sheltering target companies that are acquired by 
developed market companies, but also creating acquiring companies in developed 
economies. 
 Over the years, the upward trend of this activity has not been consistent with the 
empirical research about the extent of successfulness of the deals. Eccles et al. (1999) 
stated that in the past 75 years 50% of the deals failed to create their expected value. Many 
authors have argued that few deals generated positive returns for the acquiring firm 
shareholders, while there is a “conventional wisdom”, as Bruner (2005) poses, that M&A 
always fail and is a “loser’s game”, which according to the author, are misleading 
conclusions.5 
 The following section of the literature review has the purpose of providing some 
insight about M&A. This section will start by defining under which forms M&A may be 
materialized as well as which payment methods exist. Then, special attention will be given to 
synergies – the main driver pushing managers to engage in this kind of operations. Finally, 
this section will cover the controversial issue regarding whether or not M&A provides value to 
the shareholders. 
 
2.2.1 Categories of M&A 
 
 M&A as a term is often used in a very broad sense entailing several different types of 
transaction. Damodaran (2002) splits into two main categories according to the 
characteristics of the acquirer: a firm can be either acquired by another or can be acquired by 
its own managers and outside investors (namely through buyouts). For the sake of 
consistency and simplicity, focus will be placed only on the first category. 
 When a firm is acquired by another, Damodaran (2002) refers to four different types 
of transaction under which the deal can arise: 
1. Mergers – Operations under which the target firm will be fused to the acquirer’s 
structure and future operations will be only performed under the acquirer’s brand 
name. 
2. Consolidation – The combined companies will generate a new firm and operations 
will work under a new brand name. 
3. Tender Offer – Under this operation the acquirer company approaches the target 
shareholders – being often considered to be hostile to the target managers (Loughran 
& Vijh, 1997) and if the latter are receptive to the proposal, the deal eventually 
becomes a merger. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Bruner (2004), refers that from his empirical research, he found that 130 studies backed the proposition that M&A does pay. 
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4. Acquisition assets – The target firm will proceed as a company, although it will 
transfer its assets for the acquiring’s firm balance sheet. 
 
 Loughran & Vijh (1997) found that tender offers yielded positive excess return of 43% 
to the acquiring firm shareholders during a 5-year period , whereas mergers deals produced 
a negative excess return of -15.9%. The explanation for this number lies on the 
characteristcs of each one of the deals. Tender offers are designed to be built upon 
negotiations between the acquiring firm and target firm shareholders, leaving managers 
outside the table of negotiations. Therefore, this type of deal is prone to replace inneficient 
management boards by more dilligent and efficient ones, having a major impact on 
disciplining the way the target company is run.  
 
2.2.2 Methods of payment 
 
 When engaging in M&A, an acquiring firm has some methods to pay for the deal. It 
can pay with cash, with its own stock, by mixing those or through an earnout contract, setting 
the level of payouts according to the future performance of the target firm (Zenner et al., 
2008). 
 Empirical research shows that cash offers outperforms stock offers (Sirower & Sahni, 
2006), and during a 5-year period the former yielded a positive 18.5% excess return while 
the latter generated a -24.2% figure (Loughran & Vijh, 1997). 
 Loughran &Vijh (1997) explains that the gap between those methods of payment may 
be explained by the market adjusting to the market-timing theory stating that due to access of 
privileged information, managers only use stock to finance these operations when they think 
it is overvalued. Indeed, Savor & Lu (2009) found that there are positive effects involved in 
the long run to the acquirer company when it resorts to overvalued stock as the method of 
payment, namely through the acquisition of the target firm assets at a discount6. Plus, they 
also acknowledge the fact that stock acquirers tend to be growth firms and it is acceptable to 
argue that both managers and market might have been excessively optimistic about the 
company’s growth prospects. 
 In terms of preferences from both sides of the deal, acquirers prefer cash while the 
target firm shareholders prefer stock, due to benefits from the upside of the combined 
company and because tax payments may be deferred (Zenner et al., 2008). However, when 
the offer is based on stock, target firm shareholders end up by bearing some risk that would 
not be taken otherwise (Damodaran, 2005). 
2.2.3 Synergies 
 
 The basic concept of synergy addresses the value that is created from the 
combination of two companies which would not be generated if those companies operated 
on a standalone basis (Damodaran, 2005). 
 On one hand, synergies may either come from the generation of revenue 
enhancements (e.g. revenue increase due to the combination of expertise in product quality 
from one firm and access to a developed distribution network from the other) and cost 
reductions (Sirower & Sahni, 2006). On the other hand, Damodaran (2005) goes even 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 This premise only holds if the acquiring firm stock is more overvalued than the hard assets of the target company. 
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deeper and divides synergies into two groups and, subsequently, sources. When combining 
firms, one should assist to the creation of both operating and financial synergies. 
 Firstly, the operating synergies are those that enhance expected cash flows, due to 
the creation of economies of scale, increasing pricing power, differential functional strengths 
and higher growth by exploring new markets. Secondly, financial synergies are those that not 
only boost expected cash flows – mainly through the growth rate of the combined firm –, but 
also reduce the cost of capital at which cash flows are discounted. Tax benefits (using 
target’s depreciation or operating losses to reduce tax burden), diversification and higher 
debt capacity are the sources of this kind of synergy. 
 When valuing synergies, Damodaran (2005) built a simple and straightforward 
framework one should follow: firstly, one should value the companies involved in the deal on 
a standalone basis. Secondly, one ought to add each one of the company’s values to form 
the combined firm without synergies. Thirdly, the effect of synergies is incorporated on DCF 
inputs (e.g. growth rates, discount rates and expected cash flows), and the value of the 
combined firm with synergies is computed. Finally, the value of synergies is derived by 
computing the difference between the value of the combined firm with synergies and the 
value of the combined firm without them. 
 
 One should ask, then, if synergies are a source and a means to improve the 
company’s value, why is the debate about the profitability of M&A so intense? Why is there 
skepticism about it?  
 Firstly, when engaging in M&A, a firm makes an extreme financial effort by paying 
upfront a given amount. Secondly, synergies do not occur instantaneously, requiring some 
time to start generating value (Sirower & Sahni, 2006).Thirdly, the premium paid might not be 
adjusted to the value of the synergies, being too high for the future generation of value 
(Eccles et al., 1999). Despite the relationship between the amount of premium paid and the 
success of the deal is not linear (Eccles et al., 1999), it was shown that the higher is the 
premium paid by the acquirer firm, more is the likelihood of having negative returns in the 
long run (Sirower & Sahni, 2006). 
 The relationship described is incorporated in the concept of Shareholder Value at 
Risk (Sirower & Sahni, 2006), which is the portion of the company’s value at risk if, after the 
acquisition synergies are not realized: the higher is the premium, the higher is the value of 
risk that the acquirer shareholders have to bear, translated into lower or negative returns. 
 
 
!"#$ = !"#$%&$ % . !"#$%!"#$%!!!"#$%!"#$%&'&
 
 
 Sirower & Sahni (2006) deeply explored the relationship between synergies and the 
premium paid in deals. They suggest that a premium should only be paid according to the 
levels of synergies created from the combination of the firms. This premise is reflected in the 
“Meet The Premium Line” concept, which engrosses all the combinations of revenue 
enhancements and cost reductions necessary to boost the company’s earnings that justify a 
given premium. 
 Figure 3 shows us 3 different points in the vicinity of the MTP line7: any point below 
the line should be avoided by the acquirer firm, since neither revenue enhancements nor 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 MTP line is represented by the expression %!"#$ = Π!!Π . (%! −%!"#$), which is a function of pre-tax profit margins (Π), premium 
(%!)!revenue synergies (%!"#$) 
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cost reductions resulting from the combination of the companies provide enough earnings 
improvements that can justify the premium (point A). Conversely, those points that lie within 
the “plausibility box” (combinations of required synergies that are likely to be attained), and 
above the line, produce more than enough synergies to justify the premium paid (point B). 
 
 
Figure 3: “The Meet the premium line” concept (Sirower & Sahni, 2006) 
 Managers should also question themselves about the strategic sense of the deal. 
Sirower & Sahni (2006) argued that when assessing the strategic sense of the deal, 
managers should position themselves in the three-by-three capabilities/market access matrix 
(Figure 4). The main variables in question are the capabilities (e.g. R&D, product design, 
operations, cost structure, supply chain) and market access (e.g. sales, brand value, third 
party relationships). Then, one should analyze any deal by weighing the level of relatedness 
between the two companies, ranging from “same”, “better” (i.e. one party is better than the 
other in some capability or market access) and “new” (i.e. when there are no overlapping 




Figure 4: The Matrix Capabilities/Market Access (Sirower & Sahni, 2006) 
 
 The lower left corner of the matrix is linked to deals whose synergies are sourced by 
cost savings (e.g. economies of scale and reduction of redundancies). As we move away to 
the upper right corner, revenue enhancements become the source of synergies, due to the 
fact that the combined firm leverages what each firm has best to offer.  
 A controversial topic about M&A through academics has been the discussion about 
the extent of success between acquisitions based on focus/relatedness and on 
diversification. Sirower & Sahni (2006) argue that “projection of cost synergies are much 
more reliable than revenue synergies” and, then, deals that are based on synergies coming 
0% 
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from cost savings (lower left corner of the aforementioned matrix that entails highly related 
companies) are more likely to achieve expected synergies and justify the premium paid. 
 Bruner (2005) acknowledges that the focus strategy yields more opportunities to 
synergies to be exploited, arguing that diversification - though in specific cases can pay off - 
can be achievable in a cheap way if investors diversify themselves their portfolios.  
2.2.4 M&A and return for shareholders 
 
 Synergies are the leading argument for an acquisition (Damodaran, 2005). However, 
evidence shows that many deals are driven not only by synergies-related argument, but also 
emotions, enthusiasm and excitement aroused by the negotiations (Eccles et al., 1999). As 
previously covered, even when deals are driven by synergies, value creation is not 
guaranteed: they might only be plausible in paper (Damodaran, 2005), they take time to arise 
(Sirower & Sahni, 2006), and the premium paid may absorb any gains that, inclusively, could 
have a perverse effect (Eccles et al., 1999). 
 Literature is extensive regarding the benefits for shareholders, both from the 
perspective of acquiring firm and target firm. Yet, the findings are also broad, comprising 
positive and negative relationships between M&A activity and return to shareholders. 
 
 Regarding the acquiring firm’s shareholders, Loughran and Vijh (1997), from 947 
acquisitions (mergers and tender offers) and making a buy and hold analysis during 5 years 
upon the announcement of the deal, concluded that those yielded a negative excess return 
of -6.5%. The outcome of this analysis is regarded as predictable for most of the acquisitions 
(Eccles et al., 1999). Nevertheless, different studies proved alternative outcomes. Firstly, 
Bruner (2005) rejects that an acquisition harms the acquiring firm shareholder by definition, 
by referring that taking into account 50 studies, investment returns after the deals were as 
high as the rate of return required by the market for similar projects, in terms of risk. 
Moreover, the same author acknowledges the fact that M&A are very beneficial for buyer and 
target firm shareholders when combined, creating value at a macroeconomic level (Sirower & 
Sahni, 2006). 
 Secondly, Savor and Lu (2009) also argue against that school of thought. By studying 
this topic in detail, they wanted to test the hypothesis of whether stock financed mergers 
would bring benefits for the buyer firm shareholders in the long run. They found that when 
stock is overvalued, the buyer firm would be able to acquire hard assets at a discount, 
bringing gains to their shareholders in the long run. Throughout 3 years, those companies 
that were successfully engaged in acquisitions gained more 13.6% in returns during the first 
year than those that were operated as a single business. The disparity grew even larger as 
time window enlarged: in the second and third year the gap grew to 22.1% and 31.2% 
respectively. 
 
 The discussion seems to be less vigorous when the topic is based on the returns to 
the seller company shareholders. M&A transactions yielded a positive abnormal return in 25 
studies, boosted by the premium involved in the deal (Bruner, 2005). In fact, sellers are 
deemed to be the big beneficiaries of M&A. Despite the common acceptance that almost 
every M&A deal produce value for the seller firm shareholder, Loughran and Vijh (2005) 
explored further the question. They argued that, in fact, those shareholders who sell out soon 
after the acquisition reap all the benefits created by the premium. However, the picture 
changes if the same shareholders hold the acquirer’s stock received as payment. In that 
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case, as the authors proved, their gains diminish over time and tend to be neutral. Figure 5 
graphically represents the distribution of the value created by a deal between two 
companies. As it is represented, the purchase price turns out to get extremely important, as it 
influences the value generated to the acquirer’s shareholders. Therefore, even within a deal 
with positive synergies associated, the acquirer company should never overpay them in 





Figure 5: How the value may be distributed by shareholders between the two parts (Eccles et al.,1999) 
 
 
2.2.5 Conclusion  
 
 M&A is, without doubt, a controversial topic that draws attention for research and 
debate. Far from being an unanimous topic, the truth is that M&A not only involve metrics – 
through valuation techniques, which often add subjectivity to the assumptions – but also 
some dose of unpredictable variables such as emotional attachment, excitement and desire 
for control (Eccles et al., 1999) . 
 Through Bruner (2005) and Sirower & Sahni (2006), one can see the reason why 
M&A transactions saw an upward trend from the late 20th century, despite the prophecies of 
failure of some literature. If the effects are taken on a macro level, M&A are considered to 
have a positive impact over the economy as a whole, since the gains absorbed by the target 
shareholders are greater than the acquirer shareholders’ losses. However, within academics 
is still possible to sense some distrustfulness about M&A as a tool for generation of value, as 
the focus and attention predominantly lay on acquirer shareholders’ apparent loss of wealth. 
 Therefore, it is difficult to determine M&A net benefits for all the agents involved and 
to the economy as a whole and its inconclusive outcome should be the base of further and 
more up-to-date research. Current economic times may be unique for M&A field, as 
companies continue to find more ways to operate and compete efficiently in order to weather 
harsh economic times as those faced in late 2007. Indeed, efficiency-driven mergers and 
acquisitions during low economic cycles may create better scenarios for the involved parts 
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3. Company and Industry Analysis 
3.1 Airline Industry overview 
 
 The airline industry is surely one of the most important sectors for the US economy, 
with operating revenues of roughly $191 billion in 2011, which is equivalent to 1% of the total 
GDP of this country. Moreover, the industry not only is a source of economic dynamism – by 
having carried 730 million passengers in 2011 (Appendix 4) – but also a source of 
employment, seeing that in the same year it has directly employed 536 000 workers (US 
Department of Transportation FAA, 2011). 
  The development of the industry per se is not exclusive to the US and since the 
second half of the last century global air traffic has exponentially grown. Technological 
breakthroughs and sustainable increases in the disposable income are considered to be the 
base of such rapid growth, which helped the airline industry to be one of the major drivers for 
the globalization trend we live nowadays. 
 In 1978, following the government’s decision to stop controlling the airfares, routes 
and new-market entries the US airline sector has been operating in a deregulated market. 
Ever since, the sector saw unstable periods characterized by a cyclical financial performance 
that forced the emergence of both bankruptcy and mergers & acquisitions processes. 
  One considers the past decade as the horribilis period of the global airline industry, 
with the US industry being particularly affected. Starting the analysis in 2000, 2006 was the 
first year the industry ran into positive operating results after 9/11 events and 5 consecutive 
years delivering negative results, accumulating more than $25 billion in losses. In spite of 
some evidences of recovery, 2008 brought the industry down again specially propelled by 
the high historic record of jet fuel price - which reached a high historical figure of $3.89 per 
gallon - and by the economic crisis, which made the American economy halt: in 2008 and 
2009 US GDP recorded a negative grow of -0.4% and -3.5% respectively (US Department of 




Figure 6: Domestic Operating Profit and Loss of Major US Major Airlines, Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
 
Indeed, the historical behavior of the industry’s operating results reflects the 
extremely high industry’s sensitivity not only to internal forces but also to various external 
factors. Nowadays, companies operate under a highly stressed internal environment. 
Competition is fierce – and is propelled by low-cost carriers – meaning that one’s company 
ought to work in a very efficient way; suppliers are few (e.g. Boeing and Airbus are the main 
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aircraft providers) having an elevated bargaining power; workers are strongly supported by 
unions, being very hard for airline managers to tackle costs by reducing personnel expenses. 
 Externally, this industry is also affected by a number of factors. One could name 
terrorism threat as a major one, reflected by the negative aftermath of 9/11 in terms of the 
industry’s operating results. Government pressures are also important to emphasize. Albeit 
its known liberalization, this industry is highly regulated in terms of security and safety, which 
often absorb a considerable portion of a company’s efforts and resources. Lastly and 
perhaps the most important forces, are the economic pressures, which the industry is highly 
sensitive to. For instance, the 2008 economic turmoil weakened almost every country’s 
economy around the world. As a major consequence, employment rates were reduced 
leading downwards the purchasing power of consumers8. Seeing that travelling is highly 
elastic to disposable income, families reduced largely the portion of their income once 
allocated to this activity. 
As Figure 7 shows, the disposable income and revenue passenger miles (RPM)9 
share a similar trend after the economic meltdown: in 2008 and 2009 economic harsh times 
brought down RPM by 3.95% and 5.23% respectively and, simultaneously, the number of 
passengers also fell by approximately the same proportion. 
 
!
Figure 7: Per Capita Disposable Income (Inflation Adjusted to 2000) and Revenue Passenger miles, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and Airline Data Project 
 
 From 2009 onwards, data shows that a slow recovery is in place as RPM and 
operating results of the industry have been increasing. This sector has managed to transform 
and adapt itself to restore its profitability through enhancing its management capacity 
(involving both costs and revenues), diversifying its revenue structure and, also, resorting to 
M&A. All these questions are going to be analyzed in more detail later on. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Measured by the per capita disposable income, the purchasing power of an average US consumer fell 3% after the economic downturn that took 
place in 2008. 
 
9 Revenue Passenger Mile is extensively used in the airline industry and is regarded as a reliable proxy for air travel demand. It can be computed 
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3.1.1 Market structure and Market share 
 
 Federal Aviation Administration – national authority being in charge of the oversight of 
civil aviation in the US - defines the airline industry market into four different segments 
according to the revenue capacity of the companies (Table 1). Firstly, major companies10 are 
considered those which deliver annual revenues of over $1 billion and, in fact, are those 
which hold a significant proportion of the market: within this segment, one may find carriers 
such as United, American, Southwest, Delta and US Airways. Secondly, national companies 
entail those airlines that fall in the revenue bracket of $100 million to $1 billion, whereas 
regional companies comprise those, which have annual revenues lower than $100 million. 
Finally, cargo segment represents all companies specialized in freight services, over which 
the current analysis will not go into much detail. 
 
!
Table 1: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Classification of airline segments 
Another important topic to be highlighted affecting the way this market is organized 
has to with the distinction between network and low-cost carriers (LCCs). Indeed, over the 
past decade, the US market has seen a massive increase in the number of LCCs – 
represented by companies such as Southwest, Jet Blue and Virgin America – which caused 
a profound shift in the competitive scenario of the industry.  
 LCCs business model is based on an extreme cost differentiation, offering much 
lower fares compared to network carriers. In order to build such thin cost structure, LCCs 
often resort to high aircraft utilization with high seating density operated by a single aircraft 
type (e.g. in the European LCC Ryanair, air fleet is 100% based on Boeing 737), leading 
training and maintenance costs downwards (United States Government Accountability Office, 
2008). 
 While network carriers work under a “hub and spoke” network scheme, connecting 
different locations through hubs whose focus varies from short to long haul routes, LCCs are 
only concerned about transporting passengers from a point-to-point basis, focusing mostly 
on short-haul routes. 
 The presence of LCCs in the market brought an inevitable downward trend in terms 
of fares (Figure 8). By setting such competitive setup when it comes to offering flights at a 
very low fare to consumers, network carriers had also to adapt to such pressures by reducing 
their fares, imposing structural changes on their cost structures in order to maintain their 
original margins. Additionally, an increasing competitive environment was also matched by 
the growing transparency of ticket pricing facilitated by the Internet and online distribution 
channels, also pushing average fares downwards. Since US government deregulated this 
industry in 1978, average fares decreased by an impressive figure of 36.9%, reflecting a 
$163.28 decrease at 2000 dollars. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10!Analysts also name this group as Legacy companies. Companies that were founded before the deregulation process that took place in 1978.!
Segment Annual Revenue Bracket Main Carriers
Major/Legacy > $ 1 Bn United, Delta, Southwest, American, US Airways
National $ 100M - 1 Bn Frontier, Allegiant, Spirit
Regional <$ 100M American Eagle, Atlantic Southeast, Express Jet
Cargo - United Parcel Service, Federal Express
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  Indeed, since 1998 an increasing level of competition characterizes the industry’s 
competitive panorama: during the time frame 1998-2006 the number of dominated markets11 
fell by 15% (United States Government Accountability Office, 2008) as the number of 
competitors and their scope grew. 
 
!
Figure 8: Annual US Domestic Average Itinerary Fare (1978-2011), 2000 dollars, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
and Bureau of Transportation Statistic 
 Actually, between 2000 and 2011, LCCs saw their RPM expansively grow: whereas 
in 2000, LCCs generated RPM of roughly 49 billion, the figure has extensively grown to 153 
billion in 2011, recording a 206% impressive increase during this period. As Figure 9 depicts, 
the LCCs presence in the US airline market grew solidly, absorbing nowadays 21% of the 
market, which contrasts with its residual position back in 2000 when it accounted for only 8% 




Figure 9: Market Share by network and low-cost sub sectors, Airline Data Project 
 
If one examines the industry as a whole, one could conclude that network carriers are 
still dominant in terms of market share despite their decay over the last decade comparing to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Markets where there is one company which absorbs more than 50% of the market. 
 
12 Network companies: American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, US Airways, American West; low-cost carriers: Southwest, JetBlue, 
AirTran, Frontier, Virgin America; Other: Alaska, Hawaiian, Allegiant 
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LCCs. In 2011, United – resulting from the 2009 merger between United Airlines and 
Continental Airlines – was the largest carrier by comprising 22% of total industry RPM, 
followed by Delta Air lines (20.4%), American Airlines (15.3%) and US Airways (7.4%). 
Southwest Airlines (10.16%), which alone accounts for 2/3 of LCC market, managed to 
outperform US Airways, as the company invested more in expanding its business namely, 
through its reliance both on “hub and spoke” network schemes and on medium/long haul 
routes that were once considered exclusive features of network carriers. 
!




 Jet fuel costs have a dramatic impact over the total costs of an airline company. One 
can see that the behavior of CASM is highly molded by the variability of the jet fuel price. 
Indeed, fuel related expenses, on average, account for 22% of the total costs of an airline, 
amounting to over $31 billion in 2011. Though, interestingly, if one does exclude the fuel 
related expenses, US airline companies have been able to maintain the operating expenses 
stable and, inclusively, reduce them: non-fuel related CASM decreased 16% over the past 
decade (IATA, 2011). This downward trend is the outcome of three different factors. Firstly, 
companies have engaged in negotiations of contracts and pay concessions with labor unions, 
overcoming their strictness of giving in on any salary topic. Secondly, airline companies 
could also alleviate the personnel expenses by reducing their staff over the years, which is 
clearly reflected in the 19.8% steep decrease of personnel employed in this industry during 
the period from 2000 to 2011. Thirdly, airline companies, by taking advantage of bankruptcy 
process (when filling Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection), can rearrange their cost structure in 
a way they would not do otherwise. For instance, airline companies under bankruptcy 
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Figure 11: (a) Cost breakdown for US Airline Industry in 2009; (b) Cost per Available Seat Mile (CASM) with and 
without Fuel, IATA and Bureau of Transportation Statistic 
The level of debt in almost every airline company’s balance sheet is considered to be 
a problem and is seen as one of the reasons this industry is financially strained. 
 In order to assess the financial stability of the industry and how self-sustained it is, 
one should resort to Debt-to-investment14 ratio. By doing so, one concludes that the US 
airline industry started to become highly leveraged in the early 2000s, particularly the sub 
sector of network carriers (Figure 12). 
 In 2000, half of the investments made by the industry were financed by debt, while 5 
years later this ratio peaked at 207%. The ultimate outcome for such reliance on debt was 
the increase of the industry’s vulnerability to market turbulence, as it happened in 2008. 
 Conversely, from 2005 onwards, the level of debt has been decreasing as companies 
relied less on debt to finance their business: in 2011, on average, for every dollar invested by 
an airline company, 84 cents came from debt. The downward trend is explained by the fact 
that companies have been strengthening their cash and liquidity positions so they can 
weather economic shocks that this industry is specially sensitive to. As a consequence, 
carriers are trying to pay down the high levels of debt on their balance sheets and, also, start 
to use their own funds to finance their capital investments and routine operations (US 
Department of Transportation FAA, 2011). 
 
!
Figure 12: Leverage of Airline industry expressed by debt-to-investment ratio, Airline Data Project 
!
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 Industry’s revenues are mainly generated by 4 different sources such as passenger, 
transport, cargo and ancillary revenue. 
 The industry propensity to generate revenue has been affected by cycles over the 
past decade. The early 2000s brought the fatidic events of 9/11, which deteriorated revenue 
generation as 20% of the industry’s capacity was reduced due to a drop of demand from 
consumers. Thus, those incidents brought down industry’s revenues by $8 billion - or a 9% 
drop. From 2002 to 2008, the industry’s revenues experienced a 72% grow reaching its peak 
in 2008 by recording a $157 billion figure. As Figure 13 shows, 2008-2009 saw a sharp 
decline on income creation of roughly 15% that is being recuperated since 2009, as every 
revenue item recorded a positive grow. 
 Although the average fare paid has been decreasing since the market deregulation, 
data shows that passenger revenue is still the major driver of income in the US airline 
industry and in 2011 it accounted for 71.2% of its total operating revenue. 
 On the other hand, in spite of a still small contribution for the total operating income, 
ancillary revenue is becoming increasingly important in a company’s revenue structure. From 
the beginning of the past decade, the entrance of LCCs in the market set a completely new 
ticket pricing approach: consumers would be charged a lower basic fare for a set of 
indispensable services, leaving amenities such as baggage, ticket change, cancellation and 
seat selection – once included in the normal ticket fare – to be considered as extra offers 
subject to additional fees. In spite of the fact that LCCs first set up this pricing strategy, they 
soon started to be followed by network carriers that are now resorting to such approach in 
order to be able to offer competitive fares in the market. 
 Since the last industry shock occurred in 2008, one can verify that airline companies 
tried to boost this revenue item in order to avoid fare increases which would not be well 
corresponded by a weakened and sensitive demand. During the period 2008-2011, ancillary 
revenue grew every year on average 29%, contributing in the latter year with $8.4 billion to 
the industry’s total operating revenues. 
 
 
Figure 13: Total Operating revenue by source (1995-2011), Airline Data Project 
 Another important trend within the revenue topic is linked to the way the industry 
manages capacity, which has a direct influence on its profitability. 
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 Considering the increasing burden of fuel in any airline cost structure coupled with a 
lower demand from consumers, companies started to discipline their capacity, by reducing 
the number of scheduled flights – which decreased by 13.9% between 2009 and 2011 – and 
managing in a more efficient way their excess capacity. American companies, by cutting their 
capacity and by taking advantage of the increase of passenger enplanements (recovering 
since 2009), were able to pack flights and boost the industry’s load factor15. Consequently, 
combining an increasing trend in load factor levels with the fact that airlines have currently 
less empty available seats – being less prompt to offer discount fares to fill them –, the 
revenue per flight is being strengthened as a result. Those facts are expressed in Figure 14, 
showing that RPM and ASM have been converging since 2009, boosting the level of 
industry’s load factor from 71% (2000) to 82% (2011). 
!
Figure 14: Industry RPM and ASM, Airline Data Project 
!
3.1.4 M&A trends in airline Industry  
 
 As shown earlier, airline companies have been facing dark times since 2000, which 
severely affected their profitability: costs have largely increased led by fuel related expenses, 
whereas the combination of a lower demand for travelling struck by the crisis and a highly 
competitive environment greatly damaged companies’ ability to generate revenues. The 
accumulated net losses within network carriers totaled $61 billion between the period 2000-
2011, which is a clear reflection of a financially strained industry. 
 Since 2000, it comes as no surprise the fact that 51 US airline companies filed for 
bankruptcy and 13 of them occurred only in 2008, coinciding with the economic crisis. Indeed, 
the two central companies in this research filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
throughout the past decade: US Airways filed twice (2003 and 2004) before its merger with 
American West, while Delta Airlines filed its process in 2005. 
 M&A are considered within this sector as a means to restore the industry’s profitability. 
Analysts found that M&A are a useful way to efficiently manage capacity by reducing costs 
and expand revenues. Indeed, due to its competitive panorama, various routes across the 
US were being served by numerous carriers, leading to levels of supply substantially higher 
than demand for air travel. ASM16 peaked in 2005 with 775.4 billion ASMs combined with an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Load factor measures the percentage of available seating that is filled with passenger. It can be computed as 
!"#$!!"#$%& % = !"#"$%"!!"##$%&$'! "#$!"#$%#&%'!!"#$! "#$%  
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average load factor of 74% over the period 2000-2005, reflecting an over supply and excess 
capacity issue within the industry. 
 For that reason, excess capacity has been tackled through the consolidation of the 
sector, which saw an intense M&A process during the past decade. In early 2000, 10 airline 
companies accounted for roughly 90% of the market in terms of ASMs, whereas 12 years 
later only 5 companies17 absorbed 85% of the market, reflecting the positive outcome of M&A 
involving airline companies (Figure 15).  
 
!
Figure 15: Consolidation of the US Airline Industry from 2000 to 2011, % of domestic passenger Capacity, Bureau 
of Transportation and Statistic 
 Taking historical data into consideration, M&A within this industry may lead to the 
elimination of duplicated operating costs through reduction of personnel costs (specially non-
cabin crew), reduction of overlapping routes and hubs, procurement savings and working 
capital and balance sheet restructures. Moreover, M&A effect on the reduction of capacity 
may lead to the creation of additional revenue through increased fares in certain routes. The 
occurrence of this revenue increment, however, may only be applied on a short-term 
perspective seeing that the entrance of other competitors in that same route may diminish 
those abnormal gains in the long run (United States Government Accountability Office, 2008). 
On the other hand, M&A may be realized not because of reduction of capacity but to 
aim at strategic purposes in order to generate greater revenues. This form of process often 
occurs when a foreign carrier seeks to expand its network overseas, acquiring a domestic 
carrier that is well established in those markets, augmenting its domestic and international 
destinations.  By engaging in such strategic approach, the acquirer carrier reaps the benefits 
of how consumers behave in this market. Within this sector, consumers have a low level of 
bargaining power – specially in the sub sector of network carriers - seeing that switching 
costs are relatively high and, above all, competition across the sector made the service 
offered by each one of the operators very similar in terms of features. Therefore, considering 
the fact that every network carrier shares the same level of amenities, consumers – when 
deciding which carrier to use – may rely their decision criterion on the extent of the carrier 
network route. In fact, according to a survey conducted by Business Traveller Coalition, 53% 
of respondents confirmed that they were likely to choose a certain airline company because 
of the extent of its network route, which confirms the competitive advantage of a carrier 
having an expanded scope (United States Government Accountability Office, 2008). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 See Appendix 11 for the most recent M&A activity within the US Airline Industry 
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3.2 Company Analysis 
3.2.1 US Airways Group 
 
 US Airways Group is a major air carrier with a predominant focus on passenger 
transportation within the US. The company’s first roots date back to 1939 with the 
emergence of All American Aviation as an airmail company. Through the years, the business 
concept has dramatically changed as well as the company’s structure. After buyouts and 
mergers – which saw All American Aviation grow into Allegheny Airlines and then into US Air 
– US Airways Group was finally formed in 1982. The current organizational structure of the 
group was designed upon the merger with American West in 2005, which turned out to be a 
necessity because of the poor financial condition of US Airways. 
 Therefore, as Figure 16 shows, US Airways Group operates under its wholly-owned 
subsidiaries: US Airways (core business and brand), Piedmont Airlines, Inc., PSA Airlines Inc. 
(operating within US Airways Express), and finally Material Services Company, Inc. and 
Airways Assurance Limited which operate in areas of procurement of aviation fuel and 
insurance. 
 
Figure 16: US Airways Group Organization Structure, (US Airways Group, 2013) 
  
 US Airways Group generates revenue from four different sources one should account 
for: mainline passengers; express passengers; cargo and other18. 
 In 2012, US Airways through its operational segments, generated $13.8 billion in 
revenues, being able to offer a $ 776 million enhancement from the previous year. As Figure 
17 (a) portrays, every segment experienced an increase over the period analyzed: mainline 
and express segment increased 8.37% and 8.58% respectively, confirming their relevance 
on the company’s revenue structure as their combined contribution accounted for more than 
$12 billion in 2012. This trend is the outcome of the ongoing industry capacity discipline effort 
– earlier covered - and also the recovery of demand for air travel as the consumer 
purchasing power in most developed countries is starting to grow again after the economic 
turmoil. 
 Cargo segment showed a 1.9% CAGR19 in spite of its slowing pace recorded between 
2011 and 2012, which was essentially the ultimate consequence of the decreasing 
international freight volumes, fostered by the uncertain economic environment which has 
been surrounding Europe. 
 Conversely, following the industry trend, US Airways was also able to increase its 
ancillary revenue: between 2011 and 2012, a $48 million improvement was achieved due to 
the increase of this company’s Frequent Flyer Program as well as to the upsurge of fees 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Ancillary revenue, including extra fees applied to the basic fare (i.e. passenger ticketing change fee, baggage fee, ticketing selection fee) 
19 Compound annual growth rate 
US Airways 
Group 
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applied to items such as baggage and passenger ticketing change. In 2012, ancillary 
revenue accounted for roughly 10% of US Airways operating revenues. 
 Leaning on the comparison between the two operational segments strictly linked to 
revenue passenger, one can verify through Figure 17 (b) that the mainline segment provided 
the larger portion of RPM in 2012, representing 85% of the total figure with a contribution of 
62.435 million. Equally, express segment accounted for 15% of total RPM, reflecting a 
contribution of 10.883 million in that same year. The discrepancy of revenue generation is 
explained by the concept of business of both segments: while express segment (e.g. US 
Airways Express) focus relies on regional routes with small aircrafts, transporting passengers 
from low-density airports to the main hubs where US Airways large jets operations are not 
economically viable, mainline stands to be the core business of the group, entailing more 
available aircrafts (346) with a focus on medium/long haul routes. Indeed, in 2012, 54 million 
passengers boarded through mainline segment, whereas express segment enplaned 28 
million passengers. 
 
Figure 17: (a) Annual revenue by operational segment; (b) Passenger revenue breakdown in RPM, (US Airways 
Group, 2013) 
 Between 2007 and 2012, US Airways was affected by the volatility of jet fuel price, 
which is regarded as one of the crucial aspects that define the profitability of the airline 
industry. In fact, in 2012, aircraft fuel had a major preponderance on this company cost 
structure, as it represented 35% of total operating expenses with a sum of $4.6 billion. As 
Figure 18 shows, fuel expenses weight on total operating costs ranged from 24% in 2009 to 
35% in 2012 – surpassing in the latter year the peak of 2008 as jet fuel prices are currently 
starting to face an upward trend in the markets. 
 Nonetheless, US Airways has struggled to maintain a low-cost structure, which has 
been effective and fruitful: CASM excluding fuel expenses have been performing in a very 
stable way over the recent years, seeing that between 2010 this item has increased less than 
1%. 
 Salaries and benefits took also an important share in the company’s cost structure as it 
accounted for 19% amounting to $25 billion in 2012. Simultaneously, aircraft rent 
represented $672 million in that same year comprising the expenses related to leasing 
contracts the company engaged as an alternative of equipment acquisition. 
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Figure 18: (a) Operational expenses breakdown in 2012; (b) CASM vs. CASM ex. Fuel and Fuel expenses’ 
relevance on operating costs, (US Airways Group, 2013) 
 When it comes to income generation, US Airways profitability pattern coincides with the 
industry trend since 2008. The economic crisis in that year was severely felt in this company 
as it brought a $2 billion loss, followed by a $140 million loss in 2009. This company was only 
able to run into profit in 2010 by delivering a $600 million result. Despite the seeming recover, 
US Airways saw its net income shrink in the following year because of a substantial increase 
in fuel costs and due to the uncertainty surrounding both US and Europe economies that 
eventually led to a more fragile demand for air travel. 
 Last year, though, US Airways managed to boost their profitability, recording a 3% 
growth that was mainly driven by the combined action of revenue enhancement and cost 
control this company has been doing. Figure 19 (b) reflects the roots of such profitability 
improvement by analyzing the gap between RASM20 and CASM. One can verify that profits 
in the future can emerge in a more stable way, seeing that RASM have been growing faster 
than CASM since 2011 – 3.8% and 0.7 respectively. 
 
!
Figure 19: (a) US Airways Net Income (loss) from 2008-2012; (b) CASM vs. RASM 2010-2012, (US Airways 
Group, 2013) 
  
 The company has a capital structure characterized by the high level of leverage, which 
matches the trend within the airline industry. In 2012, long-term debt amounted to $5.3 billion 
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and accounted for 56.4% of total assets, however, if one does consider current liabilities, that 
figure can be as high as 91.6%, meaning that stockholders equity does only finance 8.4% of 
the company’s assets. Conversely, almost 40% of the company assets are based on current 
assets, which makes US Airways a company with a solid liquidity position. 
3.2.2 Delta Airlines 
 
 Delta Airlines, founded in 1929, is an airline holding company that started way back in 
1929 when it carried its first passenger in Louisiana. The company, as most of the legacy 
carriers, has grown within the US market through mergers and acquisitions of several other 
carriers. Indeed, it is still a current growth strategy as this company has acquired Northwest 
Airlines in 2008.  
 From a consolidated perspective, Delta Airlines stands out in the US airline market by 
absorbing 20% of its total RPM, obtaining the 2nd largest market share amongst its main 
competitors, which contrasts with the position this company had in 2008 – before the merger 
between United and Continental - when it was the largest carrier in the US in terms of RPM. 
 Despite that, Delta strong presence in the market is mostly reflected in noteworthy facts 
such as its wide operational scope – it operates across 318 airports, serving 59 countries in 
every continent – and also its major operational routine, offering 5.000 daily flights through its 
extensive 700 mainline aircraft fleet. 
 As with US Airways, Delta Airlines revenue structure is composed of different sources 
of revenue listed as passenger, cargo and other (i.e. ancillary revenue). During the triennium 
2010-2012 (Figure 20 (a)), Delta Airlines was able to achieve a 10.2% increase when it 
comes to revenue generation. In fact, in 2012, this company could deliver a $3.1 billion 
marginal enhancement compared to the previous exercise, reaching a $36.7 billion figure. 
 Such positive revenue scenario is the outcome of a 5% increase of passenger 
revenues propelled by the improvement on yield factor21 - which in 2012 rose by 4.9% - and 
a decrease in Delta’s capacity, reflected by a decrease of 1.8% of this company’s ASM. 
Consequently, efficiency was gained and can be measured by the increase in the company’s 
load factor that rose by 1.7%. 
 Indeed, passenger revenue is the main revenue driver of this company, having a stake 
as large as 87% of Delta’s total operating revenues and, between 2010 and 2012, it turned 
out to be the item with the most substantial growth (10.20%). Furthermore, when analyzing 
the two sources of passenger revenue (i.e. mainline and regional carriers), one verifies that 
the former has a major weight on total revenues accounting for 79%, whereas the latter gets 
a 21% stake. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Yield factor measures the average fare paid per mile per passenger. It can be computed as !"#$%!!"#$%& = !"##$%&$'!!"#"$%"!"#  




Figure 20: (a) Annual revenue by operational segment; (b) Load factor in percentage, passenger revenue per 
ASM in cents and passenger yield per mile (cents) 2010-2012, (Delta Airlines, 2013) 
 Finally, thanks to its large operational capabilities, Delta Airlines operations are not only 
restricted to the US market, rather, the company has a sizable exposure to international 
markets that has been steadily growing. The trend is confirmed by the fact that 35% of this 
company’s total operating revenue comes from outside the USA. Atlantic market (Europe 
and Africa) stands out from the list of international destinations, as Delta reached $56 billion 
in revenues from this market last year, followed by Pacific that provided $3.6 billion to this 
company. 
 Total operating expenses have increased since 2009, and have reached the highest 
value in the last year of the analysis period when the company recorded a $34.5 billion figure. 
After 2009 where more moderate levels of expenses were met, 2011 brought a 12% increase 
or a $3.6 billion compared to the previous year. The abrupt increase is heavily related to a 
rapid escalation of fuel prices, which soar $0.70/gallon driving a dramatic increase of the 
company’s aircraft fuel expenses by 28% or a $2.1 billion. The fact that fuel price has 
remained high and volatile contributes not only to a higher level of this company’s operating 
expenses, but also molds its cost structure as this item accounts for 30% of total expenses 
(Figure 21 (a)). 
 
Figure 21: (a) Operational expenses breakdown in 2012; (b) Operating expenses and CASMs 2008-2012, (Delta 
Airlines, 2013) 
 As Figure 21 (b) depicts, there is a clear upward trend on this company’s operating 
expenses since 2009, confirming the facts outlined above. The same figure shows that the 
company is below the network segment average in terms of ex-fuel CASM, reflecting the 
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company’s effort to control all the operating cost items that are not related to fuel costs. 
 Although there is a beneficial gap towards Delta, ex-fuel CASM have been increasing, 
becoming even closer to the average figures of the network segment of the business. This 
recent trend is mainly explained by the rising of some particular operating cost items such as 
aircraft maintenance costs –which increased $190 million in 2012 – and salary costs that 
under recent union agreements led to wage increments making this item larger by $372 
million. 
!
Figure 22: Delta Airlines Net income (loss) between 2009 and 2012, (Delta Airlines, 2013) 
 In 2012, Delta Airlines was able to deliver profits for the 3rd year in a row. Indeed, 2009 
was the last fiscal year the company ran into red numbers (recording a - $1.2 billion loss), 
much of that motivated by a depressed economic environment (considered as systemic and 
common across all network carriers), and also due to the integration process with Northwest 
Airlines after the 2008 merger, which made Delta Airlines incur in $1 billion in one-time cash 
costs. However, ever since that year this company has leveraged on the economic recovery 
that has been boosting air travel demand as well as on its larger operational capabilities 
gained after the recent merger. In 2010, Delta delivered a $593 million result and could 
steadily consolidate that trend by recording profits of $854 and $1 billion in 2011 and 2012 
respectively. 
 !
Table 2: Relative financial performance analysis of US Airways and Delta Airlines in 2012 
 Table 2 summarizes a comparative financial performance between US Airways and 
Delta. As mentioned earlier, Delta Airlines was the largest player in the US market up until 
the merger between United and Continental, holding therefore the 2nd larger carrier status 
nowadays. For that reason, Delta presents a bigger financial dimension when it compared to 
US Airways – positioned as the 5th larger carrier in the market. In 2012 Delta’s turnover more 
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US Airways Delta Airlines
RPM (billions) 62,435 192,974
Operating Revenues (millions) $13,381 $36,670
Operating Expenses (millions) $12,975 $34,495
EBIT (millions) $856 $2,175
Net Income (millions) $637 $1,009
EBIT Margin 6.20% 5.90%
ROA 6.60% 2.30%
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operational capability is reflected on its RPM – more than 3 times higher than its peer - and 
on net income that yielded a gap of $392 in Delta’s favor. 
 Profitability wise, US Airways, despite its lower scale, turns out to yield relatively higher 
returns. On one hand, this company’s assets were able to deliver a 6.6% return, 4.4 
percentage points higher than Delta’s. On the other hand, US Airways proved to be more 
efficient in its operating activity as its EBIT margin was also higher than Delta’s, namely 0.3 
percentage points.  
!
4. Rationale For the Proposed Acquisition 
 
The proposed merger between Delta Airlines and US Airways approached in this 
paper is the result of a thorough analysis of the potential gains attached to the combination of 
those firms. 
Indeed, US airline passenger industry has been considered to still have room to 
accommodate further consolidation, in order to sustain its over capacity issue and create 
higher levels of efficiency that can bring sustainable profit streams to the industry. 
Comparatively to 2001, this industry saw a wave of mega-mergers between top National 
carriers, which was ultimately reflected on a significant decrease in the number of major 
market players ever since. Yet, studies showed that, in order to properly compete in an 
increasing competitive global market, US carriers will have to engage in more consolidation 
as top European, South american and Asian carriers are becoming bigger, stronger and 
more resilient after merger deals. 
Delta and US Airways would have several incentives to combine themselves and 
create the biggest American carrier. If the deal were successfully applied, the merged entity 
would total revenues of more than $50 billion, surpassing by far United – the current largest 
American carrier. 
Motivated by economic reasons, the deal would essentially be supported by the 
generation of major savings at operational level, at investing level and would bring 
substantial financial synergies. Due to the similarity of business areas and geographic scope 
(i.e. high portion of overlapped routes), operational cost synergies would be greatly propelled 
by the rationalization of the firm’s new network and the elimination of the duplicated 
overhead costs. Simultaneously, this paper found reasons to believe that an adjusted aircraft 
fleet to a much more rationalized network, would reduce the merged firm’s capital investment 
requirements, and consequently improve its FCFFs. 
The type of deal suggested for this particular case – merger of equals – would not 
entitle neither of the parties to become an acquirer/target as it is seen on a traditional merger 
case. Based on previous airline mega-mergers, carriers commonly resorted to such type of 
deal, where no side takes over the other. Rather, the combined firm will be governed by both 
firms’ executives and synergies will be split by each firm’s shareholders in accordance with 
relative size of US Airways and Delta Airlines on the total enterprise value of the merged 
entity. 
Lastly, though this deal concedes stronger financial and operational foundations to 
both firms (reducing the probability of default in the coming years), antitrust reviews executed 
by the DOJ may not be sensitive to such motives and may possibly reject the completion of 
the proposed deal, since Delta-US Airways would get a considerable large stake of the 
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American market and become a giant carrier within borders. Such legal hurdles will be 
thoroughly analyzed later in this paper. 
 
Since this paper is an academic exercise, the potential merger between American 
Airlines and US Airways – that might happen in 2013 - will be ignored. For that reason, it is 
assumed that American Airlines, albeit financially weak and facing a Chapter 11 process, will 
keep operating in this market and continue to be seen as one of the top US airline market 
players. 
!
5. Stock Performance 
 
As an industry with strong ties to the economic environment, the uncertainty around 
the most advanced economies is still harming airlines’ performance, which is ultimately 
reflected in their respective earnings and consequently, on their stock prices. Figure 23, 
conveys how both companies’ stock prices have performed over the past 2 years. 
 US Airways’ share price in 2011 followed a negative trend, as its business pace 
turned out to be relatively lower than previous year’s performance. A reduction of 3.5 
percentage points of EBITDA margin that led to a 86% decrease of earnings was reflected by 
a major slump of this company’s stock price of 52% over 2011, as it dropped from $10.6 
(January 2011) to $5.07 (December 2011). 
!
Figure 23: 2-year Historical Stock prices:  Delta Airlines and US Airways, Bloomberg 
  Conversely, in 2012, as the company could reap the benefits on margin 
improvements due to a more positive economic outlook in both American and European 
markets, its share price increased. Throughout that year, US Airways stock jumped from 
$5.12 to $13.5, recording a stunning 136% year-over-year. 
 When it comes to Delta Airlines, its stock price has followed a relatively analogous 
path, being, however, less volatile throughout the 2-year analysis. When comparing to US 
Airways, this company recorded a less strong slump in 2011 – as its price dropped $4.4 or 
36% - but it showed a slower recovery in 2012, when it taped a 47% increase. As of 
December 2012, this company’s share price was at $11.87. 
 To conclude, when comparing both companies’ stock price in 2011 and 2012 to those 

















































































































Delta US Airways 
Francisco Braamcamp de Mancelos                                            M&A: The Case of Delta Airlines and US Airways 
35 
!
numbers: in January 2007, its stock was trading at roughly $60, being more than 4 times 
higher than December’s 2012 price. Equally, Delta Airlines gap is not as pronounced. In 
2007, its stock was trading at $22, less than twice as much. Table 3 summarizes the range at 
which both firms have been trading their shares during 2011 and 2012. 
 
!
Table 3: Historical stock information for Delta Airlines and US Airways, Bloomberg 
  Finally, both companies have not paid out dividends for their shareholders and from 
the available information this policy, will be kept the same for the next several years.  
6. Standalone Valuation 
 
The following part of the present report will approach each company separately when 
performing the respective valuations. As academics and practitioners suggest, standalone 
valuation is the very first step to assess a merger and all the potential value that might be 
generated from synergies. 
 The following standalone valuations will be based on historical data provided from 
both company’s SEC fillings and past reports launched by FAA. Plus, both valuations are 
strongly linked to the forecasts this analysis managed to yield for the most important key 
drivers. On this matter, the explicit period will be from 2013 to 2022, which adequately 
reflects a reasonable time window for the projections to be made. Furthermore, as sources of 
the projections – which are going to be identified through the text – this analysis took major 
considerations on 2013 FAA forecasts report and the extrapolation of recent past trends. For 
that reason, seeing that projections are made upon uncertain grounds one should not expect 
that, throughout the 10-year explicit period, the forecasted variables perform exactly the way 
this analysis predicted.   
 In order to perform both firms’ valuations, the present analysis will resort to WACC 
approach and to APV model, as suggested earlier in literature review. Albeit different in the 
respective process, one should expect that those two approaches yield identical outcomes. 
6.1 Performance Forecast and Valuation 
 
 When projecting revenues into the future, one should not only take into consideration 
how fast or slow revenues have grown, but also the specificities of the airline industry. The 
following paragraphs will synthesize how this analysis will forecast revenues, expenses and 
other important items that will have an impact on the valuation process of both US Airways 
and Delta Airlines. For both companies, this analysis will use a 10-year forecast period 
(2013-2022). As for any forecasting exercise, historical data assumes a very important role 
as a platform to align future expectations to what has occurred in the past. For US Airways, 
US Airways (NYSE:LCC) Delta Airlines (NYSE:DAL)
Range 2011 $4.00 - $11.47 $6.62 - $13.00
Range 2012 $5.03 – 14.45$ $8.01 - $12.1
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historical data will comprise the last 6 years (2007-2012), while Delta Airlines will use a 4- 
year period22 (2009-2012). 
 




The following paragraphs summarize the main assumptions made to project US 
Airways revenues into the future. Revenues are organized according to the company’s 
operating segments, such as passenger and non-passenger sources of revenue – entailing 
cargo and ancillary revenue. 
Passenger Revenue 
 
As argued before, airline industry is highly dependent on the way economies are 
performing and, therefore, in order to forecast this company’s revenue stream one should 
incorporate economic projections. As already mentioned, air travel demand heavily depends 
upon the level of business and leisure activity, therefore, the main driver of revenue growth 
defined in this analysis is the annual percentage growth of disposable income per capita, this 
being the most accurate proxy for air travel demand23. This analysis will consider that this 
company will generate revenues in line with the specificities of the industry in which it operates. 
Seeing that this sector is highly competitive and has reached a mature stage, one can presume 
that revenues will grow hand-in-hand with the moderate growth prospects of the American 
economy. For that reason, this analysis will ensure the design a smooth pattern of growth, taking 
into consideration economy-based systemic conditions as well as the absence of great industry 
shocks. 
 Within the US, from 2007 to 2012 household disposable income per capita (Table 4) 
grew on average 1.2%, reflecting a period of slower economic pace and a more-than-average 
unemployment rate. During the period 2013-2022, this analysis expects an economic recovery 
within this country, bringing more positive numbers with regard to GDP growth and employment 
growth. Thus, American families will see their purchasing power – measured by disposable 
income per capita - grow on average by 2.6% during that period - peaking at 3% in 2014 (and 
stabilizing from 2017 to 2022 when reaching a 2.4% growth. 
 On the other hand, that number is higher when considering international markets to 
which US Airways has exposure to: Europe, Asia & Pacific, Latin America and Canada. 
Regarding average household consumption for each of those regions, one should expect a 3.4% 
growth rate from 2013 to 2022. This gap between domestic and global within this indicator is 
essentially the consequence of fast growing economies in Asia and South America. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 The analysis used a reduced historical period because of the merger between Delta and Northwest airlines that took place in 2008. Indeed, if 
one considers pre-merger data, it could lead to misinterpretations about the past trend of several items on this company’s financial statements. 
Therefore, by using a historical period from 2009 to 2012 this analysis will expunge all the values before the merger.  
 
23 Many analysts would peg air travel demand to GDP of a country. However, this economic indicator may not be the best proxy for it, due to the 
fact that many of GDP components have no connection to consumption. Indeed, variations in GDP may not be related to changes in consumption, 
being rather linked to amount of imports, exports, investment stocks, etc. Therefore, when GDP records a positive variation one should not 
confidently expect an increase in household disposable income and ultimately in air travel demand. 




Table 4: Actual Annual % growth of household disposable income per capita, (2007-2012) and average annual % 
growth rate forecast per regions (2013-2022), FAA 
Up to this point, annual household disposable income growth is defined as the main 
revenue driver and now some explanations should be made. Since US Airways has two sub 
segments within passenger revenue section – mainline and express – it is crucial to attribute 
and adjust different growth rates. 
 Firstly, express segment fully relies on its operations domestically. Thus, those 
revenues coming from this segment will be pegged to US household domestic disposable 
income per capita growth rate. 
 Secondly, mainline revenue growth rate has as drivers US household domestic 
disposable income per capita growth rate (!!"#) and International-aggregate GDP growth 
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 This equation considers the weight of both international and domestic revenue on 
total revenue and respective household income growth rate (!!"# ,!!"#). 
 When applying the past insights and equations, mainline segment is expected to 
grow on average 2.8% during the forecasted period, being 0.2 percentage points above the 
express segment. The former segment is expected to take advantage of international 
markets growth, specially because the analysis expects that US Airways will expand its 
international exposure by increasing its international revenues weight on total revenues from 
25% to a 40% target in 2022. Therefore, this company by 2022, is expected to generate 





When it comes to the growth rate of the non-passenger revenue segment – cargo 
and other – some considerations should be made. 
 Regarding cargo revenue segment, US Airways reckons freight activities as important 
ways to complement its core business. From 2007 to 2012, cargo revenues grew on average 
11%, amounting to $155 million in 2012. The present analysis forecasted this item during the 
period 2013-2022 by pegging its progress to world GDP growth rate (Appendix 3). The 
reason to do so relies on the two following explanations. Firstly, it is reasonable to use a 
global indicator such as the one regarded, seeing that US freight activities have a strong 
focus on intercontinental transportation. For instance, the current economic uncertainty 
surrounding Europe has been negatively affecting the cargo revenue stream of US Airways, 
reflecting therefore its dependence and interconnectivity to international markets. Secondly, 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013-2022
Asia & Pacific 5.40% 3.70% 3.70% 5.10% 4.90% 5.00% 4.50%
Europe 1.70% -0.20% -2.00% -0.90% -0.30% 0.30% 1.80%
South America 5.40% 3.30% -1.80% 5.10% 4.60% 4.80% 4.70%
North America 1.40% -1.30% -2.60% 1.00% 1.70% 1.40% 2.40%
International Aggregate 3.50% 1.40% -0.70% 3.00% 2.70% 2.90% 3.40%
USA 1.30% -1.50% -2.70% 1.00% 1.70% 1.30% 2.60%
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one should use GDP as an indicator because it accurately pictures world industrial 
production, which is the main driver of cargo volume. For that reason, cargo revenue will 
grow annually, on average, 5.3% during the forecasted period.  
 
 Finally, “other revenues” item – also known within the airline industry as ancillary 
revenue - will grow according to its increasing relevance on total revenues in most of US 
network carriers, trailing a common upward trend. 
 This analysis, therefore, assumes that ancillary revenue will grow 6.75% every year 
during the forecasted period, following a reasonable presumption that US Airways, as a 
network carriers, will try to offset a flat growth rate on average fares by keeping or even 
escalating the charge of services such as luggage, seat selection and cancellation options. 
Consequently, this revenue item is expected to grow faster than the rest of the segments, 
reaching a $2.6 billion figure by 2022. 
 Figure 24 summarizes all the information provided regarding the forecasting for each 
one of the revenue sources of US Airways. 
 
!
Figure 24: Growth prospects for US Airways revenue segments (2007-2022) 
Expenses Forecasting 
 
The following paragraphs regard the expenses related to US airway’s operational 
activity. For the sake of simplicity, the next part will depict the prospects of operating 
expenses items that have a major impact on the company’s total expenses, identified in the 
company’s analysis. Therefore, as major operating expenses, the analysis will consider fuel 
expenses, salaries, express expenses, aircraft rent and depreciation. The reason for the 
proposed organization has to do with the fact that this company’s income statement is very 
detailed and extensive regarding operating expenses. The operating expenses not covered 
in detail are assumed to follow sales behavior in the same proportion they did over the 
historical period (Appendix 14). 
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Aircraft fuel became recently the heaviest cost item in most companies’ cost structure. 
Indeed, this item has logically a high-correlation with oil price evolution, which allows us to 
reasonably assume that aircraft fuel expenses should follow the trends verified in oil price 
evolution. This latter item has been characterized by its volatility and uncertain behavior: it 
reached a height-record in June 2008 when oil expanded to $134.38 a barrel and ever since, 
it has been varying around the $100/ barrel psychological barrier. 
 Indeed, when forecasting oil price, a couple of variables should be accounted for, 
such as future availability, the extent to which prices will fluctuate and inflation. The first two 
variables, in turn, are deeply associated with occurrences that are hardly predictable and 
difficult to be modeled like the upsurge of political disruptions in oil producer countries, the 
occurrence of natural disasters and, finally, the strength of US dollar. 
 Aircraft fuel projections,24 in this analysis, will rely on two main drivers: the average 
fuel price per gallon (indexed to refiners’ acquisition cost average,) and fuel consumption 
(Appendix 15), which are projected to follow the same ratio to revenues as it did in the past 
years (i.e. 8%). 
 Projecting aircraft fuel expenses will be the outcome of the product between average 
fuel price per gallon and fuel consumption projections, generating the following conclusions.     
This cost item is expected to reach a $4.9 billion figure at the end of the explicit period, 
meaning that the company will face an annual growth rate of 3.7%. If one breaks down that 
figure, one can conclude that this upward trend is propelled by an expected growth of 0.32% 
yearly on the average price per gallon, and by fuel consumption that is projected to increase 
on average 3.6% every year. Figure 25, depicts the projections for both aircraft fuel 
expenses and its respective inputs. 
!
Figure 25: (a) Projections for average price per gallon (USD) and Fuel consumption; (b) US Airways projected 
aircraft fuel expenses 
Salaries and Related costs 
US Airways Group employs 31.200 workers – 4.000 pilots – and in 2012 has spent 
$2.5 billion in salaries representing roughly 25% of this company’s total operating expenses. 
 Historical data shows that this cost item, from 2007-2012, averaged a 3.1% annual 
growth rate, which ranged from 10.1% in 2007 to -3.1% in the following year. 
 When forecasting salaries and related costs, one should take into account the 
following fact: 83% of US Airways are represented by labor unions, which logically makes it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 This analysis was provided with FAA forecasts for refiners’ acquisition cost. However, those projections were based on constant prices. For the 
sake of consistency with the rest of the analysis, inflation (CPI annual change) was added to that variable. 
 $-    
 $0.50  
 $1.00  
 $1.50  
 $2.00  
 $2.50  
 $3.00  
 $3.50  
 -    
 300  
 600  
 900  
 1,200  
 1,500  
















































Fuel Consumption Average Price per gallon 
 $-  
 $1,000  
 $2,000  
 $3,000  
 $4,000  
 $5,000  
 $6,000  
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 
(a)$
(b)$
Francisco Braamcamp de Mancelos                                            M&A: The Case of Delta Airlines and US Airways 
40 
!
difficult to US Airways management to reduce this cost item on a frequent basis, either 
through wage cuts or through personnel reductions. Therefore, one should expect a relatively 
stable growth during the forecasted period. This analysis will forecast salaries and related 
costs based on this item’s proportion to sales. Taking into consideration the intrinsic difficulty 
to adjust this cost item, this analysis will assume that throughout the explicit period, salaries 
will be kept at 18% of sales – maintaining the ratio recorded in 2012. 
 By doing so, in 2022 salaries will amount to $3.7 billion after growing on average 




When it comes to express expenses - those related to US Airways express – one 
should expect that those would follow the same growth trend that has been in place from 
2007. Since that year, those expenses averaged a growth of 4.5% per year until 2012, 
amounting to $3.2 billion in that same year.  
 Throughout 2007-2012, these expenses have been ranging from 22% to 25% of total 
revenues, and this cost item is expected to be 24% over the forecasted period. Associated 
with the evolution of this ratio, one can verify that this forecast reflects the few growing 
opportunities within regional segment, a fact that is mainly propelled by the increasing LCC 
dominance on those markets, and also reflects the assumption earlier stated of US airways 
increasing international exposure 
Indeed, express expenses have been the 2nd largest expense item within this 
company, being mostly affected by fuel costs operating regional flights, and also by labor 
costs incurred by employing over 5.400 employees through its express subsidiaries, such as 
Piedmont and PSA. By the end of 2022, this cost item will maintain its weight on total 





Aircraft rent expenses are associated with operational expenses incurred with aircraft 
leases, which in turn will be the base for this cost item forecast until 2022. Indeed, historical 
data highlights its importance in US Airways fleet as the number of leased aircraft surpassed 
the owned fleet in every fiscal year.  
!
Figure 26: Projections for Aircraft rent expenses 2013-2022 
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Nonetheless, US Airways has been increasing the number of owned aircrafts both in 
absolute numbers and in comparison to leasing contracts. While in 2007 the ratio leased-to-
owned aircrafts25 was 3.8, five years later the same ratio dropped to 1.8. 
 This past trend is corroborated by the projections made by the company through its 
annual report regarding future commitments of aircraft leases. As Figure 27 shows, US 
Airways, during the first three years of the forecasted period, will meet higher values for this 
item when compared to 2012, averaging $789 million per year. Thereafter, it is expected that 
the company will progressively adjust the amount of leased aircrafts to lower patterns until 
2022, stabilizing at $568 million. 
 
Depreciation and Amortization 
 
All the financial reports provided by the company refers depreciation and amortization 
(D&A) as a single account and, for that reason, the same principle will be used throughout 
this analysis. 
 For the forecasted period, this item will progress similarly at the same pace it has 
been evolving in the past years. D&A during the past 6 years has grown on average 5.9%, 
while the ratio depreciation-to-net property and equipment (PP&E) ranged from 8% to 5%. 
For that reason, throughout the explicit period, D&A item will be projected by assuming that 
the proportion to net PP&E will be equal to the average of the past 5 fiscal years, namely 
6.6%. By assuming so, D&A will, on average, present a figure of $404 million, jumping from 
$340 million in 2012 to $474 million in 2022. Figure 27 quantifies the evolution of this item 
throughout the explicit period. 
 
!
Figure 27: Depreciation and Amortization projections 
Capital Expenditures  
 
Capital expenditures comprise all the necessary investments US Airways has to fulfill 
in order to maintain or expand the company’s ability to generate value through its operations. 
US Airways capital expenditures mainly entail investments in property and equipment, which 
in turn may be split into two major areas: flight equipment – which represents the most 
important sub item due to the fact of being a core resource for this business; and, also, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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ground property and equipment. For that reason, this analysis will consider capital 
expenditures as the investment this company makes at PP&E level. 
 Looking at the most recent fiscal years, US Airways capital expenditures amounted to 
$201, $593 and $775 million in 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively. The increasing trend has 
its roots on the expansion on the number of owned aircrafts. As earlier mentioned, as US 
Airways shifted from predominantly holding leased aircrafts to purchasing them, those facts 
have arouse an increase of investment needs. For instance, 56 new aircrafts were acquired 
between 2007 and 2012, which makes US Airways fleet reach 340 aircrafts. 
 For the purpose of forecasting this company’s capital expenditures, one should 
consider the following aspects. Firstly, airline industry is capital intensive and requires 
frequent capital investments. Secondly, flight equipment has a relatively high lifecycle and 
marginal technological breakthroughs are relatively uncommon. Lastly, flight equipment 
investment may be associated with the company’s turnover: as the business grows, more 
flights will be demanded and the company may expand its fleet. Conversely, cycles of lower 
demand may lead to a lower number of flights and less aircrafts used, which prompts the firm 
to adjust its fleet composition. Consequently, being on a mature industry with few 
opportunities to meet high expansions, it is reasonable to expect that capital expenditures 
will grow moderately. 
 According to Koller et. al (2005), capital investments (capex) should be the result of 
the sum of changes in net PP&E and depreciation: 
 
!"#$%! = !"#!!!&!! − !"#!!!&!!!! + !&!! 
 
Furthermore, taking into consideration the relationship between capital needs and 
level of revenues, this analysis will project net PP&E according to its ratio to revenues, which 
is assumed to be 36%. As Figure 28 depicts, US Airways capex level will be on average 
$648 per year – ranging from $766 million (2013) to $576 million (2015) - being roughly 1.62x 
D&A throughout the period. 
This analysis strongly believes that capex projections are aligned with both the 
industry specificities and the company’s own characteristics. 
 
!
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Net working Capital 
   
 A firm’s net working capital refers to the capital it requires to keep its operational 
activity going on smoothly. This measure is often considered to set the difference between 
current assets and current liabilities; however, one should only consider current items that 
are related to the operational core of the company, excluding financing items such as short-
term investments and liabilities as well as cash and cash equivalents (Koller et. al,2010). For 
the purpose of Airline industry, and specially US Airways case, net working capital comprises 
the following components: restricted cash, accounts receivable, materials & supplies and 
prepaid expenses (current assets); accounts payables, air traffic liability, accrued 
compensation and taxes and other accrued expenses (Table 5). 
 Almost all the aforementioned items’ expected behavior is indexed to the respective 
relationship with revenues during the forecasted period, seeing that revenues turn out to be a 
reasonable driver as it represents the pace of the operational business and its turnover. 
 Throughout the historical period, net working capital (NWC) has been negative and 
the gap between current assets and liabilities has increased on average 2.5%, matching an 
increase of $52 million. In 2012, net working capital amounted to - $1.6 billion, following a 
common trend within the airline industry. This business specificities and its business cycle 
make most of carriers prone to face negative working capitals, as carriers collect the money 
at the time of booking which is considerably before the company provides the actual 
transportation service to those customers. Plus, legacy carriers – such as US Airways – are 
characterized to be large firms, which have a considerable bargaining power with their 
suppliers, which is materialized in longer credit periods. For that reason, in 2012, US Airways 
recorded accounts payables 1.22 times higher than accounts receivables and, above all, 
current liabilities 2.39 times higher than current assets. 
 When it comes to projecting net working capital into the future, by attaching the 
operating working capital items to revenues and assume that their respective proportion will 
be equal to the same average ratio recorded in the historical period, this analysis will 
presume that current liabilities will grow slightly faster than current assets. While in 2013, 
NWC will match a - $ 1.7 billion, the gap between current assets and current liabilities will be 
deepened as NWC will amount to - $2.4 billion (Figure 29). Subsequently, on average, US 
Airways will meet a $70 million marginal decrease in NWC, which turns out to be a source of 
funds to its operational activity, since it relieves cash to the firm claimholders. 
 
!
Table 5: Current Assets and Current Liabilities as percentage of revenues for 2013-2022 
 
Current Assets %Revenues Current Liabilities %Revenues
Accounts receivable 2.70% Accounts Payable 3.70%
Materials and supplies 2.00% Air traffic liability 7.10%
Prepaid expenses and other 4.50% Accrued compensation and vacation 1.80%
Accrued taxes 1.30%
Other accrued expenses 7.60%




Figure 29: Net Working Capital projections for the forecasted period 
Taxes  
 
US Airways, as an American corporation, follows the existing tax laws within that 
country. Taking into account the size of taxable income, according to the US tax law, US 
Airways falls into the highest tax bracket due to the fact of producing a pre-tax income of 
over $18.3 million. Thus, this company faces a statutory tax rate of 35% (KPMG,2012) and 
for the purpose of the forecasted period, this figure is expected to remain constant. 
 When it comes to effective tax rate,26 one can verify through Table 6 that US Airways 
tax burden has been quite uneven and considerably lower than statutory tax rate over the 
years due to the utilization of operating loss carryforwards. For the 2013-2022 period, 
effective tax rate will match the average of the effective tax rates of those years during which 
income was actually paid. For that reason, fiscal years 2006, 2007 and 2011 will be the base 
of the forecasts, yielding a 16% figure. 
 Due to previous fiscal years with major losses in 2008 and 2009, US Airways has 
been able to apply those losses to future income tax payments. As the company steps into 
profit over the next years in a stable way, those tax reliefs are expected to be gradually 
diluted, rising the effective amount of income tax paid and in consequence the company’s 
effective tax rate. Therefore, after 2022, effective tax rate is expected to increase and 
converge to the statutory tax rate, and a 30% effective tax rate is expected to be achieved 
and it will be considered for the purpose of terminal value computation. 
 
!
Table 6: Historical effective income taxes for US Airways, (US Airways Group, 2013) 
Leverage 
 
During the explicit period, this analysis assumes that US Airways will engage in a 
continuous effort to strengthen its balance sheet, by reducing its leverage. In 2012, at market 
values, this company Debt-to-equity ratio was as high as 2.80, which was fairly above what 
its main competitors were presenting.27 As Table 7 shows, from the peer group, US Airways 
verified a weaker financial position, by having higher debt ratios.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26  Effective tax rate is the amount of taxes actually paid by a firm on a fiscal year. It can be computed as !""#$%&'#!!"#!!"#$ = !"#$%!!"#!"#"$%&!!"#$%& 
 
27 For this purpose, the analysis considered Delta Airlines and United Airlines to be identical players, since both are legacy carriers and are 






 $-  





2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Taxable Income (millions)  $                  404  $                  430  $                    (2)  $                 (243)  $                  502  $                   90  $                  637 
Effective amount of income tax paid (millions)  $                  101  $                     7  -  $                  (38)  -  $                   19  - 
Effective tax rate 25% 2% - -16% - 21% -
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In an effort to converge to average leverage levels, the analysis assumed that US 
Airways over the next 10 years would set a debt-to-equity target ratio of 1.8. Conversely, 
debt-to-capital ratio (73.7% in 2012) is equally expected to be reduced throughout the explicit 
period in order to join the peers’ patterns, reaching by 2022, a 65% figure. As a reflection, by 
2022 long-term interest bearing debt will represent 65% of long-term assets, which would 
represent a 10 percentage points decrease comparing to levels recorded in 2012. 
 
!
Table 7: 2012 Debt ratios for comparable firms at market value 
 
In spite of still being a high leverage ratio, there are business specific idiosyncrasies 
that support it. Firstly, airline industry is per se a highly leveraged sector, which has already 
seen higher leverage (e.g. in 2005 debt-to-capital ratio was 205%). Secondly, this industry as 
a capital-intensive sector, quite often faces high levels of volatility in its earnings, being 
unreasonable to assume that retained earnings may fund its high capital requirements. 
Thirdly, large carriers such as US Airways can “afford” to sustain such high debt ratios 
seeing that most of its debt is secured and highly recovered (i.e. most of debt is secured by 
collaterals which are highly transferred and marketable, such as flight equipment, route slots, 
etc). 
 
Cost of Capital 
 
For the purpose of US Airways valuation, cost of capital will – according to the model 
in use  - entail the price of both sources of capital: equity and debt, and will represent the rate 
at which FCFF will be discounted. On one hand, when using DCF valuation model, cost of 
capital is matched by the WACC, on the other hand, APV model – just like previously 
announced in literature review – will discount FCFF at the unlevered cost of equity, since it 
will separately treat side effects regarding the way this company is financed. 
 Also mentioned in literature review, the current analysis – in pursuit for this company 
valuation – will be supported by CAPM model when assessing its respective cost of equity. In 
order to pursue that goal, the model’s components will be highlighted and its values will be 
framed into the specificities of US Airways. 
 Firstly, regarding the risk free rate, one can consider that since US Airways operates 
in a developed country within a mature industry, the best and most common proxy for a 
riskless asset is the 10-year US Treasury bond (being paired with the same currency as US 
Airways cash flows). For that reason, this analysis took into consideration the respective 
average yield recorded between 2009 and 2012. During that period, the 10-year US Treasury 
bond averaged 2.7%28, being, therefore, the figure used in this analysis as the risk free input 
for the CAPM model. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 This low yield reflects the current interest rate policy of Federal Reserve, in pursuit of stimulating the American economy. 
Comparable firms Debt-to-capital Debt-to-equity
US Airways 73.70% 280%
United Airlines 62.29% 165%
Delta Airlines 59.70% 148%
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Secondly, for the purpose of estimating market risk premium, this analysis will follow 
the guidelines provided by Koller et al. (2010) by extrapolating historical excess returns. 
Furthermore, since the same source argues that historical data should be based on a long 
time window, this analysis will use the long run premium for the USA from 1900-2012 
provided by Credit Suisse (2013) through its Investment return yearbook, which was 5.6%. 
Once again, this analysis will stick to US reality-market not only because it is the country 
where the valued company is mainly focused on, but also because of the strong foundations 
of US equity market for many years, which yields a sense of stability and reliability that are 
important attributes when projecting historical trends into the future. 
Concerning the computation of the beta, the following comments should be made. As  
Koller et al. (2010) argue, in order to yield better and more precise estimates for betas, one 
should use industry rather than company specific betas. Considering unlevered betas, airline 
carriers face the same operating risks throughout the industry, sharing the same industry 
cycle in terms of how revenues and expenses evolve. Subsequently, it is reasonable that 
unlevered airline industry beta will be, to a decent extent, a good proxy for the US Airways 
unlevered beta. Through Damodaran (2013a), this analysis was provided with an estimate 
for Air transportation unlevered industry beta of 0.82. 
Moreover, this analysis relied on the process of leveraging the unlevered betas29 
provided by Damodaran30. As explained in the literature review, levered betas are higher 
than the unlevered betas by the proportion of debt within the capital structure of a company. 
After applying the suggested formula, this analysis found a levered beta of 2.3, which albeit 
high is the result of a highly leveraged capital structure.  
 Finally, regarding this company’s cost of debt, the following valuation will infer it 
based on Damodaran’s credit rating spread framework (Appendix 12). The reasoning for that 
lies behind the fact that US Airways has not issued public bonds – making it therefore 
impossible to assess its respective market price. Furthermore, given the fact this company 
has several types of debt with different maturities, repayment schemes, amounts and 
conditions, a unique interest rate would be hard to compute due to the complexity involved.  
 According to US Airways 2013 10-k form, this company’s credit rating has been B- 31  
ever since 2007. The current rating is the replication of both high level of this firm’s 
indebtedness as well as the past volatility of the business itself and consequently earnings 
and cash flows: the more volatile those are, the more uncertain is US Airways capability to 
cover all its contractual obligations. For that reason, a 7.25% default spread should be added 
over the risk free rate. Therefore, this analysis will be based on a pre-tax cost of debt of 
9.95%.  
Finally, when computing US Airways terminal value this analysis will assume that 
cash flows will grow in perpetuity at 2.5%. This rate is based on the FAA long-term forecast 
for US GDP between 2022 and 2033. This growth rate is in line with the prospects of both 
US economic environment and the airline industry – which is a mature sector; and also with 
the proposal made by Koller et. al (2010), who acknowledge the fact that the long-term 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 If one assumes that the beta of debt is 0 – due to the fact that Debtholders are the first who get paid, one’s company levered beta is computed 
as follows: 




30 Unlevered betas of the industry still stand sue to the fact that they not consider any effect of the capital structure of the company. Therefore, this 
will serve as the base for the estimation of levered beta. 
 
31 Standard and Poors 
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growth rate of a company should never surpass the GDP growth of the respective country 
plus inflation. 
Table 8, reflects the fundamental inputs that were the primary base for the following 
DCF valuation conclusions. 
 
!
Table 8: US Airways Valuation inputs 
Valuation 
 
 Firstly, when applying the aforementioned input for the DCF valuation based on 
WACC, the model (deeply expanded in Appendix 18) yielded an enterprise value of $4.8 
billion.  
 Acknowledging the fact that equity value is yielded by the difference between the 
enterprise value and debt32, one can conclude that the value of equity is $2.30 billion. 
According to US Airways financial report, as of December 2012 the company had 
162.897.835 common stock outstanding33, which would yield an equity value per share of 
$14.15 (Table 9). 
 Market wise, as of December 2012 the average stock price stayed at $12.94, making 
US Airways market capitalization be equal to $2.11 billion, which is fairly close to this 
analysis estimates. 
 Analysts expect that for the next years, US air carriers will be able to improve their 
margins and, mostly, reduce their overcapacity either through their own operational efficiency 
or through market consolidation. For that reason, it is reasonable to assume that in a near 
future, these positive facts will be incorporated in a higher market capitalization due to its 
strengthened stock price. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Debt net of cash and cash equivalents. The net debt position of US Airways as of December 2012 was $2.517 billion. 
 
33 As of December 2012. Repurchase of stock is not expected to happen during the explicit period. 
Risk-free rate 2.70%
US risk premium 5.60%
Effective tax rate 16.00%
Target (D/D+E) 65.00%
Cost of debt 9.95%
Unlevered Beta 0.82
Unlevered rate of return, equity 7.30%
US Airways levered beta 2.3
Levered rate of return, equity 16.00%
WACC 10.90%
Long-term sustainable growth 2.50%




Table 9: Valuation Output using WACC 
Alternatively, performing the APV model, the present analysis named three 
components of this firm’s value: the base case value that assesses the value of the firm as a 
fully equity financed company; the tax shields generated from bearing debt on its balance 
sheet; and finally, the costs linked to the firm’s debt level, known as costs of financial distress. 
 The first component, base case value, aggregated all the FCFF that the company 
would yield during the explicit period plus a terminal value, all discounted back at the 
unlevered cost of equity of 7.3%.  
 Secondly, tax shields were computed by multiplying the company’s annual interest 
expenses by the effective tax rate (known as tax deductions), and discount them at an 
adequate rate that fairly incorporates their riskiness. As explained earlier in literature review, 
one should reasonably assume that the company’s cost of debt is a fair discount rate, which 
will be assumed in this company’s valuation. US Airways is expected to yield a present value 
of interest tax shields of $887 million. 
 Thirdly, due to the fact that US Airways relies its activity on a relatively high level debt 
– compared to other industries – it is crucial to account for the downside of sustaining such 
high debt ratios within its balance sheet. As provided earlier in literature review, costs of 
financial distress (CFD) result from the product between the probability of default and the 
present value of bankruptcy costs.34 Due to the subjectivity, complexity and lack of applicable 
alternative methods to compute CFD, its components were assessed based on frameworks 
created by academics that resulted from empirical evidence and some adjustments. 
 Those estimates were retrieved from statistical researches based on industry analysis. 
Nevertheless, assuming that even within the same industry, companies may differ from one 
to the other, one should interpret those estimates carefully. 
 
!" = !! + 1 − !! ∗ !" !"# − !! ∗%!"# ∗ !!  
 
 When it comes to bankruptcy costs, this analysis will follow the academic suggestions 
of Korteweg (2007), who looked at those costs (as percentage of firm value) in different 
industries, splitting them into ex-ante an ex-post costs of financial distress. 
 Being an air carrier, US Airways for will face relatively high CFDs, both before the 
hypothetical bankruptcy and during that process. Indeed, according to Korteweg (2007) 
research within the air transportation sector, ex-ante CFDs will be as high as 32.6%35 of the 
firm’s value. This is mainly explained by the fact that customers’ perception towards the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Present value of bankruptcy costs is expressed as the percentage of Value of the unlevered firm. 
 
35 Korteweg (2007) generated ex-ante CFD according to firms’ leverage ratio. Therefore, 32.6% represents the cost of financial distress (in 
percentage of value of the firm) of a company with the same leverage ratio as US Airways. 
Millions
Enterprise Value $                           4.821
Debt, Mv $                           4.793
Cash & cash equivalents $                           2.276
Net Debt $                           2.517
Equity Value $                           2.304
Equity per share $                           14,15
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company would be highly damaged if they were suspicious about its financial strength of the 
company. Firstly, they would stop buying tickets in advance to avoid the risk of not being 
served in the future; and secondly, they would not buy tickets from an air carrier whose 
security and safety levels may be negligible due to financial distress. 
 On the other hand, through this study an air carrier on average would also experience 
in a loss of value of 15.8% due to the litigation process and involved fees that would be 
incurred during the liquidation process. Putting together those components, a potential 
bankruptcy would absorb 48.4% of the firm value.  
 Regarding probability of default, this analysis took into consideration the probability of 
default linked to the company’s credit rating, since no other methods were applicable (e.g. 
implicit probability of default from traded bonds). According to Damodaran a B-, rated firm 
would face a probability of default of 42.12% (Appendix 12), reflecting the uncertainty of the 
firm’s ability to repay all its contractual obligations. Therefore, CFD would be expected to 
match a $1.5 billion figure. 
 According to the above equation, the enterprise value should be equal to unlevered 
value of the firm plus the present value of interest tax shields (only those when company is 
solvent and able to generate earnings), minus the cost of financial distress. APV model, 
based on the aforementioned inputs, found an enterprise value of $6.5 billion, being over 
$1.5 billion WACC estimates: 
 
!" = $7.5 + 1 − 0.421 ∗ $0.87 − 0.421 ∗ 0.484 ∗ $7.5 = $6.49!!"##"$% 
 
 Indeed, APV model yielded a higher valuation when compared to WACC outcome. 
This gap may be explained by the fact that probability of default, which the framework came 
up with, is not reflective of US Airways situation. As a matter of fact, this value is the result of 
the average of several firms from different industries, whose financial situation was identical. 
Consequently, those disparities may yield an underestimated probability of default regarding 
the financial reality of US Airways and also the specificities of the airlines industry. Therefore, 
this analysis resorted to a sensitivity analysis by changing probability of default, ceteris 
paribus. For that purpose, the analysis hypothetically set it equal to the next worse credit 
rates: CCC and CC, 51.40% and 60.40%, respectively.  
Though as high as it may seem, this number reflects both the risk-specificities of the 
industry – high capital requirements, high fixed costs (labor and fuel), fierce competition and 
the existence of uncontrollable factors that negatively influence demand - and the negative 
record of the industry itself. Ever since the deregulation process in 1978, when regulators 
stopped raising fares every time companies were in financial trouble, US air companies filed 
for bankruptcy 189 times. All these facts prove that this industry is prone to financial failures 
and, above all, overleverage may increase the likelihood of cash flows generated by the 
company being insufficient to cover companies’ obligations. 
Logically, assuming a higher probability of default will reduce enterprise value. A 
60.4% probability would set an enterprise value of $5.66 billion, reducing therefore the gap 
between the two valuation models considered. 
 




Figure 30: Sensitivity analysis adjusting probability of default, ceteris paribus 
In spite of the existence of a gap between these 2 valuation models, this analysis will 
confidently use WACC results and truly believes that it reliably depicts the fair value of US 
Airways. Hence, an enterprise value of $4.8 billion ($14.15 per share) will be considered 




For the purpose of attesting to the fairness of this analysis valuation results, this 
paper had also resorted to relative valuation in order to check whether WACC valuation is 
aligned with the market patterns. For that reason, when addressing relative valuation, this 
analysis resorted to EV/EBITDA and did not regard P/E as usually done by practitioners. The 
reasoning behind that decision has to do with the fact that the former multiple provides a 
more reliable representation of the fair value of the company, by overcoming the distortions 
P/E multiple is sensitive to. These distortions are the reflection of changes within composition 
of capital structure, variations in depreciation policies, one-time events and account non-
operating items. Indeed, those are elements that can be manipulated by the company in 
order to attain certain P/E level, leaving this multiple with a low sense of reliability. 
 Conversely, EV/EBITDA being unaffected by any capital structure decision and able 
to overcome distortions, such as depreciation and the consideration of non-operating items 
(i.e. cash is deducted to enterprise value, is considered a wiser option for this analysis. 
In order to perform a correct comparison, the analysis focused its attention on 
comparable firms, which share the same business features of US Airways. This analysis 
resorted to Goldman Sachs research regarding EV/EBITDA multiple. By considering a group 
of 6 peers (Delta, United, Lufthansa, IAG, Air France and Turkish Airlines), the average 
within the group peer was 5.13, yielding for US Airways enterprise value a figure of $4.3 
billion (Table 10). This conclusion turned out to become very close to the analysis’ findings, 
since the difference to WACC results was roughly $0.57 billion. Then, seeing that the 
restricted peer group entails companies with much similar features, it is rewarding to verify 
that the enterprise value drawn by this analysis ($4.8 billion) is close to what market would 
dictate. 
 




















Table 10: Peer group multiples, Goldman Sachs 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In order to improve robustness US Airways valuation results, one ought to deepen 
sensitivity analysis by marginally varying some key value drivers on a ceteris paribus basis. 
In fact, the valuation outcome is the result of forecasts – that are subject to uncertainty – and 
assumptions, which may often lead to some subjectivity. Table 11 entails two drivers that 
were subject to changes and materializes the extent to which equity value would vary to the 
correspondent marginal change of revenue growth rate, long-term sustainable growth rate 
and cost of capital. 
 Firstly, if annual revenue growth rate were set at 1 percentage point higher than the 
base case (4.7% vs. 3.7%), it would impact equity value by a considerable extent. This level 
of elasticity was materialized on a 27.2% change, an increment of $627 million, due to a 
positive effect on FCFF of the company. Conversely, a downward adjustment would imply a 
lower equity value of roughly $449 million. 
 Secondly, when it comes to the remainder variables one can verify that a 1 
percentage point positive change in the long-term growth rate would press upwards equity by 
13.1% whereas a 1 percentage point negative change would make equity value decrease by 
10%, or $231 million. 
 
 
Table 11: Sensitivity Analysis 
When it comes to the cost of capital, this analysis looked at the consequences of 4 
different scenarios: increase (decrease) by 1 or 2 percentage points on each of the periods 
within the explicit period. The analysis found that enterprise value would vary within a 
window ranging from $4.2 billion (yielded by a 12.9% WACC), and $5.5 billion (yielded by an 
8.8% WACC). 
Goldman Sachs 2013E
Company Country Market Cap (millions) EV/EBITDA
United Cont'l Hldgs. USA $                          7.773 3,6
Delta Air Lines USA $                        10.108 4,7
Air France KLM France $                          2.731 4,8
IAG U.K $                          6.865 5,2
Lufthansa Germany $                          8.636 7,1
Turkish Airlines Turkey $                          5.874 5,9
Average $                          6.998 5,1
($ millions) (percent)
$          627 27,2%
$         (449) -19,5%
$          303 13,1%
$         (231) -10,0%







Change in Equity Value




Figure 31: Equity and enterprise value for different cost of capital 
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The following paragraphs summarize the main assumptions made to project Delta’s 
revenues into the future. Revenues are organized by the company’s segment: passenger 
and non-passenger sources of revenue. 
Passenger Revenue  
 
Delta Airlines passenger revenues’ growth is expected to follow identical path as US 
Airways: both operate within the same segment – network carriers – and they operate on a 
mature industry with few opportunities for high growing companies. For that reason, industry 
and general economic wide variables will drive their revenues. 
During the explicit period, Delta Airlines passenger revenues reckon to grow, on 
average, 3.5% per year for the mainline segment and 2.6% for the regional segment. The 
former will be driven by the disposable income per capita growth on both domestic and 
international market 36  (Table 4). Consequently, Delta Airlines mainline revenues are 
expected to reach $35.4 billion by 2022, after jumping from a $25.2 figure in 2012. 
 On the other hand, regional segment is expected to grow from $6.8 billion to $8.5 
during the forecasted period, reflecting a 2.6% annual average growth rate. This trend is 
highly driven by the positive prospects of disposable income per capita of American families 
until 2022 (Table 4). Total passenger revenues are, therefore, expected to present a 3.2% 
average annual growth during the explicit period, making Delta Airways able to reach a $43.9 
billion figure in 2022. Furthermore, these projections keep this revenue representing 85% of 





36 Like US Airways, the analysis assumes that Delta’s international activity will account for 35% of the business throughout the explicit period. 










Enterpise Value Equity Value 





Non-passenger revenue of this company, like US Airways, entails non-core activities 
such as cargo business (freight services) and ancillary sources of revenue (previously 
explained). 
Firstly, Delta’s cargo business has been irregularly growing over the past 3 years and 
it would not be prudential to extrapolate the past trend into the future, due to the high level of 
uncertainty. Accordingly, as previously applied to US Airways, World’s GDP may serve as a 
good proxy for this part of the company business, seeing that industrial activity strongly 
affects the need for cargo transportation. Thus, this analysis expects an annual growth rate 
of 5.3% for revenues coming from cargo, yielding on average a $63 million improvement per 
year until 2022, as it follows the World’s GDP nominal growth rate. 
 Secondly, when it comes to ancillary revenue, this analysis assumes once again that 
this item’s relevance on total revenues will grow, as it did over the past years in most of US 
network air carriers when they pursued alternatives to offset a decreasing trend on average 
fares. This analysis expects an annual average growth rate of 6.8%, making this revenue 
item jump from $3.9 billion in 2012 to $7.4 billion in 2022. For this revenue source, historical 
trend shows that industry wise it has grown faster than any other revenue item. Applying to 
Delta’s case, ancillary revenue will represent 14% of its total operating revenues by 2022 - a 
3 percentage points increase compared to 2012 numbers. 
  Figure 32 summarizes all the information provided regarding the forecasting for each 
one of the revenue sources. 
!
Figure 32: Growth prospects for Delta’s revenue segments (2009-2022) 
Expenses Forecasting 
  
The following paragraphs regard the expenses related to Delta’s operational activity. 
Due to the fact that Delta income statement is very detailed and extensive with regard to 
operating expenses, only the most important items and those that could severely impact 
Delta’s performance are looked into more detail within the next part. 
Aircraft Fuel 
 
Like US Airways, this analysis considers aircraft fuel expenses outcome as a function 
of the company’s fuel consumption (in gallons) and average price of gallon. 
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 On one hand, fuel consumption is expected to follow the company’s revenue as it did 
in the past, namely maintaining a stable fuel consumption-to-revenues ratio: it is expected 
that until 2020 this ratio will be 10%, and thereafter it will decrease to 9%. 
On the other hand, average fuel price per gallon will be indexed to refiners’ 
acquisition cost average forecast built by FAA for this analysis’ explicit period (Appendix 23). 
As US Airways, aircraft fuel expenses will result from the product of fuel consumption and 
price per gallon. 
For that reason, these expenses are projected to reach a $15.7 billion figure by 2022, 
which would represent an annual average growth rate of 4.6%. As Figure 33 depicts, the 
increasing trend in fuel expenses is the ultimate result of an upward trend in both fuel 
consumption and price per gallon. Indeed, this analysis projects that average price per gallon 
will grow 1.6% per year, jumping from $2.87 in 2013 to $3.30 in 2022. Simultaneously, fuel 
consumption will grow 2.7% per year, being 1.26x of the 2012 consumption (4.766 million 
gallons vs. 3.769 million gallon). 
 
!
Figure 33: (a) Projections for average price per gallon (USD) and Fuel consumption; (b) Delta’s projected aircraft 
fuel expenses 
Wages, Salaries and Benefits 
 
In 2012, labor costs turned out to be Delta’s largest expense when excluding fuel 
expenditure and, for that reason, the analysis’ projections will keep this item’s relevance 
along the forecasted period. 
Historical data shows that salaries have consistently been constant in relation to 
revenues, after 3 years accounting for 20% of Delta’s total revenues. Thus, this analysis 
assumes that Delta will maintain the same ratio throughout the explicit period. This 
assumption will, in fact, yield an annual average growth rate of 3.8%, which ensure high 
levels of reasonableness seeing that it is aligned with inflation projections: salaries are 
expected to grow 1.8 percentage points over inflation. 
As US Airways, Delta Airlines faces an highly unionized workforce that often drives it 
to attain high levels of bargaining power in specific issues such as wage raises and layoff 
negotiations which, ultimately, restricts management’s scope when it comes to adjustments 
in this field. 
Aircraft Maintenance 
 
Delta aircraft’s maintenance costs will grow slightly slower when it compared to 
historical data, as the company is expected to start replacing its aircraft fleet and therefore 
incur in less maintenance costs. For that reason, from 2013 to 2018, this expense item is 
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expected to grow 4% gradually and 5% thereafter as the fleet’s useful life decreases. At the 
end of the explicit period, this item is projected to reach a $3 billion figure. 
 
Contract Carrier Arrangements 
 
Delta Airlines often resorts to arrangements with partner carriers in order to perform 
regional flights. Under these contract arrangements, regional affiliates operate under Delta’s 
name, although all the back office services are provided by Delta, such as scheduling, pricing, 
ticketing and reservations. 
As shown by Delta’s cost breakdown (Figure 21), in 2012, this cost item turned out to 
represent as much as 6% of the company’s total expenses, amounting to $5.6 billion. In that 
same year it also represented 16% of revenues, a ratio that is going to be extrapolated and 
used by this analysis when forecasting this cost item. Subsequently, if one projects the 
above proportion between contract arrangements and revenues, during the explicit period, 
this cost item will grow on average 4.1% yearly, amounting to $8.5 billion. 
Taxes 
 
Delta Airlines over the past four fiscal years has not shown a regular effective tax rate. 
Indeed, as US airways, this company would face a statutory text rate of 35% (KPMG, 2012) 
according to the US tax law. 
As Table 12 shows, only fiscal years 2010 and 2012 have actual seen tax payments 
of $15 million and $16 million respectively, corresponding to a rather low effective tax rate of 
roughly 2%. Furthermore, Delta Airlines, through its 2013 Annual report, reaffirmed that it still 
has $16.3 billion worth of Net Operating loss (NOL) carryforwards, expecting therefore to 
“ not pay any cash income tax during the next several years”. 
Taking into consideration this fact, during the explicit period, this analysis assumes 
that the utilization of that amount of NOL carryforwards will provide the company with the 
opportunity of having a 0% effective tax rate. However, due to the fact that NOL 
carryforwards do expire for tax relief purposes and also the fact that as the company runs 




Table 12: Historical effective income taxes for US Airways in million dollars, (2007-2012), (Delta Airlines, 2013) 
 
Capital Expenditures and Depreciation & Amortization 
  
This analysis resorted to Goldman Sachs reports regarding this firm’s capex 
projections. Analysts expect that Delta engages in higher capital expenditures when 
compared to historical average, not only to upgrade current aircrafts but also to expand its 
fleet, in order to fight LCC domestically and expand international routes – often more 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013-2022 Terminal Value
Taxable Income (millions)  $(1,581)  $608  $769  $1,025 
Effective amount of income tax paid (save) (millions)  $(344)  $15  $(85)  $16 
Effective tax rate - 2%  - 2% 0% 30%
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profitable. As of 2012, this carrier owned a 717 fleet having committed itself to purchase 178 
new aircrafts during the next years, which reflects this firm’s preference for purchasing-
contracts rather than leased ones. Indeed, it is expected Delta capex will amount to $2.5 
billion per year, in an effort to balance lower investing levels in previous years driven by large 
operating losses incur by this company.  
For the purpose of projecting the depreciation and amortization (D&A) item, it is 
assumed that it will also be tied to what Goldman Sachs projects for this company. By doing 
so, it is expected that capex-to-depreciation stays at 1.5 until 2016 and thereafter at 1.45. 
From that ratio, D&A levels could easily be derived, meaning that from 2013 to 2016 this item 




Figure 34: Capex and D&A projections for Delta Airlines 
Net Working Capital 
 
When it comes to short term operational cycle, this analysis – alike US Airways – will 
consider as current assets: restricted cash, receivables, fuel inventory, material supplies, 
deferred income tax and prepaid expenses. On the other hand, as current liabilities the 
following items were considered: air traffic liability, payables, frequent flyer deferred revenue, 
taxes payable, fuel card obligation and other accrued liabilities. 
 
Table 13: Current Assets and liabilities items as a percentage of revenues for 2013-2022 period 
This analysis tied every item to revenue growth37 and assumed that their average 
proportion to the company’s turnover recorded on the past 4 years would be extrapolated to 
the following years. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Except for item Accounts payable that was tied to the company’s total expenses 
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Current Assets % Revenues Current Liabilities % Revenues
Restricted Cash 1% Accounts Payable 5%
Accounts Receivable 5% Air traffic liability 10%
Fuel Invetory 2% Accrued compensation and vacation 4%
Materials and supplies 1% Accrued taxes 2%
Prepaid expenses and other 3% Frequent Flyer deferred revenue 5%
Deferred Income Tax 1% Fuel Card Obligation 1%
Other accrued liabilities 3%
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As previously explained, airline carriers with substantial size are able to generate very 
efficient operational cycles taking advantage of the fact that they can swiftly get cash inflows 
from Delta’s clients and customers (i.e. through reservation of travel tickets, prior to offering 
its transportation services), compared to the coverage of short term obligations. Therefore, 
Delta’s net working capital has been negative and it will keep that same trend, becoming an 
important source of funding for the company’s operations. 
 As Figure 35 depicts, this analysis projects that for each year Delta’s net working 
capital decreases on average $238 million, reaching therefore  - $8.8 billion by the end of the 
explicit period. 
!
Figure 35: Net Working capital projections for the forecasted period 
Leverage 
 
During the explicit period, this analysis assumes that Delta’s leverage will be 
maintained at the current level of indebtedness. In fact, Delta’s current debt-to-equity ratio 
(market values) is 1.48, which is apparently high when compared to other industries, but 
comparatively lower within the airline sector. Taking into account US Airways and United 
Airlines – deemed as the most similar companies in terms of scale and market segment –, 
Delta presents a stronger financial position by recording a lower debt-to-equity ratio (148%) 
and also a lower debt-to-capital ratio (59.7%). For that reason, this analysis assumes that 
Delta will present these debt ratios for the next several years, this being as an important 
input for the company’s cost of capital and, consequently, the company’s valuation process. 
Table 7 depicts the financial position of those 3 comparable firms and reiterates Delta’s 
improved financial outlook. 
Also important to mention, when it comes to long-term interest bearing debt, this 
analysis has been sensible to the fact that over the past 4 years Delta was able to reduce it 
in terms of long-term assets (e.g. PP&E plus intangible assets). Indeed, from 2009 to 2012, 
the company reduced the ratio 46-percentage points, dropping from 77% to 31%. 
Consequently, during the explicit period, this analysis assumes that long-term interest 
bearing debt will be kept at 31% of PP&E and intangible assets. 
Cost of Capital 
 
Delta Airlines, for being in the same industry as US Airways, will logically share some 
of the inputs already used to assess this company capital cost. 
 Firstly, when assessing the cost of equity – following the CAPM model –, a 2.7% will 
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yield of the last 4 years (2009-2012). Furthermore, operating in the same country entitles 
Delta to use a 5.6% risk premium according to Credit Suisse (2013) during the forecasted 
period. 
 Secondly, concerning beta computation, this analysis relied on the industry’s 
unlevered beta of 0.82 provided by Damodaran (2013a), being reflective of the intrinsic 
operational risk that any carrier incurs in the US. If one levers the industry’s based beta 
taking into consideration Delta’s indebtedness – reflected on a 1.48 debt-to-equity ratio –, a 
2.03 levered beta emerged, as explained in the following equation: 
 
!!"#"$"% = !!"#$%$&$' ∗ 1 +
!
! ⟺ !!"#"$"% = 0.82 ∗ 1 + 1.48 = 2.03 
 
After the previous computation, one is able to assess the firm’s cost of equity, which 
would be equal to 13.1% or the CAPM outcome as the following: 
 
!!"#$%& = 0.027 + 2.03 ∗ 0.056 = 0.0137 = 14.1% 
 
Finally, regarding the company’s cost of debt, the same approach used in US Airways 
case will be applied, by resorting to the company’s credit rating. According to S&P, Delta’s 
financial position was suffice to deserve a B+ rating, being 2 grade steps ahead US Airways 
due to a better financial situation. Subsequently, Delta Airlines will take advantage of a lower 
credit spread compared to US Airways, since its credit rating is matched to a 5.50% figure. 
Putting together this item with the risk free rate previously computed, Delta’s cost of debt is 
assumed to be 8.20%. 
By carrying both debt and equity on its capital structure, Delta’s capital structure will 
also be computed by taking into consideration the firm’s cost of equity and debt and 
weighting them at their respective capital weights. As previously stated, this analysis 
assumed that the company will sustain the current debt ratio during the next several years38, 
yielding a constant capital structure: debt and equity are expected to represent 59.7% and 
40.3%39 of the company’s capital respectively. By doing so, a 10.6% WACC will emerge and 
will serve as the rate at which the firm’s cash flows will be discounted when inferring its value. 
Finally, long-term sustainable growth rate is expected to be 2.5%, matching the long-
term growth rate for the US economy. 
Table 14, summarizes the valuation inputs necessary to undertake the next steps of 
this analysis: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Current weights are considered to be the target capital weights since no capital swings are expected to happen for the next several years. 
 
39 For the purpose of WACC calculation, debt and equity weight on the firm’s capital should be numbered at Market values. 




Table 14: Delta valuation inputs 
Valuation 
  
Taking into consideration all the valuation inputs (Table 15) and associated 
assumptions, the analysis concluded that Delta Airlines would be fairly valued at $20.5 billion 
(deeply exposed in Appendix 26). Splitting this value into equity and (net) debt value, one 
can conclude that after accounting for the latter item Delta’s equity amounted to $10.21 
billion or, dividing by its shares outstanding40, $12 per share. 
In order to check for the plausibility of the analysis outcome, one should align equity 
market value with equity fair value previously computed. 
If one accounts for the average Delta’s stock price during December 2012 – based on 
a $11.87 per share price – this company would have a market capitalization of $10.11 billion, 
which is fairly aligned with WACC valuation output. 
 
!
Table 15: Valuation Output using WACC 
 
Applying APV model to this analysis found the company’s unlevered value to be 
equal to $26 billion, yielded by an unlevered cost of capital of 7.3%. Regarding interest tax 
shields, following the assumption that Delta would not pay any income tax during the next 
several years, no interest tax shields are expected to be generated until 2022. However, 
Delta’s continuing value is assumed to face an effective tax rate of 30% - 5 percentage 
points below the statutory tax rate that a company like Delta would incur. By doing so, 
terminal value of interest tax shields are projected to be equal to $2.64 billion considering 
cost of debt to be a fair discount rate. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Delta Airlines had 851,590,992 shares outstanding as of December 2012. No stock buybacks are expected to occur throughout the analyzed 
period. 
Risk-free rate 2.70%
US risk premium 5.60%
Effective tax rate (terminal) 30.00%
Target (D/D+E) 59.70%
Cost of debt 8.20%
Unlevered Beta 0.82
Unlevered rate of return, equity 7.30%
Delta levered beta 2.03
Levered rate of return, equity 14.10%
WACC 10.60%
Long-term sustainable growth 2.50%
Millions
Enterprise Value $                           20.510
Debt, Mv $                           12.709
Cash & cash equivalents $                           2.416
Net Debt $                           10.293
Equity Value $                          10.217
Equity per share $                           12.00
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Finally, in order to enrich our APV estimation one should take into account the 
potential loss of value by carrying debt on this company’s capital structure. Most of the 
assumptions applied to US Airways are logically the same and will be shared in this case. 
The more debt the firm gets, the more likely is the potential event of a distress situation, 
where debt obligations might not be covered leading to a bankruptcy situation. For the 
purpose of CFD computations, since Delta has no publicly traded debt (i.e. bonds), one could 
not rely on their probability of default. For that reason, like US Airways, the analysis relied on 
the credit rating to assess it. 
On one hand, in this situation the analysis assumed that in case of a distress situation 
the company would loss 48.40% (32.6% ex-ante costs and 15.6% ex-post costs) of the 
unlevered firm value, reflecting all the specificities of the business that boost fundamentally 
ex-ante bankruptcy costs earlier explained. 
On the other hand, a B+ rated company would yield a 24.82% probability of default 
according to Damadoran’s framework (Appendix 12). 
APV model, based on the aforementioned inputs, found an enterprise value of $24.8 
billion, being over $4.3 billion when compared to WACC model conclusions. 
 
!" = !! + 1 − !! ∗ !" !"# − (!! ∗%!"# ∗ !!) 
 
!" = $26.0 + 1 − 0.2482 ∗ $2.6 − 0.2482 ∗ 0.4840 ∗ $26.0 = $24.8!!"##"$% 
 
 This gap is mainly generated by the difficulty of assessing a precise and exact 
probability of default for a company. As explained, Damodaran framework relies on average 
numbers and lacks timeliness, given that the relationship between credit rates and probability 
default is dynamic. Knowing that there is a lack of availability and applicability of alternate 
models to find the correct probability of a company’s default, and the method used across 
this analysis being somehow subjective, a sensitivity analysis should also be used. 
By modifying the probability of default, one can verify that enterprise value will vary. 
For the sake of consistency, this analysis will consider two other values for probability of 
default, which are the closest to Delta’s current credit rate (B and B-). 
Through Figure 36, one can confirm that as the probability of default moves towards 
higher values, CFD consequently increases leading to a decrease on enterprise value. Thus, 
when considering a 42.12% probability of default, CFD would equal $5.3 billion and 
enterprise value would rapidly converge towards WACC results, reaching a $22.3 billion 
figure being over $1.7 billion. In conclusion, these findings suggest that for Delta’s case a 
higher probability of default should be expected, surpassing what the framework provided. 
 
 




Figure 36: Sensitivity analysis adjusting probability of default, ceteris paribus 
Despite the existence of a gap between these 2 valuation models, this analysis will 
confidently use WACC results and truly believes that it reliably depicts the fair value of Delta 
Airlines. Hence, an enterprise value of $20.5 billion ($12 per share) will be considered 
throughout the following stages of this report. 
Relative Valuation 
 
Finally, this analysis has also resorted to relative valuation in order to check if WACC 
valuation is aligned with the market patterns. Once again, EV/EBITDA was the chosen 
multiple following the same reasoning appointed earlier, as well as the extent and 
composition of the peer group. 
The average multiple within the peer group was 5.4, yielding for Delta Airlines’ 
enterprise value a figure of $19.04 billion (Table 16). When compared to WACC results, one 
can conclude that multiples yield a lower valuation, being $1.46 billion below the previous 
model’s outcome. This gap may be explained by the fact that Delta Airlines presents different 




Table 16: Peer Group Multiples, Goldman Sachs 
! !














CFD Enterprise Value 
Goldman Sachs 2013E
Company Country Market Cap (millions) EV/EBITDA
United Cont'l Hldgs. USA $                          7.773 3.6
US Airways USA $                        2.108 5.5
Air France KLM France $                          2.731 4.8
IAG U.K $                          6.865 5.2
Lufthansa Germany $                          8.636 7.1
Turkish Airlines Turkey $                          5.874 5.9
Average $                          6.998 5.4





As previously explained, when performing a company valuation conclusions are 
drawn upon assumptions that are subject to some levels of uncertainty and, consequently, 
one should be open to relaxing some of the assumptions made. Therefore, it is useful to 
perform a ceteris paribus variation of the fundamental variables that stand behind the 
valuation outcome. As for the US Airways case, this analysis will marginally change drivers 
considered to be the most significant in the model with an impact on the final enterprise value, 
such as the annual revenue growth rate, long-term sustainable growth rate and the cost of 
capital. 
Table 17 summarizes the changes in equity value motivated by two key drivers. If a 
1-percentage point increase on annual revenue growth rate was allowed, equity value would 
increase by $2.2 billion or by 27.2%, whereas an opposite change would “destroy” $2.8 
billion, reflecting a high sensitivity of the valuation to changes in this variable. 
 
!
Table 17: Delta Valuation sensitivity analysis 
Conversely, changing the long-term growth rate would impact equity value through 
the weight of Terminal value. A conservative approach would set the growth of this variable 
evolving hand-in-hand with inflation (1.5%), yielding a 10% lower equity value when 
compared to the base value. On the other hand, an optimistic approach would set a 3.5% 
growth rate, which would bring an increment of $2.04 billion into this firm’s equity value. 
Finally, this sensitivity analysis also comprised the change in the firm’s cost of capital. 
The analysis considered 4 different scenarios with 4 different WACC, yielding respectively 
different valuations (Figure 37). It would be logically expected that the highest WACC 
considered (12.6%), would generate the lowest equity value ($7.59 billion). Simultaneously, 
the analysis found that a 1-percentage decrease would progressively increase that same 
value. On average, that effect would represent an increment of $1.4 billion, reflecting for that 
reason a moderate sensitivity of equity value to changes in the cost of capital.  
 
 










$          2.196 27,2%
$         (2.833) -19,5%
$          2.040 13,1%
$         (1.503) -10,0%
Change in Equity Value




Figure 37: Equity and enterprise value for different cost of capital 
!
7. Valuation of The Merged Company 
 
As previously introduced in the literature review, the value created by a merger and 
acquisition is the final outcome of an ongoing process, which began by valuing each of the 
involved firms independently – previously covered – having its finals steps when the 
combined firm is primarily valued without synergies, and on a further stage, valued with them. 
Logically, assessing the value of potential synergies, which consists in this analysis’ primarily 
goal, is derived from the difference between the two values obtained (Damodaran, 2005). 
7.1 Merged Firm Without Synergies 
 
Damodaran (2005) argues that the middle step to assess the potential value of 
synergies brought by mergers and acquisitions is to estimate the value of the combined firm 
by not regarding any improvement effect propelled by the deal. Therefore, one should add 
the values obtained for each firm by resorting to standalone valuation results. 
Resorting to the aforementioned academic suggestion, the value of the new firm 
comprising Delta and US Airways without synergies would total $25.3 billion when based on 
WACC findings. For this new merged firm, its respective equity value would amount to $12.5 
billion. 
 Taking into consideration the size disparity between the two players, it came as no 
surprise that Delta Airlines would represent 81% of the new company in terms of contribution 
to enterprise value, whereas US Airways would get a stake as high as 19%. 
 Conversely, when applying APV conclusions, this analysis found that the enterprise 
value for the merged firm would be higher than WACC valuation, since for standalone 
valuation it yielded a higher figure for both firms. For that reason, if one considers a value 
range based on the 3 scenarios yielded in the standalone valuation, this model generated an 
enterprise value for the combined firm from $27.9 billion to $31.4 billion. Table 18 and Table 
19 breakdown the total enterprise value of the merged firm without synergies. 
 










Enterprise Value Equity Value 





Table 18: Merged Firm enterprise value without synergies based on WACC model in millions 
!
Table 19: Merged Firm enterprise value without synergies based on APV model in millions 
7.2 Merged Firm With Synergies 
!
Synergies are considered to be the base reason for companies to resort to M&A, 
pursuing the belief that combined firms may generate a greater value from increasing 
opportunities that would not be achieved if the parts involved operated independently. Albeit 
executable, synergies are easy to conceptualize but hard to materialize into reality.    
       Theoretically, synergies might be split into two categories: operating – cost savings 
and revenue improvements within the operating activity of the combined company – and 
financial synergies. The present analysis will portray how Delta and US Airways, as a 
combined firm, might attain those synergies, taking into account the specificities of the 
business.  
Mergers and acquisitions, within the airline industry, have some tradition for some 
time now. Yet, they have been particularly important since 2000 coinciding with a very harsh 
period with regard to the industry’s profitability. As previously mentioned, airline carriers 
happen to seek M&A not only as a strategic way to fortify their position in the market, but 
also to fill the necessity to keep operating within sustainable financial borders. Increasing 
competition matched with growing operating expenses (i.e. labor and fuel burden) and a 
soften air travel demand, have brought carriers to dangerously operate under small margins. 
M&A, for that reason, provide airline carriers the opportunity to pool resources and 
share costs, thus enlarging their endurance against adverse market conditions.            
Simultaneously, within this sector M&A are known to generate benefits to the parts involved, 
such as the increase of the merged carrier’s network scope as well as its market power; and 
also the enhancement of its public image, by being perceived as a larger and stronger 
enterprise from customers’ perspective. 
M&A are often approached by the skeptics as a corporate measure to increase 
market power at the expense of customers’ welfare, by exploiting their willingness to pay and, 
due to lower levels of competition, reduce the quality level of the offered products and 
services. From the customers’ perspective, the last decade of M&A, within the US airline, 
shows no evidence that their welfare was damaged; rather, they faced better services 
EV % EV Equity Value
Delta Airlines $20,511 81.00% $10,218
US Airways $4,821 19.00% $2,304
Merged Firm $25,332 $12,522
WACC Valuation
EV
Min.  $24,870 
Max.  $22,235 
Min.  $6,489 
Max.  $5,666 
Min.  $31,359 
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provided by the smaller number of carriers. Indeed, consolidation brought higher levels of 
efficiency in services: mishandled baggage recorded the lowest rate in the last decade (2.97 
per 1000 passengers), on-time arrival rate represented the best figure in 18 years (83.7%), 
while the 1.1% flight cancellation rate was the best since 1995 (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 
2012). Moreover, efficiency improvements following mergers are not negatively offset by 
increased average fares. As it will be covered shortly, based on evidence and recent trends, 
M&A have not increased fares per se in the US. 
 Even if consolidation brings important synergies, one should not disregard several 
potential challenges for the success of a deal. Firstly, airline mergers turn out to be a 
complex process with regard to integration of workforces, organizational structures/cultures, 
aircraft fleet and IT systems. Secondly, any merger in the US market is subject to the  
Department of Justice (DOJ) antitrust review, which can potentially delay or even reject the 
completion of the deal. 
7.2.1 Financial Synergies 
!
Financial synergies may be materialized through either higher cash flows or a lower 
cost of capital or both (Damodaran, 2005). This analysis found that a potential merger 
between Delta Airlines and US Airways would generate financial synergies taking the form of 
higher cash flows. 
This analysis found that financial synergies associated with the deal would essentially 
be yielded from tax shields, due to the following evidences. Firstly, cash synergies would not 
be generated since both companies have similar low levels of cash slack and, above all, 
none of them have high-return projects in sight (due to the mature stage of the industry), 
requiring upfront investments. 
 Secondly, this analysis found that this merger would not generate value due to the 
high debt capacity per se. Indeed, both companies, from a standalone perspective, have 
tried to deleverage their businesses and have had few incentives to take on more debt, due 
to the fact of being already highly leveraged. Yet, one could expect that as the merged 
company gets a larger amount of owned assets, it would be able to use them as collaterals in 
future borrowing commitments and, eventually, reduce borrowing costs. 
 Seeing that both US Airways and Delta Airlines activities are identical and both 
operate in the same market, they would face similar features such as risk free rate, market 
risk premium, unlevered beta and long-term sustainable growth rate. 
 Based on weighted average of Delta and US Airways EBITDA, the combined firm 
capital structure was defined as being composed by 60.7% of debt and 39.3% of equity, 
which does not differentiate much from Delta’s initial position. Simultaneously, considering 
the fact that capital structure would not change drastically, this analysis assumed that the 
combined firm would face a beta of 2.03 (being equal to Delta’s), and consequently a cost of 
equity of 14.1%. When it comes to cost of debt, an 8.53% was applied by also considering 
each firm EBITDA weight.  
Finally, regarding taxes, it was assumed that the combined firm would record a 0% 
effective tax rate during the entire explicit period, whereas for the purpose of terminal value 
computations, the rate would be 30%. Indeed, a 0% effective tax rate is the result of the 
existence of a considerable amount of NOL carryforwards that Delta could use. As of 
December 2012, this company had $16.3 billion, which could still shield the consolidated 
income generated by the combined firm during the next several years. By doing so, the 
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combined firm would have consolidated income not subject to taxes, boosting the firm’s cash 
flows until 2022. 
Table 20 summarizes the combined firm’s cost of capital inputs, which altogether would 




Table 20: Combined Firm WACC inputs 
On the other hand, Table 21 portrays the cash flow improvement generated by the 
use of NOL carryforwards. On average, in each period, the combined firm would shield $131 
million, which would contribute overall to an improvement of $1.3 billion. Therefore, this 
analysis considers that a deal between these two companies would generate financial 
synergies as high as $1.3 billion. 
!
!
Table 21: Combined firm with financial synergies 
!
7.2.2 Operating cost Synergies 
!
The reduction of costs following a merger is one of the main synergies that managers 
use as the reason for the completion of such deals. Indeed, this type of synergy is the 
Cost of Capital Inputs DELTA US AIRWAYS Combined Firm
Risk-Free 2.68% 2.68% 2.68%
Market Premium 5.60% 5.60% 5.60%
Levered Beta 2.03 2.29 2.03
Unlevered Beta 0.82 0.82 0.82
Levered rate of return, equity 14.10% 15.50% 14.10%
Cost of Debt 8.20% 9.95% 8.50%
Tax rate 0.00% 16.00% 0.00%
Capital structure
D/(D+E) 59.70% 65.00% 60.70%
E/(D+E) 40.30% 35.00% 39.30%
WACC 10.57% 10.87% 10.71%
Long-term growth rate 2.50% 2.50% 2.50%
Year FCFF base case (millions) Improved FCFF (millions)
2013E 496$                              566$                           
2014E 1,427$                            1,515$                         
2015E 2,168$                            2,289$                         
2016E 2,109$                            2,221$                         
2017E 1,479$                            1,571$                         
2018E 1,181$                            1,257$                         
2019E 810$                              872$                           
2020E 1,276$                            1,322$                         
2021E 1,012$                            1,049$                         
2022E 823$                              853$                           
Terminal Value 13,144$                       
Enterpise Value 26,660$                       
Financial Synergies 1,328$                         
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easiest to estimate and the level of certainty of its achievement is quite high (Eccles et al., 
1999). Moreover, companies are generally more successful in achieving cost reductions than 
revenue enhancements, because the former have associated results that are tangible and 
often quick to execute, while the latter not only takes longer to realize, but also its execution 
is uncertain (Sirower & Sahni, 2006). 
Theoretically sustained, the merger between Delta Airlines and US Airways would go 
forward mainly because of the synergies generated at cost level. Besides the fact that 
mergers within the airline industry are fostered by the need to reduce the number of 
competitors in order to weather an adverse economic environment, a merger between these 
two players has the basic conditions to be propelled by cost savings. As Sirower & Sahni 
(2006) refer, costs synergies are likely to be significant when companies from the same 
industry and the same country are combined. 
 Figure 38 shows each firm’s capacity per geographic sector. Delta serves 4 regions 
(domestic, atlantic, latin and pacific), whereas US Airways operates in the same market 
except for pacific, where it has no presence. One can see that both companies have a very 
low level of complementary markets and a high level of overlapped regions: domestic is the 
most proeminent market for both companies with a high level of overlapped routes within the 
US territory, while international destinations are covered by both, with Delta having a more 
powerful presence in the market when compared to its counterpart. An hypothetical merger 
would not expand the airline to new markets but, rather, it would consolidate its positions 
within the already covered markets. 
!
!
Figure 38: ASM Capacity with segment breakdowns in 2012, Airline Data Project 
!
Based on that fact, cost synergies are expected to be high since the combined firm 
would engage in measures with the aim to reduce a duplicated structure. The following 
paragraphs will portray the effects on cost reductions after the deal. 
As explained, the realization of synergies associated to a merger are often expected 
to happen within a time range, with different timings according to their own nature. This 
analysis on Delta-US Airways merger believes that operating cost savings are projected to 
occur at two different paces: the first type of cost synergies – known as quick wins – are 
expected to produce a 0.25% annual decrease on operating expenses until 2019, whereas 
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The proposed merger would be able to attain a considerable portion of rapid and, to 
some extent, continuous cost savings at operating level. 
Firstly, the combined firm would be able – through the integration of both structures -  
to rationalize its administrative structure by reducing its duplicated overhead associated with 
back office activities such as those within finance, HR, control, and marketing departments. 
Although already depicted as difficult to achieve, those reductions would be partially attained 
through reallocation of tasks and people, and mainly through job cuts. It is believed that 
these jobs – necessary to the efficiency of the new company - would be easier to cut and 
legally handled when compared to jobs with higher bargaining power such as pilots and other 
cabin crew. 
Secondly, due to the similar marketing approach and brand positioning of these 
companies – whose marketing strategies were processed by identical channels –, this 
analysis believes that the combined firm would easily integrate marketing efforts and rapidly 
reduce commercial and marketing expenses. Therefore, the single marketing strategy would 
be reflected on a single network of stores/counters for selling tickets and provide assistance; 
single call centers; single commercial agreements with resellers and, finally, on a single 
brand to advertise.  
Finally, the combined firm would get rapid cost savings by reaping the benefits of the 
first stages of the network rationalization process. As explained, Delta and US Airways have 
a large overlap percentage of domestic and international routes, opening space for a 
comprehensive network restructuring. Therefore, by reducing the routes where both 
companies were simultaneously active and replacing them with a single presence, the 
combined firm would reduce the costs directly associated to the realization of those flights 




This merger would also generate cost savings whose expected delivery time is further 
ahead in the near future. Those synergies are believed to take longer due to their complexity, 
but they may bring larger savings for the combined firm. 
 Firstly, the merged firm would face considerable synergies by engaging in facility 
consolidation. On one hand, it would set a single headquarters (Delta headquarters would be 
chosen due to its larger size and more appropriate conditions for handling a larger 
organizational structure), eliminating duplicated costs required to maintain such large and 
complex buildings. On the other hand, it would engage in Airport facility consolidation by 
setting single maintenance facilities, airport check-in counters, gates and terminals. 
 Secondly, the firm would continue to engage in cost savings while rationalizing its 
network. A redesigned network with the absence of overlapped routes would make the 
combined firm lighter and more efficient. By reducing its capacity, the new firm would 
enhance its load factors compared to its individual past performance (e.g. in 2012 Delta and 
US Airways attained a 83.8% and 81.1% respectively), and to its main competitors. Moreover, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 A portion of a cabin crew member (e.g. pilots and flight attendants) salary is based on the number of landings and other variables. It is assumed 
that the variable portion is the one that can be reduced. This analysis assumes that no further salary reductions will be attained since those jobs 
are highly unionized and a salary reduction can lead to strikes, which would bring harmful consequences for the company. 
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the combined firm would eventually reduce its exposure to airport expenses associated with 
airport slots42. As firms merged, the combined firm would use the slots of only one of the 
sides, and engage in further savings. 
Thirdly, costs savings would also occur through fleet rationalization. This analysis 
believes that the combined firm would progressively “standardize” its fleet, by having a large 
portion of it using the same aircraft model or manufacturer and a small portion consisting of 
different airplanes. Both companies – from a standalone view - deeply rely on Boeing and 
Airbus equipment (Appendix 17 and Appendix 25), and a further standardization would be 
expected in order to reap all related benefits such as, lower maintenance costs; lower pilot 
training costs and easier crew scheduling. As explained earlier, network carriers have been 
focusing on this solution in the pursuit of lighter cost structures in order to replicate LCCs 
aggressive approaches; and for that reason, this new firm is expected to follow this trend.  
Lastly, following fleet and network rationalization, the combined firm would be able to 
renegotiate lease contracts and adjust the number of leased aircrafts required to operate in a 
much efficient network. Less aircrafts would be expected to be used due to the elimination of 
duplicated routes and, consequently, aircraft rent item is believed to decrease. 
 
!
Table 22: Operating cost synergies after the merger in millions 
 
Table 22 portrays the annual cost savings that would follow the merger and the total 
sum of those. From 2013 to 2019 – period where a 0.25% annual decrease is expected – the 
company is projected to save $970 million from what this analysis called quick wins. On the 
other hand, from 2020 to 2022, the company would reap a 0.5% decrease in its operating 
expenses by saving $974 million. This analysis, therefore, found that this merger could 
deliver cost synergies of $2.9 billion. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Right of operating in a certain airport. 
Year Annual Cost savings (millions) Improved DCFF (millions)
2013E 124$                               678$                             
2014E 129$                               1,620$                          
2015E 131$                               2,386$                          
2016E 136$                               2,312$                          
2017E 143$                               1,657$                          
2018E 150$                               1,338$                          
2019E 157$                               949$                             
2020E 320$                               1,463$                          
2021E 334$                               1,183$                          
2022E 349$                               980$                             
Terminal Value 15,087$                         
Enterpise Value 29,653$                         
Cost Synergies 2,993$                          
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7.2.3 Capital Expenditures 
!
For the sake of consistency, a redesigned network with the absence of overlapped 
routes would decrease the company's capital investment requirements, as the company 
would not need to expand its aircraft fleet. 
 This analysis, therefore, made some assumptions with regard to the combined firm’s 
capital expenditures strategy. Throughout the first five years (2013-2017), it is assumed that 
the company’s capex would equal the sum of both individual companies’ investment 
prospects and no savings are expected to happen. On one hand, both companies still 
needed to replace older aircrafts that have been in place during the 2000 decade, this being 
an investment that has been postponed due to their weak financial position throughout that 
period.  On the other hand, it is assumed that for the first five years, the combined firm, while 
pursuing fleet standardization in order to lower maintenance and training costs, would have 
to invest on the acquisition of identical aircrafts. 
 However, from 2018 to 2022, savings at this level are expected to happen. The 
absence of overlapped routes and substantial route rationalization would make the scale of 
the fleet prone to some adjustments. As of 2012, the combined firm would have 1047 
aircrafts (Figure 39) operating under the same carrier name that would be clearly above the 
industry average.  
 
Figure 39: Aircraft fleet of individual firms and combined firm as of 2012 
Therefore, in 2018 with less capital expenditures requirements, the combined firm 
would face a 5% decrease vis-à-vis the original projections – dropping from a figure of $3.1 
billion to $2.8 billion - and maintaining that same level thereafter. 
 Thus, at capex level, the combined firm is believed to generate synergies of $2 billion, 























Table 23: Capex potential savings 
!
7.2.4 Net working Capital 
!
Albeit larger and with a theoretically stronger bargaining power to deal with main 
suppliers and other stakeholders, this analysis assumed that no synergies at working capital 
level would be captured by the combined firm. 
 
7.2.5 Questioning the realization of revenue synergies 
!
The present analysis, by taking a conservative approach, believes that a potential 
merger between Delta Airlines and US Airways would not yield revenue enhancements. 
Albeit apparently too prudent, this assumption is supported by various studies which 
concluded that past airline mergers did not bring price increases nor the reduction of the 
fierce competition within this market. 
In the US Airline industry mergers are commonly seen as a way for the involved 
carriers to increase their fares, facing great revenue enhancements due to the fact that 
airfares turn out to be the main revenue driver. However, this school of thought is 
questionable and data shows different conclusions.  
When airfare growth is measured from 200443 to 2011, one concludes that the annual 
growth rate was quite modest (1.8%) (Figure 40), and when adjusted to inflation, airfares 
actually showed a decrease of roughly 1% per year.  
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43 The year before the first mega-merger between American West and US Airways. 
Year Annual Capex savings (millions) Improved DCFF (millions)
2013E -$                                    566$                               
2014E -$                                    1,515$                            
2015E -$                                    2,289$                            
2016E -$                                    2,221$                            
2017E -$                                    1,571$                            
2018E 155$                                1,341$                            
2019E 227$                                983$                               
2020E 221$                                1,419$                            
2021E 247$                                1,148$                            
2022E 280$                                955$                               
Terminal Value 14,703$                           
Enterpise Value 28,713$                           
Capex Synergies 2,052$                            




Figure 40: Index of quarterly average domestic airfares, Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
 
This is the result of the inability of merged firms to increase prices on their own, 
because the market is still very competitive (during the same period, 29 more routes were 
being served by more players). Studies show that even if the combined firm attempts to 
increase its fares in some markets, that upward adjustment would only lasts until other 
players retaliate (United States Government Accountability Office, 2008). Also, the presence 
of LCCs – mainly through Southwest and Jet Blue – prevented merged firms to increase 
prices and considering their faster growing pace, they will keep operating under a low-cost 
strategy, leaving no space for drastic airfare increases44.  
 Finally, this proposed agreement is essentially considered a cost-synergy driven 
merger, with few incentives to the generation of revenue enhancements. As explained, Delta 
and US Airways would merge in order to pool resources and share costs (which have been 
outpacing revenues over the last decade); moreover, Morrison and Winston (2000) argued 
that being able to raise prices is not a key factor in airline M&A decisions. 
 Given the recent historical inability of merged firms to increase fares in a sustained 
way during a considerable time window and also the fact that this proposed merger is 
supported by cost saving reasons, the present analysis will not – prudently – consider any 
revenue synergies after the completion of the deal. 
7.2.6 Integration Challenges and Regulatory reviews 
!
The next section portrays the costs the combined firm is likely to incur in order to 
integrate both structures within a single body as well as all direct costs involved with the deal 
itself. Moreover, it is crucial to cover the legal objections that might occur due to the fact that 
airline mergers are often a very sensitive case to the eyes of antitrust regulators. 
Integration Costs 
!
A merger, as shown, is prone to yield important synergies; however, there is a 
considerable number of barriers to the success of the deal and to the ability of the combined  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Historically based, the most recent mega-merger between United and Continental (2010) showed that airfares did not increase afterwards 
because of the deal and they simply followed the market fluctuations. In fact, only 4 cities experienced price increases, which is still residual when 
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firm for reaping the associated benefits. One of the major hurdles is the process of 
integrating the companies into a single body, which involves a substantial effort from 
managers, and also, a higher level of associated costs. 
Airline mergers integration processes tend to be complex at the operational level. For 
the Delta-US Airways merger, three main integration issues would arise, such as workforce, 
aircraft fleet and information technology processes and systems. 
 Firstly, workforce integration would be the main source of cost generation because it 
would be complex, involving the negotiation of new labor contracts and redefinition and 
reallocation some jobs. Besides, airline mergers often need the approval from the respective 
workforces, as by fearing salary reductions and cuts, they tend to be very reluctant to 
relinquish their original compensation conditions. Moreover, this deal would bring many 
challenges when integrating pilots seniority list – which defines salary and hierarchy 
progression –, creating tension between pilots from both sides. 
 Secondly, integration of the fleet of both companies also stands to be a relevant issue 
one ought to consider. Particularly in this case, Delta and US Airways share identical 
aircrafts, majorly relying on Airbus and Boeing equipment. In short/medium haul routes, both 
companies use Boeing 737x and Airbus A320x, while in long haul routes they commonly rely 
only on Boeing equipment such as Boeing 767x, 777x and 747x. Despite of similarities, there 
is a portion – though small – of both companies’ fleet that differs, which can raise integration 
problems at this level. 
 Thirdly, when it comes to the integration of information technology processes and 
systems, past mergers show that a full integration of those is time-consuming (it can reach 
2.5 years), due to the high complexity involved. Both Delta and US Airways keep a portion of 
their systems (back office, booking and reservations systems) in-house leaving other portion 
to outsourced parties. For that reason, a merger between those companies would create 
some integration problems at this level, because third parties would be involved hampering 
the process. 
Fourthly, additional hurdles to integration may arise due to the specificities of the 
merger agreement, which will be further analyzed (See 8.Acquisition). A merger of equals will 
most likely pose challenges at governance level, seeing that the board of directors and other 
institutional bodies within the combined firm will be shared by both companies’ managers. 
Consequently, distinct views about what future strategic paths the company should follow 
may emerge, leading to potential governance and leadership clashes. 
Finally, taking into consideration the main sources of integration problems and the 
extent to which the analyzed deal is sensible to each one of them, the present analysis 
considered integration costs based on the past trend of airline mergers. For that reason, it is 
assumed that integration costs would account for 10% of the total synergies. 
Regulatory reviews 
!
One of the biggest hurdles to overcome when pursuing the conclusion of the present 
deal would be the antitrust reviews and assessments carried out by international and 
domestic regulatory bodies, necessary to the completion of the merger. As mentioned before, 
in the US, any merger is subject to the review and approval of the DOJ. Particularly within 
the airline mergers, both DOJ and the Department of Transportation (DOT) would jointly 
assess the effect of the merger on competition within the American market. Indeed, this 
review has proven to be strict and rigorous along the past decade, as it has objected the 
realization of the proposed merger between United and US Airways in 2001 and the 
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acquisition of Continental by Northwest. However, the current deteriorating financial position 
of many carriers may compel regulators to adjust their criteria. 
Yet, each merger review is case specific and, for that reason, some facts should be 
weighted when deciding the legitimacy of this deal: there are facts that favor the agreement 
Delta-US Airways – particularly related to efficiency gains –, and other that may bring some 
questions about the competing environment left after the transaction. 
On one hand, DOJ would give credit to this deal due to some beneficial facts that are 
exogenous to it. Firstly, the US airline industry has become increasingly competitive both in 
domestic and international routes, being reflected by the fact that in 2011 more routes were 
served by a larger number of major competitors when compared to 2004 (Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, 2012). Moreover, the presence of LCCs (that often assures fierce competition and 
lower fares) is still growing and has increased in top markets since 1998. Consequently, this 
argument would favor the conclusion of the merger seeing that the likelihood of the combined 
firm charging higher prices and drastically restricting its output would be considerably low, 
considering its market competing forces. 
Secondly, as previously stated, studies have shown that the merger wave within this 
industry over the last decade has not brought a loss of service quality and a reduction on 
consumers’ welfare, as opposed to what is spread by common knowledge in this matter. 
Inversely, those mergers have brought better service seeing that operational statistics such 
as on-time arrivals, mishandled baggage and flight cancelations were at their best numbers 
for a considerable time window. Simultaneously, after this merger, customers would have an 
expanded route network and a more seamless travel experience. Subsequently, this analysis 
believes that in this matter, DOJ would also be expected to produce a positive judgment 
favoring the agreement. 
Thirdly, Delta and US Airways would argue that a merger would tackle overcapacity, 
which has been an industry’s problem since 2000 seriously damaging the companies’ 
profitability and financial health. The merger would reduce capacity, as the combined firm 
would eliminate duplicated and inefficient routes, assuring its capacity to better weather the 
economic pressures that an airline company has to face. 
On the other hand, this last fact could also play against the merged firm since its high 
overlapping portion of routes and geographic segments might threaten the market’s 
competitive scenario thus opening the way for the entry of new players. Simultaneously, this 
merged firm would become the largest American air carrier both in terms of ASM and RPM, 
which would draw attention and would lead to further questions and investigation from DOJ. 
 
Finally, even if the DOJ approved the merger, the combined firm may still be imposed 
requirements, limitations, costs and restrictions that might constraint some or all the 
synergies that were predicted in the previous section. Unfortunately, based on past mergers, 
those restrictions are often unpredictable and, consequently, will not be considered in this 
analysis. 
!
7.3 Merged Firm With Synergies 
!
Once all the sources of potential improvements are properly identified and valued, 
one can compute the merged firm value considering those synergies (Appendix 34). This 
analysis found an enterprise value with synergies based on the incorporation of 
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improvements at financial, operational and capex level into the company’s FCFF discounted 
at the combined WACC earlier computed. 
 
!
Table 24: Valuation of the Combined firm considering synergies in millions 
As Table 24 shows, the Delta-US Airways merger would generate an enterprise value 
of $31.1 billion (net of integration costs that would total $637 million), yielding a $5.7 billion 
boost from the base case enterprise value without synergies, or a 22.6% value increase.  
This analysis found that within the US airline industry, past mergers have successfully 
generated synergies of 3.9% to 6.5% of the combined firm’s revenue (Rich, 2012). 
Comparatively, this merger would generate synergies representing 8.6% of the combined 
revenues during the forecasted period. This analysis believes that the reasoning behind this 
relatively higher figure is due to the scale of the companies involved, which is considerably 
higher than any other merger agreement that has occurred within this sector. 
!
7.4 Distribution of Synergy Benefits 
!
This analysis found interesting to examine how much value both companies would 
capture after the merger agreement, according to the contribution of each to the generation 
of synergies. 
Firstly, financial synergies wise, one can conclude that both companies would benefit 
from this merger. On one hand, Delta would be able to shield a larger amount of income 
every year taking advantage of its $16 billion NOL of previous fiscal years, at no extra cost. 
On the other hand, US Airways would face a neutral tax rate, rather than its current effective 
tax rate of 16%. 
Secondly, because of its smaller network, US Airways had higher core costs45 than 
the average figures of the industry ($435 million more), which frequently turned out to be a 
competitive disadvantage for this company. By integrating itself in a larger network, the 
company would take advantage of Delta’s scope and scale and would be able to dilute much 
of those costs. Simultaneously, Delta’s need of capital investment in aircrafts within the next 
years would be somehow mitigated by the merger with US Airways, whose fleet is more 
standardized and modern. 
Thirdly, though this analysis is not considering any revenue enhancement following 
the merger, it is believed that the combined firm would strengthen its market scope within 
both domestic and international market. After the merger, the company would have 5 hubs 
(Salt Lake City, Cincinnati, Atlanta, Charlotte and Philadelphia as Appendix 13 shows), thus 
making the company capable of easily operating domestically coast-to-coast. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Operating expenses net of fuel and labor costs 
Enterprise Value 31,706$                
Cost Synergies 2,993$                  
Capex Synergies 2,052$                  
Financial Synergies 1,328$                  
Integration Costs 637$                     
Net Enterprise Value 31,068$                
Value added 22.6%





Figure 41: Distribution and sources of synergies in millions 
This analysis considers that synergies would be grasped by both parties based on 
their enterprise value weight on the total combined firm value, considering that it is believed 
this is the fairest way to distribute the value generated in accordance with each firm’s 
capabilities, scale and power. 
As previously analyzed, Delta Airlines represented 81% of the total enterprise value 
which would entitle this firm to a larger portion of the synergies ($4.6 billion), while US 
Airways would grasp $1.1 billion due to its 19% stake on the combined enterprise value. 
Indeed, this distribution would reflect fairness seeing that Delta, due to its scale and scope, 
would be the propeller of most synergies. Figure 41 shows graphically the value creation 
after this merger as well as its distribution. 
8. Acquisition 
!
The present analysis believes that an agreement between these two companies 
would follow a merger of equals (MOE) type of deal, due to the most recent trend in mega-
mergers in the US airline industry. In 2010, United and Continental – the most analogous 
case in terms of size – precisely followed this kind of agreement. 
 In a MOE, companies are expected to be combined differently from the perspective of 
a traditional merger/acquisition consisting of a larger acquirer and a small target as well as 
synergies premium payments involved. Conversely, under this kind of deal, one of the 
companies survives the transaction, and its stock will be used for the new combined firm to 
go forward. In this case, Delta would be the surviving firm – due to its scale – and a 
redesigned firm would emerge through the establishment of a holding (Delta-US Airways 
Group). For that reason, this new company would be governed jointly by Delta and US 
Airways boards and all value yielded from synergies would be directed to the shareholders of 
both companies, being distributed according to each firm’s weights on total enterprise value. 
Consequently, in spite of US Airways being formally named as target, it would be a part of 
the combined firm management and, for that reason, no premium control should be 
considered.  
 In fact, these strategic transactions are often simple without the need for complex 
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synergy premium upfront. Rather, as managers involved in MOE transactions usually argue, 
shareholders would face a premium that is reflected in a stronger and more capable 
combined entity. 
 More formally, this merger would be based on a stock-for-stock exchange, and a 
fixed exchange ratio would be established to enable the shareholders from each company to 
retain a certain ownership in accordance with the weight on the combined firm. 
 
8.1 Exchange ratio 
 
Through literature one can verify that the exchange ratio reflects the number of 
shares of the new entity (Delta-US Airways) that each firm’s shareholder is entitled to receive 
for each share he/she owns. Mathematically, in this case exchange ratio, is the division 
between the US Airways and Delta stock price. 
 This analysis looked at the historical average exchange ratio based on the daily close 
prices of both firms over a 2-year period46. As Table 25 shows, the analysis found different 
exchange ratios for distinct time ranges. As it can be verified, the shorter the period the 
larger the exchange ratio. This fact can be explained by a more positive record from US 
Airways stock over the most recent period when compared to its counterpart. Altogether, 
historical exchange ratio between these two firms ranged from 0.84 to 1.14 during the 
analyzed period. Thus, the proposed ratio for the consummation of the deal would be 
logically expected to fall within this interval. 
 
!
Table 25: Historical Exchange ratio between US Airways and Delta Airlines stock, Bloomberg 
Based on evidence of past mergers and the fact that US Airways stock has been 
positively performing over the last year, this analysis considers the deal’s exchange ratio as 
equal to the last ratio recorded in 2012, or in other words, 1.14. Therefore, US Airways 
shareholders would receive 1.14 shares of the new firm per each US Airways share, 
whereas the stock surviving company’s shareholders receives 1 share of the new firm for 
every share of Delta. 
 Once the exchange ratio is defined, one can answer to the question of which portion 
of ownership would be held by each firm. The deal would create a combined firm with 1.036 
billion shares outstanding (Delta’s shares outstanding of 851 million plus 185 million shares 




46 From 1st January 2010 to 31st December 2012 
Period Exchange Ratio











Table 26: Exchange ratio and ownership control 
As Table 26 shows, based on post-transaction shares outstanding allocated to each 
party, one can verify that Delta would own 82% of the new merged firm, whereas US Airways 
would grasp a 18% stake. Interestingly, these final ownership percentages are very similar to 
the individual enterprise value weights on the combined firm’s total enterprise value, whose 
distribution turned out to be 81% for Delta and 19% for US Airways. 
! !
US Airways Delta Delta-US Airways
Shares Outstanding (millions) 162.90                       851.591                  
Stand alone value of equity (millions) 2,304$                       10,218$                  12,522$                
Exchange ratio 1.14 1.00
Post-transaction Shares Outstanding (millions) 185.267 851.591                  1,037                    
% of Delta-US Airways Group 18% 82% 100%





Since the US airline deregulation process in 1978 - that brought incredible benefits to 
final consumers –, network carriers have seen a long troubled period of volatile profitability, 
leading to countless fiscal years of significant losses that ultimately led to the bankruptcy of 
many market players. In fact, an increasing competitive environment with very fierce players 
(e.g. LCCs) and unpredictable and often exogenous factors (e.g. jet fuel price and air travel 
demand), made the industry unable to bear such level of capacity and number of market 
players. Thus, it comes as no surprise that from the beginning of the new century, 51 US air 
carriers filed for bankruptcy and 13 of them occurred only in 2008. 
In response to such adverse set of conditions, airlines have relied on mergers and 
acquisitions to become more resilient and, jointly, enhance their profitability. Since 2001, 
reflecting that trend, the US airline passenger market saw considerable consolidation 
developments, as the number of the biggest market players dropped from 10 to 5. 
 
The proposed merger between Delta Airlines and US Airways would deepen the 
current consolidation trend within this industry and as it was shown, would generate 
additional value to both firms’ shareholders and consumers in general. 
 
As previously mentioned, an hypothetical merger between these 2 firms would be 
mainly supported on cost savings and efficiency reasons.  
On one hand, the combined firm would save resources at operational level 
throughout several years in areas such as: administrative and overhead, network and routes, 
facilities and aircraft equipment. As shown, this portion of synergies is expected to be as high 
as $2.9 billion.  
On the other hand, the merged firm would face lower capital requirements due to fleet 
rationalization, leading to $2 billion in Capex savings. Simultaneously, $1.3 billion would be 
attained through financial synergies propelled by Delta’s NOL carryforwards, shielding a 
higher income yielded by both firms.  
Yet, this paper predicted several integration problems that would particularly occur at 
workforce, information systems and air fleet level, which would justify earlier computed 
integration costs of $637 million. 
Overall, Delta-US Airways is expected to reach an enterprise value of $31 billion 
becoming the largest American air carrier operating in this market, holding major hubs in 
every part of the American territory. 
 
Lastly, it is necessary to reinforce that this hypothetical merger might have problems 
when facing antitrust reviews from regulatory entities, due to the large relevance of both firms 
in the US passenger airline market. Indeed, even considering the possibility of Delta-US 
Airways might absorb 37.1% of the market47 , it is still important to acknowledge the 
interesting findings that could be drawn from this paper with regard to both companies’ 






47 Measured in RPM. 






Economic and Industry data 
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Appendix 2: Inflation projections for the US, FAA 
GDP (trillions) Annual Growth
2007 13,134$                                  2.0%
2008 13,273$                                  1.1%
2009 12,761$                                  -3.9%
2010 12,986$                                  1.8%
2011 13,234$                                  1.9%
2012 13,528$                                  2.2%
2013E 13,764$                                  1.7%
2014E 14,118$                                  2.6%
2015E 14,594$                                  3.4%
2016E 15,026$                                  3.0%
2017E 15,428$                                  2.7%
2018E 15,809$                                  2.5%
2019E 16,196$                                  2.4%
2020E 16,602$                                  2.5%
2021E 17,018$                                  2.5%
2022E 17,445$                                  2.5%












































































































Appendix 5: Domestic and International Passenger Traffic in RPMs, Bureau of Transportation and Statistics 
!
!
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Appendix 9: Projections for Refiners' cost acquisition for a barrel and average price per gallon in dollars, FAA 
!
!
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Year Refiners' cost acquisition Average price per gallon
2013E 90.85$                     2.87$                      
2014E 86.78$                     2.75$                      
2015E 81.30$                     2.57$                      
2016E 83.46$                     2.64$                      
2017E 88.59$                     2.80$                      
2018E 91.92$                     2.91$                      
2019E 95.68$                     3.03$                      
2020E 98.75$                     3.12$                      
2021E 101.72$                    3.22$                      
2022E 104.42$                    3.30$                      




Appendix 10: Average fare based on domestic itineraries at 2013 dollars, Bureau of Transportation and Statistics 
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Appendix 11: Recent merger deals within the US Airline Industry, GAO 
!
!
Appendix 12: S&P rating and default spread by credit rating, Damodaran 2012 
!
Year Average Fare
1995 444$                       
1996 409$                       
1997 415$                       
1998 440$                       
1999 450$                       
2000 456$                       
2001 420$                       
2002 402$                       
2003 397$                       
2004 375$                       
2005 365$                       
2006 378$                       
2007 364$                       
2008 373$                       
2009 335$                       
2010 357$                       
2011 375$                       
2012 378$                       
Airline/Year 2000 2001 2005 2007 2009 2010 2012
Delta $ ASA and Comair $ Northwest
American $ TWA
US Airways $ American      West $ American
United $ Continental
Southwest $ Air Tran 




























Valuation: US Airways 
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   Total Operating revenues
Operating expenses
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
8,135$         8,183$         6,752$         7,645$         8,501$         8,979$         9,199$         9,522$         9,880$          10,241$        10,587$        10,926$        11,298$        11,691$         12,098$         12,532$         
2,698$         2,879$         2,503$         2,821$         3,061$         3,326$         3,427$         3,530$         3,639$          3,746$          3,838$          3,922$          4,017$          4,117$           4,218$           4,325$           
138$            144$            100$            149$            170$            155$            161$            168$            178$             187$             197$             208$             219$             230$              242$              255$              
729$            912$            1,103$         1,293$         1,323$         1,371$         1,464$         1,562$         1,668$          1,780$          1,901$          2,029$          2,166$          2,312$           2,468$           2,635$           
11,700$       12,118$       10,458$       11,908$       13,055$       13,831$       14,250$       14,782$       15,364$        15,955$        16,523$        17,085$        17,700$        18,350$         19,026$         19,747$         
Aircraft fuel and related taxes
Fuel hedging instruments
Salaries and related costs
2,630$         3,618$         1,863$         2,403$         3,400$         3,489$         3,100$         3,072$         2,991$          3,189$          3,505$          3,760$          4,055$          4,339$           4,634$           4,937$           
(245)$           356$            7$                -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                -$                 -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                   -$                   -$                   
2,302$         2,231$         2,165$         2,244$         2,272$         2,488$         2,670$         2,769$         2,878$          2,989$          3,095$          3,201$          3,316$          3,438$           3,564$           3,699$           
Express expenses 2,594$         3,049$         2,519$         2,729$         3,127$         3,162$         3,391$         3,517$         3,656$          3,797$          3,932$          4,065$          4,212$          4,366$           4,527$           4,699$           
Aircraft rent
Aircraft maintenance
727$            724$            695$            670$            646$            643$            916$            780$            670$             610$             568$             568$             568$             568$              568$              568$              
635$            783$            700$            661$            679$            672$            692$            828$            861$             894$             926$             957$             992$             1,028$           1,066$           1,107$           
Other rent and landing fees 536$            562$            560$            549$            555$            556$            659$            684$            710$             738$             764$             790$             811$             832$              853$              875$              
Selling expenses 453$            439$            382$            421$            454$            466$            517$            536$            557$             579$             599$             620$             632$             645$              658$              671$              
Special items, net 99$              76$              55$              5$                24$              34$              35$              57$              59$               62$               64$               66$               68$               71$                74$                76$                
Depreciation & amortization 189$            215$            242$            248$            237$            245$            340$            353$            367$             381$             394$             408$             425$             440$              457$              474$              
Goodwill Impairment
Other
-$                 622$            -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                -$                 -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                   -$                   -$                   
1,247$         1,243$         1,152$         1,197$         1,235$         1,220$         1,442$         1,496$         1,555$          1,615$          1,672$          1,729$          1,791$          1,857$           1,926$           1,999$           
    Total operating expenses
EBIT
11,168$       13,919$       10,341$       11,128$       12,630$       12,976$       13,762$       14,093$       14,306$        14,852$        15,520$        16,165$        16,870$        17,584$         18,327$         19,105$         





Total Non operating expenses
Income before taxes
   Income tax provision
Net Income
172$            83$              24$              13$              4$                2$                50$              29$              20$               20$               21$               24$               27$               24$                23$                23$                
(277)$           (258)$           (304)$           (329)$           (327)$           (343)$           (435)$          (466)$           (467)$            (463)$            (464)$            (456)$            (470)$            (486)$             (501)$             (517)$             
2$                (240)$           (81)$             37$              (13)$             122$            -$                -$                 -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                   -$                   -$                   
(103)$           (415)$           (361)$           (279)$           (336)$           (219)$           (386)$          (436)$           (447)$            (443)$            (443)$            (433)$            (442)$            (463)$             (479)$             (494)$             
429$            (2,216)$        (244)$           501$            89$              636$            102$            253$            612$             660$             560$             487$             387$             303$              220$              147$              
7$                -$                 (38)$             -$                 19$              -$                 16$              40$              98$               106$             90$               78$               62$               48$                35$                24$                
422$            (2,216)$        (206)$           501$            70$              636$            86$              212$            514$             554$             470$             409$             325$             254$              185$              124$              
Refiners' cost of acquisition
2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
91$         87$         81$         83$         89$         92$         96$         99$         102$       104$       
Average Price per gallon
Fuel Consumption (gallons in millions)
Aircraft Fuel expenses
2.80$      2.68$      2.51$      2.58$      2.73$      2.84$      2.95$      3.05$      3.14$      3.22$      
1,106      1,147      1,192      1,238      1,282      1,325      1,373      1,424      1,476      1,532      
3,100$    3,072$    2,991$    3,189$    3,505$    3,760$    4,055$    4,339$    4,634$    4,937$    






























Investment in Operating WC
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
2$                 186$             -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   
374$             293$             285$             311$             327$             298$             386$              401$              416$              432$              448$              463$              480$              497$              516$              535$              
3.2% 2.4% 2.7% 2.6% 2.5% 2.2% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7%
249$             201$             227$             231$             235$             300$             281$              291$              303$              314$              326$              337$              349$              362$              375$              389$              
2.1% 1.7% 2.2% 1.9% 1.8% 2.2% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
548$             684$             520$             508$             540$             608$             638$              662$              688$              715$              740$              765$              793$              822$              852$              885$              
5% 6% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5%
366$             797$             337$             386$             386$             366$             505$              517$              525$              545$              570$              593$              619$              646$              673$              701$              
3.1% 6.6% 3.2% 3.2% 3.0% 2.6% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7%
832$             698$             778$             861$             910$             1,054$          1,007$           1,044$           1,086$           1,127$           1,167$           1,207$           1,251$           1,297$           1,344$           1,395$           
7.1% 5.8% 7.4% 7.2% 7.0% 7.6% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1%
225$             158$             178$             245$             176$             258$             254$              263$              274$              284$              294$              304$              315$              327$              339$              352$              
1.9% 1.3% 1.7% 2.1% 1.3% 1.9% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8%
152$             142$             141$             149$             163$             181$             179$              183$              186$              193$              202$              210$              219$              229$              238$              248$              
1.3% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3%
859$             887$             853$             802$             1,089$          1,027$          1,076$           1,117$           1,161$           1,205$           1,248$           1,290$           1,337$           1,386$           1,437$           1,492$           
7.3% 7.3% 8.2% 6.7% 8.3% 7.4% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6%
(1,261)$        (1,318)$        (1,255)$        (1,393)$        (1,622)$        (1,680)$        (1,716)$          (1,771)$          (1,824)$          (1,893)$          (1,968)$          (2,040)$          (2,120)$          (2,203)$          (2,289)$          (2,379)$          
367$             (57)$             63$               (138)$           (229)$           (58)$             (36)$               (55)$               (53)$               (70)$               (74)$               (73)$               (80)$               (83)$               (86)$               (91)$               
























2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
 + Operating revenues 11,700$      12,118$      10,458$      11,908$      13,055$      13,831$      14,250$      14,782$      15,364$      15,955$      16,523$      17,085$      17,700$      18,350$      19,026$      19,747$      
 - Operating expenses 11,168$      13,919$      10,341$      11,128$      12,630$      12,976$      13,762$      14,093$      14,306$      14,852$      15,520$      16,165$      16,870$      17,584$      18,327$      19,105$      
 = Earnings before interests and Taxes (EBIT) 532$           (1,801)$       117$           780$           425$           855$           488$           689$           1,059$        1,103$        1,003$        920$           830$           765$           699$           642$           
 - Income tax provision 7$               -$                (38)$            -$                19$             -$                78$             110$           169$           176$           160$           147$           133$           122$           112$           103$           
 = After-tax EBIT 525$           (1,801)$       155$           780$           406$           855$           410$           579$           889$           926$           842$           773$           697$           643$           587$           539$           
 + Depreciation and Amortization 189$           215$           242$           248$           237$           245$           340$           353$           367$           381$           394$           408$           425$           440$           457$           474$           
 - Investment in Operating Working Capital 367$           (57)$            63$             (138)$          (229)$          (58)$            (36)$            (55)$            (53)$            (70)$            (74)$            (73)$            (80)$            (83)$            (86)$            (91)$            
 - Investment in Fixed Capital (269)$          915$           495$           (63)$            472$           844$           762$           540$           572$           589$           595$           606$           678$           672$           698$           731$           
 = Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF) 616$           (2,444)$       (161)$          1,229$        400$           314$           24$             447$           736$           788$           716$           647$           524$           494$           432$           373$           
Terminal Value 5,121$        
Discounted FCFF of Forecasted Period 21$             363$           540$           521$           428$           349$           254$           217$           171$           133$           
Disocounted FCFF of Terminal Value 1,825$        
Enterprise Value 4,821$        
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
 + Operating revenues 11,700$       12,118$       10,458$       11,908$       13,055$       13,831$       14,250$       14,782$       15,364$       15,955$       16,523$       17,085$       17,700$       18,350$       19,026$       19,747$       
 - Operating expenses 11,168$       13,919$       10,341$       11,128$       12,630$       12,976$       13,762$       14,093$       14,306$       14,852$       15,520$       16,165$       16,870$       17,584$       18,327$       19,105$       
 = Earnings before interests and Taxes (EBIT) 532$            (1,801)$        117$            780$            425$            855$            488$            689$            1,059$         1,103$         1,003$         920$            830$            765$            699$            642$            
 - Income tax provision 7$                -$                 (38)$             -$                 19$              -$                 78$              110$            169$            176$            160$            147$            133$            122$            112$            103$            
 = After-tax EBIT 525$            (1,801)$        155$            780$            406$            855$            410$            579$            889$            926$            842$            773$            697$            643$            587$            539$            
 + Depreciation and Amortization 189$            215$            242$            248$            237$            245$            340$            353$            367$            381$            394$            408$            425$            440$            457$            474$            
 - Investment in Operating Working Capital 367$            (57)$             63$              (138)$           (229)$           (58)$             (36)$             (55)$             (53)$             (70)$             (74)$             (73)$             (80)$             (83)$             (86)$             (91)$             
 - Investment in Fixed Capital (269)$           915$            495$            (63)$             472$            844$            762$            540$            572$            589$            595$            606$            678$            672$            698$            731$            
 = Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF) 616$            (2,444)$        (161)$           1,229$         400$            314$            24$              447$            736$            788$            716$            647$            524$            494$            432$            373$            
Terminal value 8,014$         
Discounted FCFF of Forecasted Period 22$              388$            597$            595$            504$            425$            320$            282$            230$            185$            
Discounted FCFF of Terminal Value 3,973$         
Value Unlevered 7,521$         












Appendix 21: Financial Distress costs and APV outcome in millions 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
Interest expenses 295$            277$            258$            304$            329$            327$            343$            435$            466$            467$            463$            464$            456$            470$            486$            501$            
Effective corporate tax rate 2% 0% -16% 0% 21% 0% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%
Interest Tax shields 6$                -$                 (41)$             -$                 69$              -$                 55$              70$              75$              75$              74$              74$              73$              75$              78$              80$              
Terminal Value 1,104$         
Discounted its Forecasted Period 50$              58$              56$              51$              46$              42$              38$              35$              33$              31$              
Discounted its Terminal Value 427$            
PV Interest Tax Shields 867$            
Value Unlevered 7,521$         
% Cost of Financial Distress 48.40%
Probability default 42.10%
Costs of Financial Distress 1,532$         
Enterprise Value 6,489.47$    
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Appendix 22: Delta Airlines Income Statement from 2007-2022 in millions
Operating Revenues






       Total operating revenues
Operating Expenses
18,522$        21,408$       23,843$       25,237$       25,893$         26,837$         27,886$         28,940$         29,950$         30,933$         31,995$         33,101$         34,236$         35,429$         
5,285$          5,850$         6,414$         6,570$         6,703$           6,904$           7,119$           7,328$           7,508$           7,673$           7,858$           8,054$           8,251$           8,460$           
23,807$        27,258$       30,257$       31,807$       32,596$         33,741$         35,005$         36,269$         37,459$         38,605$         39,853$         41,155$         42,487$         43,889$         
788$             850$            1,027$         990$            1,026$           1,076$           1,134$           1,195$           1,259$           1,326$           1,397$           1,470$           1,547$           1,628$           
3,468$          3,647$         3,831$         3,873$         4,134$           4,414$           4,711$           5,029$           5,369$           5,731$           6,118$           6,531$           6,972$           7,443$           




Aircraft Maintenance and outside repairs
Passenger commissions & other selling expenses
Contracted services
Depreciation and amortization




Restructuring and other items
Other
7,384$          7,594$         9,730$         10,150$       10,100$         10,773$         10,510$         11,223$         12,359$         13,282$         14,342$         13,824$         14,776$         15,749$         
6,838$          6,751$         6,894$         7,266$         7,551$           7,846$           8,170$           8,499$           8,817$           9,133$           9,474$           9,831$           10,201$         10,592$         
3,823$          4,305$         5,470$         5,647$         6,041$           6,277$           6,536$           6,799$           7,054$           7,306$           7,579$           7,865$           8,161$           8,474$           
1,434$          1,569$         1,765$         1,955$         2,033$           2,115$           2,199$           2,287$           2,379$           2,497$           2,622$           2,753$           2,891$           3,036$           
1,405$          1,509$         1,682$         1,590$         1,624$           1,687$           1,757$           1,827$           1,896$           1,963$           2,037$           2,114$           2,193$           2,277$           
1,595$          1,549$         1,642$         1,566$         1,624$           1,687$           1,757$           1,827$           1,896$           1,963$           2,037$           2,114$           2,193$           2,277$           
1,536$          1,511$         1,523$         1,565$         1,667$           1,667$           1,667$           1,667$           1,786$           1,786$           1,786$           1,786$           1,786$           1,786$           
1,289$          1,281$         1,281$         1,336$         1,359$           1,382$           1,406$           1,430$           1,458$           1,487$           1,517$           1,546$           1,576$           1,608$           
638$             673$            721$            732$            755$              785$              817$              850$              882$              913$              947$              983$              1,020$           1,059$           
-$                  313$            264$            372$            547$              569$              592$              616$              639$              662$              687$              713$              740$              768$              
480$             387$            298$            272$            502$              484$              473$              423$              373$              400$              400$              400$              400$              400$              
407$             450$            242$            452$            200$              200$              200$              100$              100$              50$                50$                50$                50$                50$                
1,558$          1,646$         1,628$         1,592$         1,861$           1,933$           2,013$           2,094$           2,173$           2,250$           2,334$           2,423$           2,514$           2,610$           
       Total operating expenses
EBIT
28,387$        29,538$       33,140$       34,495$       35,864$         37,404$         38,096$         39,642$         41,811$         43,693$         45,812$         46,402$         48,502$         50,685$         
0$                 0$                0$                0$                0$                  0$                  0$                  0$                  0$                  0$                  0$                  0$                  0$                  0$                  
(324)$            2,217$         1,975$         2,175$         1,893$           1,827$           2,754$           2,851$           2,276$           1,970$           1,556$           2,755$           2,504$           2,275$           
Other Income (Expenses)
Interest expense (908)$            (969)$           (901)$           (812)$           (909)$             (931)$             (949)$             (970)$             (991)$             (989)$             (1,009)$          (1,030)$          (1,053)$          (1,076)$          
Amortization of debt discount
Interest income






(370)$            (216)$           (193)$           (193)$           (193)$             (193)$             (193)$             (193)$             (193)$             (193)$             (193)$             (193)$             (193)$             (193)$             
27$               -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   
(83)$              (391)$           (68)$             (118)$           (56)$               (56)$               (56)$               (56)$               (56)$               (56)$               (56)$               (56)$               (56)$               (56)$               
77$               (33)$             (44)$             (27)$             (7)$                 (7)$                 (7)$                 (7)$                 (7)$                 (7)$                 (7)$                 (7)$                 (7)$                 (7)$                 
(1,257)$         (1,609)$        (1,206)$        (1,150)$        (1,164)$          (1,186)$          (1,205)$          (1,226)$          (1,247)$          (1,245)$          (1,265)$          (1,286)$          (1,308)$          (1,332)$          
(1,581)$         608$            769$            1,025$         729$              640$              1,549$           1,625$           1,029$           725$              292$              1,469$           1,196$           943$              
(344)$            15$              (85)$             16$              -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                   
(1,237)$         593$            854$            1,009$         729$              640$              1,549$           1,625$           1,029$           725$              292$              1,469$           1,196$           943$              









Appendix 24: Delta Airlines Net Working Capital 2007-2022 in millions 
2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
Refiners' cost of acquisition 91$              87$              81$              83$              89$              92$              96$              99$              102$            104$            
Average Price per gallon 2.87$           2.75$           2.57$           2.64$           2.80$           2.91$           3.03$           3.12$           3.22$           3.30$           
Fuel Consumption (gallons in millions) 3,769           3,923           4,085           4,249           4,409           4,566           4,737           4,424           4,591           4,766           
Aircraft Fuel expenses 10,100$       10,773$       10,510$       11,223$       12,359$       13,282$       14,342$       13,824$       14,776$       15,749$       
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
Restricted cash 423 409 305 375 375$            392$            409$            425$            441$            467$            484$            503$            522$            542$            
%revenues 1.5% 1.3% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0%
Accounts receivable 1,353$         1,456$         1,563$         1,693$         1,812$         1,883$         1,961$         2,040$         2,116$         2,192$         2,274$         2,359$         2,448$         2,542$         
%revenues 4.8% 4.6% 4.5% 4.6% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8%
Fuel Inventory -$                 -$                 168$            619$            644$            671$            684$            711$            750$            784$            822$            833$            870$            910$            
%expenses - - 0.5% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8%
Materials and supplies 327$            318$            367$            404$            407$            423$            441$            458$            475$            492$            511$            530$            550$            571$            
%revenues 1.2% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1%
Deferred Income tax 357$            318$            461$            463$            458$            476$            495$            515$            534$            554$            574$            596$            618$            642$            
%revenues 1.3% 1.0% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2%
Pre paid expenses and other 853$            1,159$         1,250$         1,344$         1,473$         1,530$         1,593$         1,657$         1,719$         1,781$         1,847$         1,917$         1,989$         2,065$         
%revenues 3.0% 3.6% 3.6% 3.7% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9%
Air Traffic liability 3,074$         3,306$         3,480$         3,696$         3,904$         4,056$         4,223$         4,393$         4,558$         4,721$         4,897$         5,082$         5,273$         5,475$         
%revenues 11.0% 10.4% 9.9% 10.1% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3% 10.3%
Accounts Payable 1,249$         1,713$         1,600$         2,293$         1,950$         2,096$         2,177$         2,346$         2,354$         2,458$         2,555$         2,659$         2,745$         2,855$         
%expenses 4.5% 5.4% 4.6% 6.3% 5.2% 5.3% 5.3% 5.5% 5.3% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4%
Frequent flyer deferred revenue 1,614$         1,690$         1,849$         1,806$         2,007$         2,085$         2,172$         2,259$         2,344$         2,427$         2,518$         2,613$         2,711$         2,815$         
%revenues 5.8% 5.3% 5.3% 4.9% 5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 5.3%
Accrued salaries and related benefits 1,037$         1,370$         1,367$         1,680$         1,510$         1,569$         1,634$         1,700$         1,763$         1,827$         1,895$         1,966$         2,040$         2,118$         
%revenues 3.7% 4.3% 3.9% 4.6% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Taxes payable 525$            579$            594$            585$            659$            685$            713$            742$            769$            797$            827$            858$            890$            924$            
%revenues 1.9% 1.8% 1.7% 1.6% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7%
Fuel Card obligation -$                 -$                 318$            455$            405$            421$            438$            456$            473$            490$            508$            528$            547$            568$            
%revenues 0.9% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1%
Other accrued liabilities 765$            654$            1,549$         1,128$         944$            981$            1,021$         1,062$         1,102$         1,142$         1,184$         1,229$         1,275$         1,324$         
%revenues 2.7% 2.1% 4.4% 3.1% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5%
Net working capital (4,951)$        (5,652)$        (6,643)$        (6,745)$        (6,210)$        (6,517)$        (6,797)$        (7,152)$        (7,327)$        (7,592)$       (7,871)$       (8,197)$       (8,485)$       (8,809)$       
Investment in operating WC (701)$           (991)$           (102)$           535$            (307)$           (279)$           (355)$           (175)$           (265)$          (280)$          (325)$          (288)$          (325)$          




Appendix 25: Delta Airlines Fleet Composition as of 2012 
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
 + Operating revenues 28,063$       31,755$       35,115$       36,670$       37,757$       39,230$       40,851$       42,493$       44,087$       45,663$       47,368$       49,156$       51,006$       52,960$       
 - Operating expenses 28,387$       29,538$       33,140$       34,495$       35,864$       37,404$       38,096$       39,642$       41,811$       43,693$       45,812$       46,402$       48,502$       50,685$       
 = Earnings before interests and Taxes (EBIT) (324)$           2,217$         1,975$         2,175$         1,893$         1,827$         2,754$         2,851$         2,276$         1,970$         1,556$         2,755$         2,504$         2,275$         
 - Income tax provision 344$            (15)$             85$              (16)$             -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                 
 = After-tax EBIT (668)$           2,232$         1,890$         2,191$         1,893$         1,827$         2,754$         2,851$         2,276$         1,970$         1,556$         2,755$         2,504$         2,275$         
 + Depreciation and Amortization 1,536$         1,511$         1,523$         1,565$         1,667$         1,667$         1,667$         1,667$         1,786$         1,786$         1,786$         1,786$         1,786$         1,786$         
 - Investment in Operating Working Capital (701)$           (701)$           (991)$           (102)$           535$            (307)$           (279)$           (355)$           (175)$           (265)$           (280)$           (325)$           (288)$           (325)$           
 - Investment in Fixed Capital 1,008$         2,026$         1,498$         1,962$         2,500$         2,500$         2,500$         2,500$         2,500$         2,500$         2,500$         2,500$         2,500$         2,500$         
 = Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF) 561$            2,418$         2,906$         1,896$         525$            1,300$         2,200$         2,373$         1,737$         1,520$         1,122$         2,366$         2,078$         1,885$         
Terminal Value 29,290$       
Discounted FCFF of Forecasted Period 475$            1,064$         1,628$         1,588$         1,051$         832$            555$            1,059$         841$            691$            
Discounted FCFF of Terminal Value 10,727$       
Enterprise Value 20,511$       




Appendix 27:Unlevered Value of the company in millions 
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Appendix 28: Interest Tax Shields 
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Appendix 29: Financial Distress Costs and APV outcome in millions
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
 + Operating revenues 28,063$       31,755$       35,115$         36,670$         37,757$         39,230$        40,851$          42,493$         44,087$        45,663$        47,368$        49,156$        51,006$        52,960$         
 - Operating expenses 28,387$       29,538$       33,140$         34,495$         35,864$         37,404$        38,096$          39,642$         41,811$        43,693$        45,812$        46,402$        48,502$        50,685$         
 = Earnings before interests and Taxes (EBIT) (324)$           2,217$         1,975$           2,175$           1,893$           1,827$          2,754$            2,851$           2,276$          1,970$          1,556$          2,755$          2,504$          2,275$           
 - Income tax provision 344$            (15)$             85$                (16)$               -$                   -$                  -$                    -$                   -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                   
 = After-tax EBIT (668)$           2,232$         1,890$           2,191$           1,893$           1,827$          2,754$            2,851$           2,276$          1,970$          1,556$          2,755$          2,504$          2,275$           
 + Depreciation and Amortization 1,536$         1,511$         1,523$           1,565$           1,667$           1,667$          1,667$            1,667$           1,786$          1,786$          1,786$          1,786$          1,786$          1,786$           
 - Investment in Operating Working Capital (701)$           (701)$           (991)$             (102)$             535$              (307)$            (279)$              (355)$             (175)$            (265)$            (280)$            (325)$            (288)$            (325)$             
 - Investment in Fixed Capital 1,008$         2,026$         1,498$           1,962$           2,500$           2,500$          2,500$            2,500$           2,500$          2,500$          2,500$          2,500$          2,500$          2,500$           
 = Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF) 561$            2,418$         2,906$           1,896$           525$              1,300$          2,200$            2,373$           1,737$          1,520$          1,122$          2,366$          2,078$          1,885$           
Terminal Value 29,290$         
Discounted FCFF of Forecasted Period 490$              1,130$          1,783$            1,792$           1,223$          998$             686$             1,350$          1,105$          935$              
Discounted FCFF of Terminal Value 14,520$         
Enterprise Value 26,010$         
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
Interest expenses 909$            969$            901$              812$              909$              931$             949$               970$              991$             989$             1,009$          1,030$          1,053$          1,076$           
Effective corporate tax rate 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Interest Tax shields -$                 -$                 -$                   -$                   -$                   -$                  -$                    -$                   -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                   
Terminal Value 5,805$           
Discounted its Forecasted Period -$                   -$                  -$                    -$                   -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                   
Discounted its Terminal Value 2,640$           
PV Interest Tax Shields 2,640$           
Value Unlevered 26,010$       
% Cost of Financial Distress 48.40%
Probability default 24.82%
Costs of Financial Distress 3,125$         
Enterprise Value 24,870$       
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Appendix 31: Financial synergies incorporated in FCFFs in millions. 
2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
 + Operating revenues 52,008$                54,012$                56,215$                58,447$                60,610$                62,747$                65,068$                67,506$                70,032$                72,707$                
 - Operating expenses 49,627$                51,496$                52,402$                54,494$                57,331$                59,858$                62,682$                63,986$                66,829$                69,790$                
 = Earnings before interests and Taxes (EBIT) 2,381$                  2,516$                  3,813$                  3,954$                  3,278$                  2,890$                  2,386$                  3,520$                  3,203$                  2,916$                  
 - Income tax provision -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         
 = After-tax EBIT 2,381$                  2,516$                  3,813$                  3,954$                  3,278$                  2,890$                  2,386$                  3,520$                  3,203$                  2,916$                  
 + Depreciation and Amortization 2,007$                  2,020$                  2,033$                  2,048$                  2,180$                  2,194$                  2,211$                  2,226$                  2,242$                  2,260$                  
 - Investment in Operating Working Capital 499$                     (362)$                    (332)$                    (425)$                    (250)$                    (337)$                    (359)$                    (408)$                    (374)$                    (416)$                    
 - Investment in Fixed Capital 3,262$                  3,040$                  3,072$                  3,089$                  3,095$                  3,106$                  3,178$                  3,172$                  3,198$                  3,231$                  
 = Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF) 627$                     1,857$                  3,106$                  3,337$                  2,613$                  2,315$                  1,778$                  2,983$                  2,622$                  2,361$                  
Terminal Value 34,411$                
Discounted FCFF of Forecasted Period 496$                     1,427$                  2,168$                  2,109$                  1,479$                  1,181$                  810$                     1,276$                  1,012$                  823$                     
Discounted FCFF of Terminal Value 12,552$                
Enterprise Value 25,332$                
2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
 + Operating revenues 52,008$                54,012$                56,215$                58,447$                60,610$                62,747$                65,068$                67,506$                70,032$                72,707$                
 = Earnings before interests and Taxes (EBIT) 2,381$                  2,516$                  3,813$                  3,954$                  3,278$                  2,890$                  2,386$                  3,520$                  3,203$                  2,916$                  
 - Income tax provision -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         
 = After-tax EBIT 2,381$                  2,516$                  3,813$                  3,954$                  3,278$                  2,890$                  2,386$                  3,520$                  3,203$                  2,916$                  
 + Depreciation and Amortization 2,007$                  2,020$                  2,033$                  2,048$                  2,180$                  2,194$                  2,211$                  2,226$                  2,242$                  2,260$                  
 - Investment in Operating Working Capital 499$                     (362)$                    (332)$                    (425)$                    (250)$                    (337)$                    (359)$                    (408)$                    (374)$                    (416)$                    
 - Investment in Fixed Capital 3,262$                  3,040$                  3,072$                  3,089$                  3,095$                  3,106$                  3,178$                  3,172$                  3,198$                  3,231$                  
 = Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF) 627$                     1,857$                  3,106$                  3,337$                  2,613$                  2,315$                  1,778$                  2,983$                  2,622$                  2,361$                  
Terminal Value 36,359$                
Discounted FCFF of Forecasted Period 566$                     1,515$                  2,289$                  2,221$                  1,571$                  1,257$                  872$                     1,322$                  1,049$                  853$                     
Discounted FCFF of Terminal Value 13,144$                
Enterprise Value 26,660$                
Enterprise Value w/synergies 25,332$                
Financial Synergies 1,328$                  








Appendix 33: Capex synergies incorporated in FCFFs in millions
2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
 + Operating revenues 52,008$                54,012$                56,215$                58,447$                60,610$                62,747$                65,068$                67,506$                70,032$                72,707$                
 - Operating expenses 49,503$                51,368$                52,271$                54,358$                57,188$                59,708$                62,525$                63,666$                66,495$                69,441$                
 = Earnings before interests and Taxes (EBIT) 2,505$                  2,645$                  3,944$                  4,090$                  3,422$                  3,040$                  2,543$                  3,840$                  3,537$                  3,265$                  
 - Income tax provision
 = After-tax EBIT 2,505$                  2,645$                  3,944$                  4,090$                  3,422$                  3,040$                  2,543$                  3,840$                  3,537$                  3,265$                  
 + Depreciation and Amortization 2,007$                  2,020$                  2,033$                  2,048$                  2,180$                  2,194$                  2,211$                  2,226$                  2,242$                  2,260$                  
 - Investment in Operating Working Capital 499$                     (362)$                    (332)$                    (425)$                    (250)$                    (337)$                    (359)$                    (408)$                    (374)$                    (416)$                    
 - Investment in Fixed Capital 3,262$                  3,040$                  3,072$                  3,089$                  3,095$                  3,106$                  3,178$                  3,172$                  3,198$                  3,231$                  
 = Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF) 751$                     1,986$                  3,237$                  3,473$                  2,757$                  2,464$                  1,935$                  3,303$                  2,956$                  2,710$                  
Terminal Value 41,733$                
Discounted FCFF of Forecasted Period 678$                     1,620$                  2,386$                  2,312$                  1,657$                  1,338$                  949$                     1,463$                  1,183$                  980$                     
Discounted FCFF of Terminal Value 15,087$                
Enterprise Value 29,653$                
Cost Synergies 2,993$                  
2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
 + Operating revenues 52,008$                54,012$                56,215$                58,447$                60,610$                62,747$                65,068$                67,506$                70,032$                72,707$                
 - Operating expenses 49,627$                51,496$                52,402$                54,494$                57,331$                59,858$                62,682$                63,986$                66,829$                69,790$                
 = Earnings before interests and Taxes (EBIT) 2,381$                  2,516$                  3,813$                  3,954$                  3,278$                  2,890$                  2,386$                  3,520$                  3,203$                  2,916$                  
 - Income tax provision -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         -$                         
 = After-tax EBIT 2,381$                  2,516$                  3,813$                  3,954$                  3,278$                  2,890$                  2,386$                  3,520$                  3,203$                  2,916$                  
 + Depreciation and Amortization 2,007$                  2,020$                  2,033$                  2,048$                  2,180$                  2,194$                  2,211$                  2,226$                  2,242$                  2,260$                  
 - Investment in Operating Working Capital 499$                     (362)$                    (332)$                    (425)$                    (250)$                    (337)$                    (359)$                    (408)$                    (374)$                    (416)$                    
 - Investment in Fixed Capital 3,262$                  3,040$                  3,072$                  3,089$                  3,095$                  2,951$                  2,951$                  2,951$                  2,951$                  2,951$                  
 = Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF) 627$                     1,857$                  3,106$                  3,337$                  2,613$                  2,470$                  2,005$                  3,204$                  2,868$                  2,641$                  
Terminal Value 40,672$                
Discounted FCFF of Forecasted Period 566$                     1,515$                  2,289$                  2,221$                  1,571$                  1,341$                  983$                     1,419$                  1,148$                  955$                     
Discounted FCFF of Terminal Value 14,703$                
Enterprise Value 28,713$                
Capex Synergies 2,052$                  












2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
 + Operating revenues 52,008$                54,012$                56,215$                58,447$                60,610$                62,747$                65,068$                67,506$                70,032$                72,707$                
 - Operating expenses 49,503$                51,368$                52,271$                54,358$                57,188$                59,708$                62,525$                63,666$                66,495$                69,441$                
 = Earnings before interests and Taxes (EBIT) 2,505$                  2,645$                  3,944$                  4,090$                  3,422$                  3,040$                  2,543$                  3,840$                  3,537$                  3,265$                  
 - Income tax provision
 = After-tax EBIT 2,505$                  2,645$                  3,944$                  4,090$                  3,422$                  3,040$                  2,543$                  3,840$                  3,537$                  3,265$                  
 + Depreciation and Amortization 2,007$                  2,020$                  2,033$                  2,048$                  2,180$                  2,194$                  2,211$                  2,226$                  2,242$                  2,260$                  
 - Investment in Operating Working Capital 499$                     (362)$                    (332)$                    (425)$                    (250)$                    (337)$                    (359)$                    (408)$                    (374)$                    (416)$                    
 - Investment in Fixed Capital 3,262$                  3,040$                  3,072$                  3,089$                  3,095$                  2,951$                  2,951$                  2,951$                  2,951$                  2,951$                  
 = Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF) 751$                     1,986$                  3,237$                  3,473$                  2,757$                  2,620$                  2,162$                  3,523$                  3,203$                  2,990$                  
Terminal Value 46,046$                
Discounted FCFF of Forecasted Period 678$                     1,620$                  2,386$                  2,312$                  1,657$                  1,423$                  1,060$                  1,561$                  1,282$                  1,081$                  
Discounted FCFF of Terminal Value 16,646$                
Enterprise Value 31,706$                
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